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Part I. 
This part is the first of the three parts of this research project. This is composed of two chapters. 
The goal of this part is to introduce the problem, situate it within the bigger literature of migration 
and inform of the possible contributions of this project.  
 
The first chapter will focus on providing a broad introduction and a review of the literature. I do 
this to be able to locate the concept of integration in a field that is as old as time. Migration has 
been an exercise that people have undertaken since time immemorial and because it is people 
that social scientists study, the literature is replete with contradictions and paradigm shifts. What 
I aim in this part is to establish where I am coming from.  
 
The second chapter then looks at the gaps in the literature, expounds on the theoretical and 
conceptual framework that I utilize in the project, explains the research questions and the 
significance of this project and introduce the methodology. The last part of the chapter also 
provides an introduction to the data collected.  
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Chapter 1: Broad Introduction and Review of Related Literature 
 
A. Introduction 
moved in and out of Japan even before the economic boom in the 1980s. Though relative to 
other OECD countries, Japan has a fairly small population of foreign residents, we see that 
population growing and growing each year. The continuous increase in the number of long-term 
and permanent residents in Japan which by 2016 is at 2.38 million suggests that contrary to 
existing beliefs, migrants are coming and are staying longer than they are expected to. 
Foreseeing a bigger need for workers for the upcoming Tokyo 2020 Olympics, Japan is poised to 
open its doors for more foreign workers. What the country fails however to recognize is that time 
and again, it has seen that many people do not simply go back once their contracts end many 
of the foreigners who came to Japan during the 1980s stayed. In light of the continuous increase 
in the number of foreign residents, a pressing issue has come to light: integration of foreign 
residents. The Japanese government has taken a particular way of trying to address this 
issue that is devolving tasks to local municipalities to provide services and implement policies 
aimed at promoting multicultural co-existence among foreign residents and Japanese locals. 
Amidst the celebration of the hope of a more accepting Japan through the efforts of the localities, 
one question remains unanswered: How integrated are foreign residents?  
 
This is the question I aim to answer. I situate this question in the context of the Filipino residents 
in Nagoya City. Filipino residents constitute one of the biggest foreign resident population in 
Japan. Nagoya City is comparable to a microcosm, reflecting the distribution of foreign residents 
at the national level. Further, Nagoya City is among the biggest and most populated cities in 
Japan, and the role of cities are becoming more highlighted as they are the first point of contact 
for many migrants and tensions between native-born and foreign-born residents are most felt in 
urban areas. Yet Nagoya City has been fairly unstudied compared to bigger cities such as Tokyo, 
Osaka and Kyoto. 
 
This project is divided into three parts and into nine chapters. The first part of this project sets out 
the framework by which I approach the research question. The first part includes Chapter 1 and 
2. In the first chapter, I set out to do the much-needed task of locating integration in the literature 
of migration. Doing so will assist me in defining and clearing out any misconceptions and 
convolutions to be able to utilize the concept as an analytical tool. Locating it will also tell me 
where this project comes in and in what fields of research this project can contribute to. In 
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Chapter 2 I present the conceptual framework with which I will set out to analyze and understand 
migrant integration. Building on the work done by integration researchers and filling in the gaps, I 
present a definition that I will be utilizing to answer the research questions that I also present in 
this chapter. I also specify my goals and the limitations of this project. Chapter 2 will also provide 
an account of the methodology that I utilize. Knowing the extent of integration of a group of 
migrants is a daunting task as there are so many facets and elements that have to be considered. 
I specify all these in this chapter.  
 
Chapters 3, 4 and 5 form the second part of this research. These chapters provide the context 
whereby I examine the integration of Filipino residents. Chapter 3 details the development of 
Japan s immigration policy, while Chapter 4 provides the historical foundation in understanding 
the Philippine migration to Japan. It is argued that the movement of people from Philippines to 
Japan is a reflection of the compounding effect of specific labor demand from Japan, and the 
labor export policy in the Philippines which helped shape a culture of migration. And in Chapter 5 
I introduce the case study of Nagoya City. What Nagoya City has been doing in terms of migrant 
integration is discussed in this chapter. It is argued that integration policy and goals provide the 
baseline with which integration outcomes of foreign residents are assessed. Integration policies 
; it sets the areas where 
foreign residents are allowed and not allowed. In Chapters 3, 4 and 5 I discuss the contextual 
factors that I argue impact the specific outcomes and patterns of integration that emerge. 
 
Finally, the third part of the project presents the findings. In Chapter 6, the data collected from 
the survey is presented to establish the individual characteristics of the respondents. This is 
important in understanding the individual characteristics of the Filipino residents and how these 
can possibly affect their outcomes and patterns of integration. Chapter 7 continues this by 
discussing the outcomes of integration in four different dimensions of integration. In this chapter, 
I argue that Filipino residents are experiencing an uneven integration, as they are more 
integrated in some dimensions than others. I argue that the numbers and statistics presented 
indicative of the integration levels of the respondents are a product of many contextual and 
individual factors including but not limited to the integration policies and approach of the local 
government, the context by which the Filipino residents came and settled in Nagoya City and the 
individual characteristics of the foreign residents. And finally, Chapter 8 utilizes the integration 
outcomes in the four dimensions of integration discussed in Chapter 8 to uncover patterns of 
integration. I explore how different factors impact pattern membership. Chapter 9 presents 
conclusions and ways forward.  
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Any discussion of integration begins with the much-needed task of locating the concept of 
integration in the development of migration theories. Locating integration in the literature will 
assist in clearing out any misconceptions and convolutions to be able to utilize the concept as an 
analytical tool. After locating the concept, I set out to disentangle the many definitions and 
measures that have already been discussed in the literature. This chapter will proceed as 
follows: first, I discuss the three main strands of theories in migrant integration and discuss how 
each of these strands develops as a response to the happenings in their time. The changes in 
migration and the continued influx of people led strands to be replaced by other strands of 
theories. The development in the literature of migration showed that there is no one path to 
migration. The purpose of this section is to explain how each of these strands is but one of the 
many p
 
 
In the following sections, I endeavor to assess the existing definitions of integration as well as 
measures already utilized in the literature. I look at two important components of integration: 
outcomes and patterns. Further, because migration is ever changing, I also take note of the 
recent developments in the literature including transnationalism, ethnic social ties and migrants  
agencies and work to understand how these can possibly impact integration. At the end of this 
chapter, I endeavor to point out the gaps and provide a definition of integration that I will be 
utilizing in this project.  
 
B. Literature Review 
Assimilation Theory 
Assimilation, as a concept used in the discussion of immigrant incorporation, has fallen largely 
out of favor for many researchers. It is used to explain the melting pot , a metaphor to describe a 
heterogeneous society becoming more and more homogenous as time progress. Initial 
conceptions of the concept have 
- (Park and Burgess 1969) which 
is inevitable (see Park and Burgess 1969, Alba and Nee 1997).  
 
Developed during the context of the racial segregation in the United States, it works from the 
-charged 
words used in the early conception of the concept of assimilation have been toned down, it is 
generally taken to mean as the process where members of immigrant groups will begin to reflect 
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the norms, values and various characteristics of their host countries. To understand better the 
development of the concept of assimilation, as well as to understand more thoroughly its 
meaning, I will discuss the three major theories of assimilation.  
 
The canonical theory of assimilation is associated with Milton Gordon s 1964 work titled 
. Gordon (1964), an 
American sociolo
and Nee 1997). The canonical theory of assimilation postulates that assimilation follows 
 
1. Acculturation or cultural or behavioral assimilation, which pertains to the change of cultural 
patterns to those of the host society 
2. Structural assimilation, or large-scale entrance into cliques, clubs and institutions of host 
society which operates on primary group level 
3. Marital assimilation, which refers to large-scale intermarriage 
4. Identificational assimilation, or the development of sense of peoplehood based exclusively 
on host society 
5. Attitude receptional assimilation, absence of prejudice 
6. Behavior receptional assimilation, or the absence of discrimination 
7. Civic assimilation, refers to absence of value and power conflict 
 
to dress and outward 
assimilation begins, according to Gordon, and once this begins all other stages of assimilation 
will follow. Simply, what Gordon s work postulates is that minority and majority groups follow a 
straight-line  convergence. 
 
rst, the 
-group framework. Since the conception 
of the canonical assimilation theory, the immigrant groups in the US have diversified and the 
society became more heterogeneous. Immigrants from Asia and the South America have 
compounded the racial divide.  
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The stre
when the dimensions of assimilation he theorizes about are taken as stages. This changes the 
rather static conception of assimilation into a dynamic process, a process that follows a 
- opularized by Herbert Gans (1992, 2007), sees 
assimilation as a process happening through many generations of immigrants, with each 
generation taking a step farther away from their ethnic culture and a step closer to the host 
 
 
What the straight-line convergence model of assimilation does not consider is that minority 
cultures are not static, in that in response to the various migration contexts and conditions, 
minority cultures can change (Alba and Nee 1997). In response, Gans (1992, 2007) proposed 
-
general concept of the intergenerational move towards assimilation. What Gans  modifications in 
the cannon suggest is that there are variations in the process of assimilation, and that the 
so-called bumps  represent that different adaptations minorities utilize to adapt to the 
circumstances. These can result from different structural circumstances such as discrimination, 
or access to resources or even interaction among these (Deaux 2006).  
 
However, such revisions on the theorization of the assimilation framework did not really stop 
researchers from declaring it dead (Glazer 1993). Times have changed and more and more 
ethnic groups are coming in and settling in. The assimilation theory seemed to not be adaptable 
to the American context anymore. Further, the assimilation theory has been criticized for being 
Anglo-conformist  and in light of the Civil Rights Movement in the 1960s, assimilation has been 
deemed not applicable anymore.  
 
In response to this, Alba and Nee (1997) proposed an extension of the assimilation theory to 
 s extension of 
the race-
 They 
argue that assimilation is continuing and evidenced by the continued blurring of ethnic divides in 
terms of ethnic economy, participation in the open labor market and spatial patterns. What they 
argue is that overtime immigrants still assimilate and slowly resemble the host society.  
 
Portes and Zhou (1993) and Portes and Rumbaut (2001, 2005) build on Gans (1992) work in 
their discussion on the assimilation of the so-
the new immigrants. New immigrants came from a much more varied socio-economic 
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background, during the period when demand for low-skilled and semi-skilled labor has dwindled 
down due to the changes in the economy of the United States (Xie and Greenman 2005). Portes 
and Zhou (1993) proposed t
segments which the immigrant population can assimilate into. Following this, Portes and 
Rumbaut (2001, 2005) recognized three paths of acculturation: Path 1 which follows the classical 
assimilation theory evidenced by increased acculturation; Path 2 is acculturation and 
assimilation into the urban lower class suggesting a downward assimilation as opposed to Path 
 
assimilation with the deliberate preservation of the minorities culture and norms.  
 
(2001, 2005) segmented assimilation theory 
(1997) new assimilation theory, according to Waters et al (2010) lie in which 
mechanisms can lead to successful outcomes. Portes and Rumbaut (2001, 2005) notes that 
non-white poor immigrants would be better off maintaining their ethnic connections while Alba 
and Nee (1007) argue that over time, as both host society and immigrants begin to share similar 
historical processes, the differences between them will blur.  
 
Much of the empirical studies on assimilation theory have based their measures on the 
conceptualization of Gordon (1964) and on the succeeding revisions of theory by Alba and Nee 
(1997), Gans (1992, 2007) and Portes and Rumbaut (2001, 2005) (See for example, Williams 
1990, Dustmann 2000, Hum and Simpson 2000, Meng and Gregory 2005, Waters 2005, 
Greenman and Xie 2006, Xie and Greenman 2011). It is among these researches that canon 
measures about how certain outcomes can predict overall incorporation were developed.  
 
Early immigrant incorporation scholars working within the framework of classical migration 
theories that highlight the economic push and pull factors of migration have focused on the 
economic outcomes of immigrants in predicting successful integration (See for example Borjas 
1985, Dustmann 2000, Hum and Simpson 2000, Meng and Gregory 2005). For instance, 
measures of employment and earnings had been commonly utilized to determine how 
economically integrated immigrants are, and how different immigrant groups fare in comparison 
to locals. Studies show that earnings among immigrants are generally lower than those by locals 
and their earnings increase the more they assimilate (Borjas 1985, Dustmann 1993).  Human 
capital measures such as language proficiency and educational attainment of immigrants had 
often been cited as significant in predicting successful economic integration. Studies such as 
Dustmann (1993) 
participation in the labor force. There was also a focus on using citizenship and intermarriage as 
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important indicators of successful assimilation (Kantarevic 2004, Meng and Gregory 2005, Meng 
and Meurs 2006, Geurts and Lubbers 2017, di Belgiojoso 2016). Naturalization has been a 
common feature of many assimilation studies owing from Gordon  (1964) stages of 
acculturation. Naturalization and intermarriage signal successful assimilation of immigrants, 
especially in terms of economic assimilation, as these indicate that cultures are on the path to 
resembling each other. However, as studies show, naturalization does not necessarily mean the 
blurring of the distinctions of cultures nor does intermarriage mean complete assimilation. Many 
migrants are opting to lead more and more transnational and transcultural lives. 
 
The older strands along with the two new theories of assimilation have been tested extensively 
empirically as has been shown, and each time an extension of the theory is offered, suggesting 
that there is still no coherent umbrella explanation of the assimilation process of migrants. 
 
Multiculturalism 
In response to the growing number of immigrants, and to the more varied ethnic groups such as 
Mexicans, Asians and other non-white groups coming into the United States, researches have 
turned to multiculturalism. Multiculturalism is seen as a rejection of the melting pot  metaphor 
arguing an ideal wherein members can maintain their distinct ethnic collective identities and 
practices. By underlining the importance of ethnicity in the formation of identity, it disputes the 
claim of the assimilation theory that as the distance between the minority and the majority culture 
diminishes ethnicity will cease to be a factor in identity formation.  
 
Among the earlier proponents of multiculturalism is Charles Taylor (1992). He argues that the 
struggle for recognition can be resolved only through reciprocal recognition among equals 
(Taylor 1992). He pushes forward the idea that identity is always shaped and defined in relation 
to others and that therefore non-recognition is a serious injury to identity formation. He therefore 
sums up that people should adopt the presumption that all cultures are worth equally. Following 
Taylor (1992) is Will Kymlicka, a Canadian political philosopher, who to this day leads the 
multiculturalism discourse. According to Kymlicka (1995, 1999, 2007, 2013), cultures are 
valuable to individuals for two reasons: first, cultural membership is a precondition to personal 
autonomy in that cultures serve as contexts of choice. Cultures are the contexts by which people 
frame and pursue their goals. Second, echoing Taylor (1992), Kymlicka argues that culture has 
an important role in people s identities. Celebrating culture and diversity is often considered the 
hallmark of multiculturalism, focusing often on ethnic groups  familiar cultural markers (Kymlicka 
1999, 2007) such as clothing, cuisine or music.  
 
9 
 
With this is as the center of his argument, he establishes that minority groups are disadvantaged 
in terms of access and are therefore entitled to special protections. He bases this claim on luck 
egalitarianism  that states that individuals, while responsible for inequalities resulting from their 
own choices, should not be held accountable for those inequalities that arise from unchosen 
circumstances. Kymlicka (1999, 2007) argues that being born in the majority culture is luck  and 
that therefore the majority culture should contribute to rectifying the inequalities experienced by 
those in the minority culture by virtue of them being born into a minority culture. He further notes 
that anti-discrimination laws do not work because states are always going to be biased and 
never neutral towards other cultures. It is important however to note at this point that he does not 
argue that all types of minority groups are the same. For instance, he sees indigenous groups as 
needing the most recognition and migrants on the other hand have voluntarily relinquished their 
access to their native culture when they chose to migrate. And that a demand for fairer and just 
terms of integration rests on granting exemptions and accommodations.  
 
By the 1970s to mid-1990s, there was a clear trend among Western countries towards 
 
(Banting and Kymlicka 2013). As assimilation theories started failing to explain immigrant 
incorporation in the wake of more diverse immigration, multiculturalism theorists looked at more 
human development-centered and social justice policies, highlighting the need for more 
government interventions to protect minority and immigrant rights. A host of multicultural policies 
(MCPs) have been implemented by governments in Europe in particular to address the 
increasing number of diverse immigrant groups coming to the continent (Banting and Kymlicka 
2013).  
 
However, multiculturalism is not without criticisms. Even before national governments in Europe 
including Germany and Britain have declared the failure of multiculturalism, theorists and 
researchers have already begun discussing the inherent flaws in the theoretical conception of 
multiculturalism. First, critics argue that multiculturalism theories are premised on an essentialist 
view of culture , in that cultures are not isolated, distinct nor self-contained wholes but have since 
time immemorial been affected by interactions, influence through wars, trade and migration and 
technology. Jeremy Walden (1995) provides a very good illustration of this point by saying that 
fascinating anthropological experiment, but it involves an artificial dislocation from what actually 
 (1995, p.100). To aim to preserve a pure  culture runs the risk of 
essentializing that culture, making it unable to adapt experience changes in the world. Further, 
Walden (1995) rejects earlier claims by Kymlicka (1995) that culture provides the context of 
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choices by arguing that many meaningful choices may come from other cultures. Many can also 
fall victim to the 3Fs multiculturalism (fashion, food, festival) (Carruthers 2004). By essentializing 
culture and putting focus on the pure  culture that is often depicted as that which is different from 
the majority culture through fashion, food and festival, we run the risk of objectifying and 
consuming cultures.  
 
The second critique to multiculturalism theories is that what toleration requires is indifference not 
accommodation. This suggests that the idea of toleration of different cultures will lead not to 
accommodation but indifference. According to Kukathas (1995) there are no group rights, only 
individual rights and if the states, following multiculturalism theories of recognition, recognize 
group and cultural rights then it oversteps its role and undermines individual rights of association. 
Further, focusing on the group rather than on the individual may ignore the possible 
discrimination within the group and that therefore this politics of indifference stemming from 
tolerance will permit abuse of vulnerable members of the group and will create 
which bring up children unschooled and illiterate; which enforce arranged marriages; which deny 
conventional medical care to their members (including children); and which inflict cruel and 
unusual  (Kukathas 2003, 134). Among these are the concerns brought up by 
Germany and Britain when they declared that multiculturalism has failed.  
 
The third criticism points to multiculturalism s argument on the need for recognition. Critiques 
have argued that this shifts the view from a politics of redistribution  to a politics of recognition . 
What it does is while it does indeed challenge inequality, it only asks for a simple remedy and 
that is cultural and symbolic change. This ignores the actual problem of economic inequality and 
exploitation of which the remedy is economic restructuring (Miller 2006, van Parijs 2004). In a 
way, this can be seen as shifting the focus from a fight towards quantity of life  to quality of life  
in that for many minority groups, the most basic needs that should be addressed are those that 
pertain to shelter, housing, subsistence and that by putting the focus on quality  or recognition, 
multiculturalism runs the risk of skipping over addressing the more basic issues. Issues of which 
pertain to more basic needs that are important to be able to negotiate fairer terms and positions 
vis-à-vis the majority culture.  
 
The biggest challenge to multiculturalism however may not be philosophical. Those criticisms 
aside, there was a massive political retreat from multiculturalism, even a backlash against 
immigrant multicultural policies. While there are no empirical evidences showing that 
governments have retreated and removed multiculturalism policies for immigrants (Banting and 
Kymlicka 2013), this backlash is most salient in terms of concerns about lack of social unity and 
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increasing tensions among diverse groups as what is currently unfolding in many countries in 
Australia and in Western Europe including Germany, Britain and France. Western European 
governments have called multiculturalism as promoting division and separation, contrary to what 
it was conceptualized to stand for, for integration and unity.  
 
Integration 
The supposed failure of multiculturalism has led many migration theorists to rethink what they 
know of the integration process. The shift from assimilation to multiculturalism has also shifted 
the way the integration of migrants is understood for one, from economic-focused outcomes to 
more human-centered outcomes. However, as we saw, the focus on recognition  of differences 
has taken for granted the need for redistribution  to facilitate fairness and justice and break 
economic inequalities. And on the other, it also showed that an over-emphasis on outcomes at 
the level of either the micro (migrants) or the macro (relations between migrants and host 
society) can be counterproductive.   
 
As what we have seen, assimilation with its discriminatory undertones has fallen out of favor. 
Further its inability to explain the increasing variety of minorities coming into the United States 
after 1965 have rendered assimilation somewhat useless. The following years saw the increase 
in popularity of multiculturalism, however the backlash against the concept spurred by the 
increasing income divide between minorities and native-born residents in the West such as in the 
United Kingdom and Germany, as well as changes in the world that saw younger people finding 
it hard to keep jobs and buy properties, created somewhat a negative sentiment against 
minorities as foreigners who are coming in to take away jobs. Further, the heightened negative 
ideas about Muslims have changed the way many countries approach immigration. What 
policymakers and researchers point to is the inability of multiculturalism as both a concept and as 
a methodology guiding policymaking to be adaptable to current circumstances. In response, 
researches have shifted to the usage of integration as a way of understanding the incorporation 
of migrants.  
 
One big problem however with the usage of integration is how to define it and its components. 
Recently, migrant integration researchers have been putting emphasis on the importance of both 
macro and micro approaches and that by understanding integration from this perspective, 
assimilation and multiculturalism become two of the possible trajectories or approaches to 
integration (Schunk 2014, Garcés-Mascareñas and Penninx 2015). Hartmut Esser (2004), a 
German sociologist and head of the Mannheim Center for European Social Research, offers in 
response a general model of immigrant integration. His approach is a combination of economic 
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and sociology and he has contributed significantly in the field of empirical social research. Esser 
(2004) notes that integration has three key components. The first component specifies the 
individual migrants  courses of action. The second component links these actions to the 
structural conditions that migrants may face in the host society. In short this refers to the 
inclusion (or exclusion) to social subsystems and patterns of social differentiation that are 
reflected in the integration outcomes of individual migrants. While the third component indicates 
what and how specific patterns of integration arise given how individuals act in different 
situations with different opportunities and restrictions (Schunk 2014). The assumption of this 
model is that migrants are individuals who migrated to improve their outcomes, whether it be 
economic, educational or any type of outcome. Migrating, they choose to integrate or not to 
integrate into a core  referring to the host society depending on whether they think that 
integrating is going to improve their outcomes or not. Therefore, in this view, integration is an 
investment decision. As such, opportunities and restrictions at the contextual level become 
crucial factors that will determine the outcomes and patterns of integration of the individual 
migrant. And as such contextual factors constitute the structural frame for individual actions  
(Schunk 2014, p.32).  
 
All three components are highly related. Actions specified by the first component are linked to the 
structural conditions defined in the second component, and the access to these structural 
conditions can determine the specific patterns of integration as shown in the third component. 
Therefore, this theory claims that assimilation and its variants such as segmented assimilation 
are but among the many possible patterns that can come up because of different circumstances 
which include both structural and agential circumstances. Schunk (2014) notes that by 
understanding integration in this way, the door is open for a more analytical approach to 
immigrant integration, relieving it of its normative image.  
 
The recent literature saw an explosion of debate regarding whether integration is an outcome or 
a process. This debate fails to acknowledge that it can be both, as Esser (2004) argues in that 
integration as an outcome pertains to the first component or the inclusion or exclusion of a 
migrant into certain social subsystems and that as a process pertains to the second component 
or the specific patterns of social differentiation that can arise given the inclusion or exclusion into 
the subsystems.  
 
While researchers do agree that integration is two-way, meaning that it involves both migrants 
and the receiving society, there is still a debate whether it is an outcome or a process. Knowing 
now that these are linked, let us assess these studies in turn. Researches understanding 
13 
 
integration as policy outcomes have sprouted recently including Garcés-Mascareñas and 
Penninx s (2015) dimensions of policies for integration, Koopman et al s (2005) citizenship index 
and the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX 2004). On the other hand, those understanding 
integration as a process that is affected by both individuals and structures include theoretical 
works from Portes and Rumbaut (2006) study on modes of incorporation, Berry s (1992, 1997, 
2007, 2011) dimensions of integration and the subsequent work of Bosswick and Heckmann 
(2006) adapting it to the context of Europe, as well as the empirical works from Joppke (2007) 
comparing integration models among the Netherlands, France and Germany, Sheringham 
(2009) on Brazilian immigrants in Ireland and Hellgren (2015) on immigrants in Sweden and 
Spain. 
 
Studies that focus on integration policies, or as an outcome of migrants  inclusion or exclusion 
into social subsystems, often put focus on the existence and effectiveness of policies for 
immigrant integration. More often than not integration policies include basic legal and social 
protection, formal naturalization and citizenship rights or in the absence of such rights 
residence-based rights, antidiscrimination laws, laws on equal access to opportunities, rights to 
organize, policies on public housing, law and order, multicultural education policy, laws on 
tolerating cultural practices, and language and cultural courses (Favell 2003). We see these 
reflected in big indices assessing policies of different countries. For instance, the MIPEX, first 
published in 2004, measures 167 indicators in eight policy areas in 38 countries. MIPEX 
measures outcomes in terms of labor market mobility, education, political participation, access to 
nationality, family reunion, health, permanent residence and anti-discrimination. On the other 
hand, the European Commission (2011) looks at four policy areas including employment, 
education, social inclusion and active citizenship and assesses progressiveness of integration 
policies based on 14 indicators including but not limited to employment and unemployment rates, 
education attainments, income and naturalization rates.  
 
What we see given those lists is a conflation of individual outcomes with supposed policy 
outcomes. This is exactly what Goodman (2015) and Helbling (2013) note in their critique 
towards integration policies. Individual outcomes such as employment rates or drop-out rates 
may be affected by policies but may also be affected by many other circumstances such as 
physical disability, motivations, preference among others. While a low employment rate among 
migrants may suggest a discriminatory labor market to migrants, such a suggestion is incomplete. 
At the same time, policies may have unintended consequences  which indices looking at policy 
measures cannot assess.  
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While still being widely used and becoming bases for Europe s assessment of its approach to 
migrants, and recently refugees, there is a call for a focus on the process rather than on 
outcomes. A focus on process, or on the specific patterns of integration according to Hellgren 
(2015) takes into consideration the many actors involved in the integration of migrants, the 
policies and programs that either facilitate or limit their participation into different areas of the 
society, including migrant organizations that may have more mobilizing resources to campaign 
for recognition and representation, while at the same time a focus on process can see the 
agencies and histories of migrants and how these impact their integration. However, to be able to 
study integration as a process is an ambitious endeavor and even integration scholars (Penninx 
2005) recognize this, hence the lack of empirical studies.  
 
Understanding integration in terms of dimensions and its corresponding outcomes is important in 
describing an actor s inclusion or exclusion from social subsystems. This is important in 
providing nuances in the extent of integration based on the migrants  experiences. Esser (2004), 
Bosswick and Heckmann (2006) and Garcés-Mascareñas and Penninx (2015) offered ways on 
how to utilize integration as an analytical concept. Though differing in the terminologies used, all 
agreed that integration is multi-dimensional. While slightly differing in labels, the dimensions that 
they suggest are comparable. Esser s (2004) Placement, Berry s (2011) Structural and 
Garcés-Mascareñas and Penninx  (2015) Socio-economic integration dimensions refer to the 
access to the core institutions of the host society such as the labor market, housing systems, 
welfare and social protection systems, citizenship and residence. These, as we have seen 
previously, are among the most commonly measured outcomes in various policy indices 
including the MIPEX (2004) and the European Commission index (2011).  These are 
considered core structures according to the European Forum for Migration Studies (2006) 
-economic status, the opportunity structure 
The table below compares 
the dimensions of integration as discussed by Esser (2004), Berry (2011) and 
Garcés-Mascareñas and Penninx (2015).  
 
Table 1.1. Dimensions of integration 
Esser (2004) Berry (2011) Garcés-Mascareñas and 
Penninx (2015) 
Placement Structural Socio-Economic 
Culturation Cultural Cultural/Religious 
Interaction Interactive 
Identification Identificational Legal/Political 
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On the other hand, Esser s (2004) Cultural, Berry s (2011) Cultural and Garcés-Mascareñas and 
Penninx  (2015) Cultural/Religious integration dimensions represent changes in mindset and 
behavior towards the host society often seen in language acquisition and perceptions about the 
host society and the migrant s position in the host society. However cultural integration also has 
an economic function. Algan et al (2012) note that, cultural integration facilitates trade across 
 in that the incentives for an individual belonging to the minority cultural group to 
assimilate and adopt the culture of the majority are then directly related to the expected gains 
. 
  
Interactive integration in Berry s (2011) terminology and Interaction in Esser s (2004) refer to the 
inclusion or acceptance of foreign residents into the primary relations and various social 
networks in the society (Bosswick and Heckmann 2006). Bosswick and Heckmann (2006) note 
that these relations include friendships, partnerships and memberships in different organizations. 
Interactions can help revise and shape prejudices and stereotypes and slowly allow the creation 
of a collective that can represent the minority group in the host society to be able to negotiate 
better the terms of their membership (Nagel and Staeheli 2008). Interactions can help revise and 
shape prejudices and stereotypes and slowly allow the creation of a collective that can represent 
the minority group in the host society to be able to negotiate better the terms of their membership. 
Such interactions at different levels become important especially in cases when a foreign 
resident is not employed, not studying or not involved in any activity where he or she can meet 
people from different ethnic backgrounds and understand more about the host culture.  
. 
And finally, the last dimension refers to identification with a certain social structure, whether it be 
with the host society, or the ethnic community or other ethnic communities. In terms of immigrant 
integration however, the focus is on the perception of belongingness or the degree to which the 
migrant identifies with the dominant culture. Hence identificational integration is crucial in identity 
formation, and its role in interacting with gains and losses is associated with integrating into the 
host society (Akerlof and Kranton 2000). Developing identificational integration then is seen as 
an investment, an investment resulting from the weighing of gains and losses of the individual 
when he or she makes the choice to either integrate or not. The concept of identificational 
integration becomes doubly important when it comes to oppositional cultures. Talking about 
cultural identity, Akerlof and Kranton (2000) note that there are two concepts lying at the heart of 
oppositional cultures: social exclusion and lack of economic opportunities. Beginning from the 
well-argued sociological fact that majority define themselves by differentiating and excluding 
others, Akerlof and Kranton (2000) note that it is within this that minority cultures try to make their 
way in without betraying their own culture and belief systems. However complete opposition to 
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the majority culture may result in lack and loss of economic opportunities.  
 
While mostly similar, the main differences in the dimensions as discussed by Esser (2004) Berry 
(2011) and Garcés-Mascareñas and Penninx (2015) lie in their usage. Garcés-Mascareñas and 
Penninx (2015) for instance focus heavily on the structure side or the host society side of the 
two-way process. Penninx (2015) put focus on the policy directions and hence his focus on 
citizenship in the legal/political dimension. On the other hand, Esser s (2004) focuses heavily on 
the micro or on the migrant and Berry s (2011) dimensions put equal focus on the policies and 
how such policies may impact migrant outcomes. This has been demonstrated in Nagy s (2012) 
adaptation of Berry s dimensions of integration.  
 
As a process, we also see a number of studies offering classifications of paths to integration. 
Integration as a process can be understood in terms of Esser s (2004) third component. The third 
component that Esser (2004) mentions in his general theory of integration involves patterns of 
social inequality and social differentiation as described by their inclusion of exclusion from the 
social subsystems. Inclusion or exclusion in social subsystems which may rely on the 
approaches a state adopts in dealing with migrants can produce particular patterns of social 
inequality and differentiation, such as assimilation, or exclusion among others. Researchers 
have also tried to establish typologies of these patterns including Portes and Rumbaut (2001, 
2005), Esser (2004) and Berry (2011).  
 
Table below shows the correspondence among these typologies. We have previously discussed 
Portes and Rumbaut (2001, 2005) three patterns or paths of assimilation: Path 1 pertains to fully 
assimilated migrants, those who follow the classical assimilation theory. Path 2 are those 
migrants whose assimilation can be described as downward who experience full assimilation but 
engage with low socio-economic standing ethnic communities whose cultures are in opposition 
to the host society. Path 3 are those that are partially assimilated, in that while engaging with the 
host society they are still engaging with the ethnic community. This is still worth noting even 
though Portes and Rumbaut (2001, 2005) conceived of these typologies more in terms of the 
integration of second-generation immigrants. On the other hand, Esser (2004) and Berry (2011) 
offer related typologies. Esser (2004) discusses four patterns: multiple inclusion which refers to 
migrants who are integrated successfully to both ethnic community and host society; assimilation, 
those that are integrated into the host society and are not engaging with the ethnic community; 
integrate into the ethnic community and not into the host society. And Berry (2011) labels the 
four patterns Assimilation, Integration, Marginalization and Separation. 
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Table 1.2. Paths/Typologies of integration 
Portes and Rumbaut (2001, 
2005) 
Esser (2004) Berry (2011) 
Path 1 (Consonant 
acculturation) 
Assimilation Assimilation 
Multiple inclusion Integration 
Path 3 (Selective 
acculturation)  Marginalization Marginalization 
Path 2 (Dissonant 
acculturation) 
Segmentation Separation 
 
The matching that I have done may be called crude as these typologies have different units of 
assessments and that their conception somewhat differs among themselves. As what was earlier 
mentioned, Portes and Rumbaut (2001, 2005) conceived their typologies more in the context of 
second-generation migration, Esser (2004) on the other hand comes from a sociological point of 
view while Berry (2011) comes from a psychological discipline. What this shows however is that 
conceptions had been done, but that they are not coherent and not extrapolated clearly. These 
can be because of the criticisms below.  
 
First, the lack of empirical studies as recognized by the proponents of the literature (Penninx 
2005) has not clearly established how non-membership in social subsystems can impact 
patterns of social differentiation. In that, there is no clear established connection between 
individual outcomes and their paths or trajectories of integration. Knowing the outcomes of 
migrants based on indices does not provide nuanced and sufficient information as to how they 
experience the integration process. Stopping at outcomes defeats the purpose of utilizing 
integration as an analytical concept devoid of the normativity of the literature. What this only tell 
us in which social subsystems migrants are not integrated, but does not inform us how this 
impacts their overall integration, running the risk of boxing immigrants into stereotypes of 
unintegrated burdens of the economy.  
 
Second, in light of recent trends in the literature, it leaves many questions unanswered. This 
approach only assumes that there is one core  in which migrants integrate into, hence the 
similarities in the typologies presented by Esser (2004) and Berry (2011). What these 
discussions however fail to consider are the changing patterns of migration. These typologies 
presuppose that the choice to integrate is only made between two choices: to integrate into 
either the host society or into the ethnic community in the host society. While useful it 
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immediately forgets possibilities of integrating into various groups. Further, the typologies remain 
limited in that the measures by which individuals are cast into the types are based on their 
engagement only with these two groups. What these typologies assume is that immigrants only 
from the host society, it does 
increasing ease of border-crossing and communication with the development of technological 
engaged in newer forms of migration such as transnationalism (Glick-Schiller 1999, Vertovec 
2004, Schunck 2014). What these recent developments implies is that there are more patterns of 
integration beyond those that have already been discussed in the literature, especially if we 
understand patterns of integration as arising from the interplay between individual and contextual 
factors. Taking into account possibilities of increased transnational activity in light of the 
changing nature of migration, there may be more types that have not been explored. In the 
succeeding sections I discuss these new trends and discuss the possible implications they pose 
in acquiring a more holistic understanding of integration.  
 
 
Recent trends  
In the existing literature on integration the assumption is that the individual migrant left his or her 
home country to migrate to a different country to improve his or her outcomes. Therefore, the 
integration process is seen as an investment. The individual may or may not choose to integrate 
based on how he or she sees integration as able to facilitate an improvement in his or her 
outcomes. If he or she sees integration as positive investment, he or she is most likely to 
integrate, but if he or she does not see this as a positive investment, he or she is most likely to 
not integrate. What this assumes however is that the choice to integrate into just involves a 
choice to integrate into one core  which is the host society. However, advancements in 
information and communication technologies have changed the nature of migration. As Manuel 
Castells  (2004) notes, people are becoming more and more connected. Distance is just a click 
away as they say. Communication is easier with the development of the internet, and travel has 
become more accessible and much affordable. What we see are more and more people 
migrating, moving around and not simply settling down. What we also see are more and more 
people engaging with more and more places all at once.  
 
Studies have shown that people are more likely to migrate if they know someone in the 
destination country; hence we see a build-up of ethnic communities all over the world. As people 
migrate more and more, ethnic communities flourish and as such they become viable cores  
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where migrants can integrate into. On the other hand, the ease with which we travel and 
communicate in the wake of the developments of information and communication technologies 
(ICTs) have allowed for continued and real-time interactions with people from all over the world 
(Castells 2004). Migrants can continuously interact with their families and relatives in the home 
country and as such this constitutes another viable core  where people can integrate into. 
Integration as an investment decision then can be affected by other such factors as engaging 
with the ethnic community and with the home country. 
 
Ethnic social ties constitute an important social capital for migrants. It has been said in the 
literature that people are more likely to migrate to a certain place if someone they knew is 
already there. Further as mentioned earlier, existing typologies cast migrants into types based on 
their engagement with either host society or with the ethnic community. This stresses the 
importance of ethnic ties. Above typologies immediately places host society on one end and 
ethnic ties on the other as if engaging with both is not a possibility. Ethnic ties are categorized as 
homophilious ties in contrast to heterophilious ties, which are ties among dissimilar people. 
Ethnicity, often being a mark of similarity, can be a source of social capital which 
enabling capacity or resource .   
 
The literature has recognized two possible impacts of strong ties with the ethnic community on 
integration. First, which provides a more positive view, argues that ethnic communities, in 
particular ethnic community-based organizations are able to provide support to migrants 
especially during the settling in period. Further, ethnic communities can act as buffers in cases 
when the labor market is competitive and difficult to penetrate by providing an area where 
support can be accessed and where ethnic businesses can flourish. The second one, which 
highlights the disadvantage, notes of the so-called ethnic mobility entrapment. A scenario 
wherein a migrant remains economically immobile because of his or her developed dependence 
on the ethnic community. In this case, there is no incentive to go beyond the community and 
integrate since most of what is needed is available and accessed through the ethnic community. 
 
The first group of studies espousing a more positive view of ethnic ties, pushes forward the 
immigrant enclave thesis theorized by Wilson and Portes (1980, cited in Li 2001) and Wilson and 
Martin (1982, cited in Li 2001) and suggest that ethnic ties can be a source of economic success. 
In immigrant societies with limited resources, ethnic enclaves can provide positive returns. What 
this means is that immigrants can use ethnic ties, resources and connections to overcome 
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On the other hand, the other group of studies argues that ethnic ties promote ethnic immobility 
(Wiley 1967, cited in Li 2008). The ethnic mobility entrapment thesis suggests that over reliance 
on the ethnic community can result in missed opportunities. This entrapment thesis has been 
evidenced by studies showing the huge income disparity between native-born and foreign-born 
population, as well as the ease of penetration of the labor market by foreign residents.  
 
Empirical studies however found mixed and even inconclusive evidence. Goris-Rosario (1994) 
found no evidence that Dominicans working inside the ethnic community have lower integration 
levels than those working outside. However, this is only true in so far as the working conditions of 
the two groups are the same. Goris-Rosario (1994) found that the workplaces inside the ethnic 
community are being reproduced in that Dominicans who work outside tend to mostly 
concentrated in the manufacturing sector and work alongside other Hispanics and speak 
Spanish on a regular basis. Musterd and Ostendorf (2007) in their study on spatial segregation in 
the Netherlands found no evidence that more contact between very diverse groups of ethnicities 
leads to higher levels of integration and increased individual opportunities. While in a similar 
fashion Andersson (2007) in a study on ethnic residential segregation in Sweden also note that 
while they see low earnings and low outcomes in other economic indicators among migrants who 
live in ethnic neighborhoods, it might be because more a result of policy failure than anything 
else.  
 
But nuances should be taken into consideration. The literature on social capital has differentiated 
between weak or loose and strong or tight social ties. Often tight ties are seen as sources of 
norms, values and family-mediated benefits (Portes 2000, Putnam 2000) that people often use to 
ies refers to the more expansive 
social capital often called loose or weak ties that includes ties with work colleagues, 
a clearer distinction between tight (strong) and loose (weak) ties by stating that while both types 
of ties provides resources, emotional support is often provided by tight ties. According to 
Woolcock (1999) different combinations of bridging and bonding social capital can bring about 
different outcomes. This networks-view of social capital according to Woolcock (1999) suggest 
that social capital is a double-edged sword in that while it can provide access and services, it can 
- and commitment that 
 
 
On the other hand, transnationalism began being used as concept to explain the process of 
migration in the 1990s in the works of Glick Schiller et al (1999), Portes et al (1999), Levitt and 
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Glick-Schiller (2004) and Guarnizo et al (2003) after noticing the increased interactions between 
migrant-sending and migrant-receiving countries. Proponents of transnationalism studies have 
argued that migration processes are changing and that the assumption that people will stay and 
live in only one place no longer holds. What transnationalism researchers argue is that migrants 
exist in many contexts at once and have various affiliations that are not contradictory to each 
other. Therefore, the core of transnationalism lies in the continued interaction of migrants with 
their home country while they settle and establish new relations in their destination countries. To 
be a transnational migrant then is to live across international borders  (Glick Schiller and Fouron 
1999).  
 
Transnationalism can be seen in the various transnational practices that migrants engage in. 
Transnational practices according to Portes (1999) refer to an individual migrant s border 
crossing activities. These activities can be economic, political or socio-cultural. Further, these 
activities can be categorized as those that involve the physical movement of people such as 
visits to home country, and those that do not, such as sending remittances. In light of these 
developments, two strands of opposing beliefs have come up: on the one hand transnationalism 
scholars argue that there is nothing to be feared and that transnational practices have long been 
an exercised practice among migrants. An increasing number of empirical researches celebrate 
these transnational practices as helping to facilitate a much more connected world (Portes 1999; 
Sheringham 2009; Van Bochove et al. 2010). While on the other hand, some researches warn 
that migrant integration and transnational practices can be a recipe for disaster arguing that 
living in two different societies can create conflicts of interest between home and host countries 
(Snel et al. 2006), and more especially when the host country becomes the home country 
through naturalization and permanent residency. 
 
Studies linking these two concepts together tend to be limited. While studies such as Snel et al. 
(2006) on migrant groups in the Netherlands, Sheringham (2009) on Brazilian immigrants in 
Ireland, de Haas and Fokkema (2011) on African immigrants in Spain and Italy, Schunk (2014) 
on migrants in Germany and Carling and Pettersen (2014) on immigrant groups in Norway shed 
some understanding on how these two concepts interact, their results demand further 
investigation. 
 
And finally, more recently, there has been a tendency to look at the agency of migrants and to try 
to understand how their agency can impact integration. While factors measuring individual 
outcomes such as employment and intermarriage rates had been part of integration research for 
a long time as we have previously discussed, newer additions to individual outcomes look at 
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more variable factors such as intentions.  
 
Skepticism regarding the use of intent to stay can be expressed in the same way that skepticism 
on the use of intent to return abounds in the literature. Researches suggest that intent to return is 
an intent that often never gets fulfilled. Studies have shown that intentions are being revised 
again and again. Intent to stay can be read in the same way, however, Carling and Pettersen 
among those who will return will always be included those who intended to return. The same 
argument can be made for intent to stay among those who will stay will be those that initially 
expressed intent to stay. 
 
Luthra et al (2014) note that regardless of whether a migrant actually stays or not, their intention, 
especially at the beginning of their migration, can have impact on their integration outcomes. 
They argue that different intentions are associated with different patterns of integration (p.5). 
They found that for instance circular and temporary migra
subjective orientation towards the receiving society and perceptions of its hospitality and have 
 
 
In the same way, a migrant expressing no intention to stay permanently can create for him or 
herself no incentive to invest in integration. What having such a mindset does is deter a person 
from investing in relationships and in human capital that can improve his or her outcomes in the 
destination country. This argume  (2014) second argument in 
migration experience, and can affect behaviour other than return itself  for instance about 
in
intent to stay can affect behavior and experiences related to migration, such as integration and 
developing affinities with the host country.  
 
Third, complementing earlier argument on intention as a possible predictor of behavior, intention 
to either stay or return can inform us of the possibilities of a smoother and easier integration as 
staying can encourage development of affinities with the host country. A spate of research has 
argued that staying permanently and eventually naturalizing in the host country have big impacts 
on migrant integration (Penninx 2005, Geurts and Lubbers 2016, Belgiojoso 2016). Belgiojoso 
(2016) notes that intentions are related to attachments in the host and home countries and 
Geurts and Lubbers (2016) found that migrants who decide to stay permanently invest better in 
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the language. Bijwaard et al (2011) found that intentions to stay are shaped by experiences in 
the host country. Intentions to stay can thus be seen as a summary of the experiences of a 
foreign resident in the home country. Understanding it in such a way, the intention to stay of a 
permanent resident who has lived a long time in the destination country thus becomes doubly 
important as it can inform us of how he or she has experienced the country so far. What is not 
being argued here is that intent to stay is equal to actual staying. What is being argued is that it is 
precisely because intent to stay can change that it becomes important to study. A foreign 
resident may intend to stay one day and intend to not stay the next, but what it means is that 
following Bijwaard et al (2011) this change can be attributed to what is happening to him or her in 
the destination country and thus can inform us of the complexities of the processes of 
integration.  
 
And fourth, looking at intent to stay can also help address another problem in the literature of 
migrant integration  ive structure or 
to stay accepts this implication of a cohesive structure, because it is in this structure which 
migrants decide to stay with, while accepting that 
and Morawska 2003). This ties in with what Bijwaard et al (2011) that intentions to stay can 
inform us of the experiences in the destination country. What this means is that intention to stay 
can be seen as anchored to the cohesive structure into which the foreign residents integrate. 
 
 
C. Gaps  
It has been mentioned already that the proliferation of concepts in the field of migration and 
specifically migrant integration has made understanding the process of integration very difficult. 
Concepts, at the outset, always seem as if they are measuring different ideas that have no 
relation to each other and as such wading through the literature can be a daunting task. I have 
endeavored in the previous section to make sense of the many interesting and at times 
confusing researches that had been done on migrant integration, both empirical and theoretical. 
Though migration is an old concept, migrant integration is not. In light of this, two major 
shortcomings have been noted. The first one involves a theoretical and conceptual gap in the 
literature and the second one involves a methodological problem. In terms of a theoretical and 
conceptual gap, we have seen concepts after concepts being discussed in the literature. And as 
such a general model of integration seems fairly lacking in the field except for one that we have 
previously discussed (see Esser s (2014) general theory). I agree with Alba and Nee (1997) in 
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saying that the migrant integration literature is already teeming with concepts and that what we 
need is not a new one, but a configuration of how we understand existing concepts. Many 
theories have been offered and though at first glance these theories may seem contradictory, 
subsuming them in Esser s (2004) general theory helps to understand how initial theories in 
migrant integration can fit together and how previously stated specific gaps can be addressed. 
However due to the newness  of the general model, it has not been extensively tested 
empirically, and though some studies have adopted it, (for instance see Schunk s (2014) 
extensive work on immigrants  integration in Germany), further empirical testing needs to be 
done to establish how components of the general model are linked, how the historical context of 
the migrants  migration to the host society impacts their integration and how recent changes in 
the nature of migration affect migrant integration. Knowing the limitations of the general theory of 
integration then, we can now proceed with laying down a clear methodological path on how to 
understand migrant integration. This is where this study comes in.  
 
There are two limitations to Esser s (2004) theory however. For one, while it does highlight the 
importance of both contextual and individual factors, we see a limitation in what factors are being 
pertained to. Esser (2004) mostly pertained to government policies on immigration and while this 
can influence tremendously the path and patterns of immigration, it doesn t consider why certain 
groups of migrants can have different outcomes given similar conditions. We see these 
classification in an interesting work by Portes and Zhou (1993) and Portes and Rumbaut (2001, 
2005) however not much was provided beyond mere classification of why one group follows a 
straight-line assimilation and the other does not. What I argue here is the importance of 
understanding the contexts whereby migrants integrate. This has been the focus of more 
qualitative works such as Sheringham (2009) and Zellgren (2015). Adding this component to 
Esser s (2004) general theory will enrich the findings.  
 
Another shortcoming found in Esser s (2004) theory is that it has not been adopted to include 
more recent trends that consider transnational engagements of migrants, stronger ethnic 
communities in light of advancements in ICTs as well as intents for the future. I have previously 
discussed some studies which have looked at the impacts of these new trends in integration and 
I argue that as ICTs continue to advance what we will see are more mobile migrants, giving rise 
to questions of rootedness, belonging and identification.  
 
On the other hand, the shortcomings in the literature in terms of methodological approaches 
seem to be more problematic. Let me describe more specific gaps in terms of the methodological 
shortcomings found in the literature. First, we found two sides competing about the unit of 
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analysis. On the one hand, some argue that policies and host societies should be the focus of 
the integration process, after all, integration is an unequal relationship where the host society 
has the capability to expand or limit opportunities. While on the other, there is a recent trend 
towards bringing down the discussion to the level of the immigrant whose experiences are 
unique and cannot be simply measured by outcome indicators. A focus on either one cannot 
provide a holistic view.  
 
The second issue pertains to normativity. The evolution of theories and conceptual discussions 
and measurements on what constitutes integration has been normative. The problem with the 
recent literature is that there is an effort to be overly non-normative, losing the ability for social 
science research to have policy implications. Esser s (2004) general theory notes that contextual 
factors make up the frame by which we decide to carry out our individual actions. In this sense, 
integration is non-normative, but accepts that contextual factors such as, for instance, policies 
against wearing head scarves, or banning people against certain religious practices, are among 
the frames by which migrants make the decision to integrate or not.  
 
Third, there is confusion between micro and macro approaches which I am putting forward as 
both necessary to understand the process. There are two main concerns that have to be 
addressed in terms of this confusion with micro and macro approaches. First, focusing on the 
need to understand and measure integration as a process and not as an outcome convolutes the 
process of measuring, as outcomes are rarely detachable from the process. What I argue here is 
that macro and micro approaches cannot be separated from each other. Second, while it is true 
that a focus on outcomes limits our understanding of the process, I argue that this limitation is 
brought about by the confusion on where these outcomes come from. Many of the existing 
indices on integration measure policy outcomes. It is what Goodman (2015) in her paper calls 
. What is measured usually is whether policies 
targeting certain integration outcomes exist. The actual take-up however is often left 
unmeasured, as well as how the existence or non-existence of policies affects the actual 
intended integration outcomes at the level of the migrants.  Policy outcomes, however, can be a 
good baseline for how we can measure unintended consequences and ultimately how we can 
understand integration as a process at the level of the migrants. And as has been mentioned 
before, outcomes tell us of the inclusion or exclusion of migrants into different social subsystems 
and this inclusion or exclusion can give rise to specific patterns of integration as Esser (2004) 
notes in his general theory.  
 
Fourth, there is a lack of discussion in the historical and institutional aspects of migration and 
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how this can complicate and i
means is that the shift from a purely economic approach to a human development approach is 
merely a shift on how integration process is understood, but not a shift on the more fundamental 
understandings of what drives immigrants to move across borders, as well as what drives 
migrants to migrate to certain destinations. While recent researches have made contributions by 
focusing on migrant experiences, there is a tendency still to highlight migrants as recipients of 
policies rather than as agents that can direct their own integration experience while being 
governed by existing institutional and historical limitations. Existing historical and institutional ties 
of sending and receiving countries can greatly impact integration experiences and outcomes, as 
well as impact how a migrant will integrate into his or her host society. Even Esser s (2004) 
theory does not touch upon this. I argue that the historical context of migration can impact the 
outcomes and process of integration, in that the context whereby migrants come into the host 
society can immediately situate them in areas of the society that may be beneficial to them or not. 
Further, acknowledging the historical context brings to the fore the importance of the nation-state 
and the collective experience of the country. In this light, nation-states, in the time of increased 
migration, is more important than ever, as nation-states set the frames by which migrants 
integrate contrary to Appadurai s (1990) claim that nations and states are disjunctive. At the face 
of migration, what we currently see is a stronger sense of nation-state, which sets the boundaries 
and areas allowed for migrants. Further, we also see a stronger sense of nationhood, as shown 
in the increasing practice of transnationalism and presence of ethnic communities. Further, 
acknowledging the relationship of the migrant-sending country and the migrant-receiving country 
further enriches our understanding of why do we have stereotypes or certain images of, for 
instance in the context of Japan, Brazilian migrants as working in factories, of Filipino migrants 
as entertainers, of Indians as ethnic restaurant owners among others.  
 
And fifth, in light of recent developments in the migration literature, there should be more focus 
on the agential capacities of migrants to dictate their own integration process. There is still a 
dearth in the literature looking at the motivations, capacities, intents and practices of migrants 
and how these agential capacities can impact their integration overall. In the first place, 
integration should be a question of whether migrants migrated with the intention to integrate. 
Further complicating this are recent trends such as transnationalism. As mentioned earlier, 
different motivations can mean different levels of integration, as a migrant who sees the host 
society as step to another migration experience may only integrate into the labor economy. 
Further with increased access to information and communications technology, more and more 
migrants are living double lives in the host and home country and sometimes even more as they 
can simultaneously communicate with different people from different places. Such transnational 
27 
 
practices and creation of transnational capit
integration extent, positively or negatively the literature is still at odds.  
 
These are the gaps the research aims to address. By addressing these, this research can 
contribute to a better understanding of how different institutional actors can have intended and 
the process of integration. More importantly, by approaching integration as both an outcome and 
a process, we can have a better understanding of how migrants integrate. Understanding how 
they integrate can provide us important information on how to craft better policies that can 
facilitate a better integration process.  
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Chapter conclusion 
In this chapter, I presented a broad introduction to the research endeavor. As the first chapter of 
Part I of this research, I endeavored to make sense of the murky literature of migrant integration. 
In this chapter, I first located the concept of integration in the literature of migration. I argued that 
initial conceptions of assimilation and multiculturalism are no longer applicable and this is 
acknowledged by the literature. I traced the inapplicability of these mainstream concepts and 
note that it is the changing dynamics in the area of migration as well as the changing 
understandings of countries regarding the reasons for migration which have slowly shifted the 
focus of migrant integration literature. From an approach that focuses on straight-line 
convergence to a politics of recognition, the understanding of integration has expanded to 
include not just economic integration issues, but cultural, interactive and identificational 
integration issues. I also introduced the debate in the literature on whether integration is a 
process or an outcome and I argued that it is both. I discussed how outcomes cannot be 
detached from the process and vice versa and utilizing integration as both process and outcome 
can help rid the concept of normativity while allowing it to be measurable. Further, I also 
discussed how the literature has seen a drive towards a need to understand and analyze the 
outcomes and process of integration more holistically, expanding the analysis to include both 
host societies, migrants, local governments and various stakeholders.  
 
After pinpointing the location of the integration in the literature, I discussed the theoretical and 
conceptual shortcomings of the literature as well as the methodological gaps. I endeavor to 
address these gaps in this research which will be discussed in the next chapters.  
 
Chapter 2 joins this chapter in Part I and serves to establish the conceptual and methodological 
underpinnings of this research. Part II, composed of Chapters 3, 4 and 5 are dedicated to 
discussing the contextual factors that serve as frames whereby foreign residents integrate. 
Finally, Part III composed of Chapters 6, 7 and 8 shows the individual factors, as well as the 
integration outcomes and patterns of integration that arise from these outcomes. Parts I, II and III 
together provide a much more holistic understanding of the integration of the Filipino residents in 
Nagoya City. Chapter 9 provides conclusions and discusses ways forward. 
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Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework, Research Questions, Goals and Methodology 
 
A. Theoretical Framework: Integration as an analytical concept to describe both 
process and outcome 
I build on Hartmut 2004) general theory of integration. As mentioned in the previous 
 (2004) theory has three components. As was previously mentioned in Chapter 1, 
the first component specifies the individual migrants  courses of action. The second component 
links these actions to the structural conditions that migrants may face in the host society, in short, 
the inclusion (or exclusion) to social subsystems and patterns of social differentiation that are 
reflected in the integration outcomes of individual migrants. And the third component indicates 
what and how specific patterns of integration arise given how individuals act in different 
situations with different opportunities and restrictions  
(2004) theory addresses the following issues: normativity, holistic understanding of integration, 
and debate regarding integration as either process or outcome. Let us look at each of these in 
turn. 
 
2004) argument by suggesting integration is this general concept in 
which assimilation and multiculturalism are but only two of the possible patterns and approaches, 
relieves the concept of its normativity. The usability of integration as an analytical concept devoid 
is conducted by individuals who wanted to better their outcomes (Esser 2004). And that by 
coming in to a host society, they assume a position in an unequal relationship. In short, for 
individual migrants, integration is seen as an investment and becoming an accepted part of 
society entails the understanding that there are socially defined and shared meanings of success. 
Therefore, integration outcomes of foreign residents in different areas and dimensions should be 
assessed against what is set as the  in the 
destination country. For instance, a country which assumes an assimilationist approach to 
integration would have different socially defined and shared meaning of success than a country 
which utilizes an exclusionary approach to integration. Normativity is therefore removed from the 
discussion when outcomes are measured against these socially defined and shared meanings of 
success in a host society that migrants enter.  
 
2004) theory as a general approach to the concept of integration highlights the 
roles of both contextual and individual factors and argues that these factors can impact the 
integration of individual migrants. As discussed in Chapter 1, opportunities and restrictions at the 
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contextual level become crucial factors that will determine the outcomes and patterns of 
integration of the individual migrant. And as such contextual factors constitute the structural 
frame for individual actions  (Schunk 2014, p.32). And at the same time, individual factors refer 
to the agential capacities of migrants that can impact the direction and pattern of integration. 
 
2004) addresses the ongoing debate as to whether integration is a process or an 
outcome. The answer is both, as looking at just one can greatly limit our understanding of 
integration. Therefore, this project treats integration as both a process and an outcome. As Esser 
(2004) notes, as an outcome, integration refers to the inclusion or exclusion of migrants into 
social subsystems, and as a process, integration refers to the specific patterns of integration that 
only be assessed by looking at the outcomes of the individual migration given the individual and 
contextual factors that may impact integration.  
 
However, because of the relative newness of this conception there are a number of 
shortcomings that have been recognized. First, the importance of the historical relations between 
the migrant sending country and the migrant receiving country has not been taken into 
consideration. While Esser (2004) notes of institutional factors, he mostly looks at the institutions 
that can impact integration within the host society. In many cases, especially in the case of the 
Filipino migrants to Japan, the relationship between Japan and the Philippines has played a 
huge role in the highly gendered and rather low-skilled Filipino migration to Japan. This historical 
context has a big implication on the current and future integration of Filipino residents.  
 
Second, considering that not so much empirical studies have been made both in the field of 
 (2004) theory, the methodological implications and 
operationalization of the concept have not been fully understood. I offer in this project a 
(2004) three components and provide a perspective of integration 
that is holistic and takes account of both institutional and individual factors. What constitutes the 
outcomes that have to be measured that will inform us of the patterns of integration? We have 
discussed in Chapter 1 how the literature has agreed that integration outcomes are 
multi-dimensional. Looking at it from a multi-dimensional lens that takes into account structural, 
cultural, interactive and identificational dimensions (Berry 2011) can provide a richer and more 
nuanced understanding of the foreign residents  integration outcomes and therefore a better 
discussion on the what s and why s specific patterns of integration arise. Acknowledging these 
factors, I look at the individual outcomes of the migrants vis-à-
, I try to understand the specific 
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patterns of integration that arise given their inclusion or exclusion into the social subsystems or 
dimensions that I looked into. 
 
2004
beyond the host society that foreign residents can integrate into. We have discussed in the 
previous chapter that recent literature on migration suggest an ever-changing flow of migration 
where migrants are engaging more and more with their home countries and other communities 
beyond their destination countries because of the developments in ICTs. Now, more than ever, 
migrants can choose where to integrate. As individuals who migrated to improve their outcomes, 
migrants can choose to invest in integrating into the host society, into the ethnic community and 
or into their home countries if they think that their outcomes would improve by doing so.  
 
In general, I see integration as both an outcome and a process of becoming an accepted part of 
society (Penninx 2005). Specifically:  
1. It is assumed that the very process of migration is conducted by individuals who wanted 
to better their outcomes (Esser 2004) 
2. For individual migrants, integration is seen as an investment.  
3. That by coming in to a host society, they assume a position in an unequal relationship.  
4. But this relationship, though unequal, has spaces for migrant agency and that the host 
society is not static and can change (Esser 2004, Penninx 2005, Nagy 2008) 
5. Societies are heterogeneous, but regardless, there are still socially defined and shared 
means for success (Esser 2004) 
6. Individual and institutional factors impact the way migrants choose to invest in their 
this. 
7. Integration is both an outcome and a process. As an outcome, it provides information 
into which social subsystems is a migrant excluded or included. As a process, it provides 
information on what patterns of integration arise given the inclusion or exclusion into 
social subsystems.   
8. Recent developments in the literature open possibi
they can choose/invest to integrate. (See recent trends) 
9.  can choose/invest to integrate can affect the 
outcomes and process of integration that may give rise to specific patterns of integration. 
 
Having established the framework, I endeavor to use in this project I present my research 
questions as well as the objectives and significance of this research project.  
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B. Research Questions, Objectives and Significance 
Using this framework therefore, I ask in this study: To what extent are Filipino residents 
integrated in the Japanese society? Simply, how integrated are Filipino residents in Japan? This 
is a big question, one that I aim to address by breaking it down into questions that can be 
operationalized. To be able to answer this, I investigate the following: 
1. How do we measure integration as both an outcome (inclusion/exclusion into social 
subsystems) and a process (patterns of social inequality and differentiation that arise from 
inclusion/exclusion into social subsystems) that takes account of the interplay between 
individual and contextual factors?  
2. Understanding that Filipino residents are individuals with agential capacities who make 
choices within the context of different institutional factors in terms of immigrant acceptance 
and integration, what then are their integration outcomes? In which social subsystems are 
their included or excluded and to what extent? And how do contextual factors such as the 
context of Japan and the history of Philippine migration to Japan and individual factors such 
impact this? 
3. From these integration outcomes, what patterns can be seen? In that knowing their inclusion 
or exclusion into social subsystems that had been brought about by a conflation of individual 
and contextual factors, what specific patterns of integration arise? And again, what are the 
possible impacts of the contextual and the individual factors on their integration patterns?  
 
In this research, I aim to assess the extent of integration of the Filipino residents in Japan and 
provide nuances and a better understanding how a conflation of individual and contextual factors 
impacts the level of integration of the foreign residents. By looking specifically at Filipino foreign 
resident experiences in Nagoya City, I aim to provide a more thorough and more holistic 
understanding of the outcomes and processes of integration. Further, by conducting this 
research, I would have tested a methodological approach to assessing and measuring 
integration which can be utilized to look at and study the integration extent of other migrant 
groups in various other contexts. These have significant policy implications in that being able to 
empirically explain and assess integration of foreign residents can facilitate evidence-based 
policy making. This can improve what and how policies are implemented to facilitate better ways 
of integration that can benefit both host society and migrant community. All these, I aim to 
achieve and demonstrate in this research. 
 
The significance of this research on the other hand is two-fold, one that is conceptual and 
theoretical and the other methodological. In light of the first aim, this research aims to contribute 
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to knowledge production. By delving into such a current topic, this research will contribute to the 
literature on migration, migrant integration, transnationalism, and ethnic social ties. More than 
ever more research is needed to be done in the field of integration as migration is increasing and 
becoming easier to do. Migrants are also staying longer and longer and more women are 
embarking into this endeavor. This brings to the fore issues that include global householding, 
intermarriage, child rearing and culture sharing, issues that go beyond inflows and outflows of 
people.  
 
Further, this research addresses the gaps in the literature previously discussed. By 
acknowledging the merits of both approaches of integration as outcome and process, this 
research can provide a more holistic understanding of integration while at the same time 
avoiding the pitfalls detailed in the previous chapter of approaching integration using just one 
lens. Secondly, such an approach rids the concept of normativity which has plagued previous 
theories such as assimilation and race-relations cycle. By assuming that migrants migrate to 
improve their outcomes, their outcomes are assessed against shared meanings of success, 
meanings of which are often detailed by host societies. This also addresses the empirical 
problems of the concept.  
 
And as an externality of this research, I aim to make a commentary on the continued importance 
of nation-states as the frames by which we, as agential actors, conduct our individual actions. 
Increased migration was predicted to diminish the purpose of nation-states and state boundaries. 
What we see however, in light of the recent events pertaining to the refugee crisis from Syria and 
the announcement of the failure of multiculturalism among Western European countries is a 
stronger sense and purpose of nation-states which may be either for the better or for the worse. 
Regardless, what this shows is that nation-states continue to be important factors in the analysis 
of human relations, especially in the field of migrant integration.  
 
Further, this study is timely. With Japan poised to possibly admit more foreign workers to 
address its preparation needs for the Tokyo 2020 Olympics, we can just expect the number of 
foreigners to increase. This necessitates more than ever a better approach to integration and to 
be able to implement policies and programs that can benefit both foreign residents and the host 
society; a proper, more holistic understanding of integration should be conducted. 
 
In terms of the second aim of this research, I aim to present a systematic way of understanding 
integration as both an outcome and a process. This research can contribute to the call for 
empirical studies on integration. This study offers a methodological frame for operationalizing 
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integration, something that has been missing in the literature. Building on the existing literature 
and taking into account criticisms on previous studies and the strengths from past researches, 
this project offers a way to understand integration as both outcome and process in an empirical 
way that can be replicated and adapted to various contexts and even to intergenerational 
migrants. 
 
At this point I would like to point out the limitations of this study. Due to resource constraints, this 
study only looks at the specific circumstances of one migrant group in one city. Regardless, I 
argue that this methodology can be adapted to analyze other groups as this project builds on 
2004) theory which takes into account agency and structure, hence the methodology 
can be revised and adapted depending on the circumstances and context. Further I only look at 
the first generation of migrants as the migrant group that I study in this project is fairly young and 
though there is already a second generation, the population is still not that substantial.  
 
C. Methodology: Approaches in the literature 
I have previously discussed how integration is a multi-dimensional and multi-way process 
involving many stakeholders. Migrant integration researchers such as Penninx (2005), Helbling 
(2013), Goodman (2015) have noted the variety of approaches that have been done in 
understanding the complex process of migrant integration. So far, researches in migrant 
integration have used mainly two types of approaches: quantitative and qualitative approaches. 
The choice between the two usually relied on the unit of analysis. We have previously discussed 
how integration looks at both migrants and host societies. Most studies utilizing quantitative 
approaches look at the outcomes of migrants in terms of various integration indicators. This has 
been the favored approach since the assimilation theory became a popular theoretical 
framework to understand and analyze integration. Studies including Portes and Zhou (1993), 
Alba and Nee (1997), and Portes and Rumbaut (2001, 2005) have relied on surveys to compare 
outcomes of foreign-born and native-born respondents in certain economic outcomes. This was 
because during this time, migration as an economic endeavor still dominates the discussion. And 
hence if migration is seen as an endeavor undertaken by individuals to improve their economic 
outcomes, then it becomes intuitive to look at employment rates and income disparities to 
measure how well migrants have adjusted to their host societies. After the increase in second 
generation migrants and the subsequent acknowledgment of the changing nature of migration, 
more and more researches have started utilizing factors that go beyond earnings such as 
educational attainment, intermarriage, naturalization, among others (See Williams 1990, 
Dustmann 2000, Hum and Simpson 2000, Meng and Gregory 2005, Kantarevic 2004, Waters 
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2005, Greenman and Xie 2006, Meng and Meurs 2006, and Xie and Greenman 2011 for such 
studies).  
 
However, criticisms to these abound, in that quantitative approaches may tend to generalize 
findings without acknowledging the personal experiences of migrants. In response, qualitative 
studies in migrant integration started sprouting, though it did not really take hold. Most of the 
earlier qualitative studies have been done in the field of transnationalism such as those 
conducted by Glick-Schiller et al (1999), Landolt (2001), Guarnizo et al (2003), and Vertovec 
(2004).  
 
In light of the recent surge of refugees, foreign workers and issues relating to Islamic extremism, 
there has been a renewed interest in the role of governments in facilitating integration as has 
been mentioned in the previous chapters. We have seen from the review of related literature how 
the nation-state has always been present as variations of the integration theories dominate, fade 
and was replaced. During the height of assimilation theory, most governments were limited to the 
inflows and outflows of people as migration was seen as an individual actor s endeavor to 
maximize his potential and gains. At the height of multiculturalism, we see a role for the 
government as assuring recognition of different cultures and minority rights but never before has 
governments been the focus of migrant integration until recently. Goodman (2015) notes of the 
sudden explosion of researches looking at integration as being impacted by state policies. This 
renewed interest on the role of the nation-state in ensuring rights and better outcomes of people 
arrived at the heels of the supposed failure of multiculturalism. It failed when governments 
confused recognition with indifference.  
 
In this light, two strands of how integration studies are conducted became apparent. The first one 
includes quantitative approaches to integration (Koopmans et al 2005, Koopmans et al 2012, 
Banting and Kymlicka 2013, MIPEX 2004). The second one, acknowledging that host societies 
and migrants are both responsible for the integration process involved more qualitative 
approaches (Sheringham 2009, Hellgren 2015, Fernández-Suárez 2017). Contrary to the surge 
of quantitative researches during the reign of assimilation theory that focuses on individual 
outcomes, current quantitative researches assess integration from a policy analysis perspective. 
These studies tend to favor quantitative approaches which include construction of composite 
indices. What these indices do is try to exhaust all possible indicators of integration to be able to 
assess whether existing government policies facilitate this process.  
 
The recent years saw an explosion of indices measuring migrant integration. Notable examples 
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of such studies include the MIPEX (2004) and the Multiculturalism Policy Index (Banting and 
Kymlicka 2013). Helbling (2013) and Goodman (2015) provide a very good review of existing 
indices measuring integration policies  capacity to facilitate integration. The criticism however is 
that such indices only measure what the policies are intended to measure (Helbling 2013, 
Goodman 2015). Measuring only what policies are conveyed to do disregard the way policies are 
received and the circumstances of those supposed to receive these policies. 
 
On the other hand, more qualitative approaches such as case studies have been utilized by 
Sheringham (2009) and Hellgren (2015). The main reason according to researchers who utilized 
such qualitative approaches is that integration as a process cannot be simply captured in 
numbers and that there are too many facets that have to be assessed to be able to understand 
the integration process as a whole.  
 
Understanding and noting of the advantages and disadvantages of using either approach, I 
employed a mixed-methods approach to be able to look at many different facets of integration 
while at the same time providing concrete measurements that can be useful in policymaking. I 
conduct mixed-methods because of the following reasons: first, integration is an issue that is 
important at the policy-making level and thus an understanding of what constitutes the shared 
meanings of success  is required to be able to assess the situation at the ground level to be able 
to come up with policies that are tailored, useful and that would yield solutions and improve the 
integration process.  
 
Second, while acknowledging that, I also understand that integration is a multi-faceted process 
that involves migrants, host societies, as well as the histories between the receiving and sending 
countries. By acknowledging the plurality of the actors, I acknowledge that while the relationship 
between the migrants and the host societies are unequal, such an approach that treats migrants 
as among the many actors that can impact the integration process, but who ultimately is the 
focus of this process, allows a better and more holistic understanding of the process. That this 
process is a process that is being affected not just by the openness or the closeness of the host 
society, but by the agential capacities of the migrants, as well as the history that connects the 
migrants with the host society. Such a perspective is especially useful for the main focus of this 
study: Filipino residents in Japan. The Philippines have a long history of migration to Japan due 
to their proximity with each other, and the Philippines  culture of migration combined with Japan s 
labor shortage facilitated this movement of people.  
 
Third, while aiming to tailor the methodology to a particular group, I also aimed to construct a 
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methodology that can be replicated and utilized to fit other contexts. Migrant integration, 
especially in the context of the sudden increase of migrants and refugees in Western Europe 
from conflict areas in West Asia, and in the context of increasing focus on Islam phobia, is more 
important and urgent than ever before. An approach such as this brings down the analysis of the 
integration process to the level of human migrants, treating them as individuals with agency, 
capacities and motivations, while also allowing governments to come in and implement policies 
that will facilitate better outcomes for people.  
 
In this study, I utilized a mixed-methods methodology. Mixed-methods approach is becoming a 
popular and preferred method recently with the acknowledgement of the shortcomings of pure 
quantitative and pure qualitative approaches. It has even been argued as the third paradigm  
after the quantitative and qualitative paradigms (Tashakkori and Teddlie 2003, Denscombe 
2008). According to Denscombe (2008) it can be traced to the works of Campbell and Fiske 
(1959). Following Campbell and then Denzin (1978) 
. 
Denscombe (2008) lists the characteristics of mixed-methods as: 
 
1. Usage of both quantitative and qualitative methods in the same research project; 
2. A research design that clearly specifies the sequencing of the quantitative and qualitative 
aspects of the project 
3. An account of how these two aspects relate to each other  
4. Pragmatism as the philosophical underpinning for the research which welcomes fusion of 
approaches to be able to answer the current question. 
 
The literature of mixed-methods approach acknowledges four broad rationales why researches 
undertake mixed-methods approach: to improve the accuracy of their data, to produce a more 
complete picture by combining information from complementary kinds of data or sources, to 
compensate specific strengths and weaknesses associated with either quantitative or qualitative 
methods, and to develop the analysis and build upon initial findings.  
 
Mixed-methods, according to Tashakkori and Teddlie (2003) employ a combination of 
quantitative and qualitative methods not just in the study design, but also in the analysis and 
inferences. This mixed-method study involved three stages: a first stage which is identified as 
the qualitative stage, and the second and third stages which are identified as the quantitative 
stages. These stages will be discussed in detail in the next section.  
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In short, the goal of using mixed-methods for this project is very simple. On the one hand, I want 
to be able to provide a more general picture of the integration extent of the Filipino residents in 
Japan while at the same time provide more nuanced discussion and offer explanations of why 
such results come up. The quantitative component of this project aims to provide the latter and 
precisely because I acknowledge the limitations of the quantitative approach I proceeded to 
incorporate a qualitative element to the research. I humbly note that we can only generalize as 
far as our data is concerned, and contradictories, while the data may seem to show a coherent 
whole, exist and I discuss and highlight these contradictions in the course of this project. I do this 
in an effort to underscore the importance of balance. On the one hand, a general picture is what 
is needed for improved policymaking, while on the other, a more nuanced discussion is needed 
to better understand and humanize the research. 
 
D. Mixed-method approach 
Stage 1. Establishing the baseline information  
In order for my understanding of integration to be holistic, I decided to first see what is already 
being done in the field. Conducting a thorough review of the literature has shed light on how I will 
approach this topic. Integration, as a field of study, has not yet caught up with migration, 
considering that these two should go hand in hand. The literature review in the earlier section 
showed the theoretical and methodological challenges of investigating foreign resident 
integration. As part of this first stage, I also conducted at the same time initial contact with the 
study site. 
 
To first understand the context of the Filipino residents in Japan, I began contacting key 
informants from September to December of 2015. From February 2016 to November 2016, I 
conducted visits to the field to simultaneously conduct both the qualitative and quantitative parts 
of my research. I conducted an interview with Mr. Keita Suzuki from the Multicultural 
Co-Existence Promotion Office of the Aichi Prefectural Government, as well as I participated in 
the Nagoya Regional Seminar that aimed to open discussion and prepare stakeholders for the 
launch of a new multicultural plan in 2018. I had interviewed representatives of various Filipino 
migrant organizations in Nagoya City such as the Philippine Society of Japan (PSJ), the Filipino 
Migrants Center (FMC), and the Chubu Philippines Friendship Association (CPFA). 
 
I also got involved with their activities. I translated some documents for some of FMC s events, 
including their Know Your Community Series  a series of talks designed to get opinions and 
relay experiences of Filipino residents in different prefectures in Aichi. This series has been 
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conducted in a number of prefectures always in coordination with non-profit organizations based 
in the prefecture. I also observed in a consular event by the Philippine Embassy held in the Aichi 
Prefectural Government building that was assisted by the PSJ, as well as took part as audience 
in a national singing competition called Utawit which has regional finals in Nagoya. The event 
was co-organized by the PSJ along with the Utawit organizing committee. I also joined a Bingo 
event held by PSJ in November. I also had continuous conversations with my key informants 
from PSJ from February to November 2016, as well as correspondence with Mr. Kyle Serra of 
the International Relations Division of the Bureau of Tourism, Culture and Exchange of the City 
Government of Nagoya.  
 
Interviewing key informants, as well as having casual conversations with the Filipino residents in 
Nagoya City, as well as participation in the events that they hold in the community have allowed 
me a better, if not holistic, understanding of the context of their experiences. I utilized information 
gathered from this part of the methodology to feed into the survey instrument that I will be using 
for the second step of the research. 
 
Stage 2. Constructing the survey instrument and pre-test 
Preparing the Survey Questionnaire 
The first stage of the study informed me how the research is going to move forward. From my 
interviews and from the literature review, I constructed an integration policy rubric to understand 
how the data fits within the framework of integration that I am utilizing. This rubric showed in what 
dimension of integration the policies and programs of Nagoya City fall into. The information from 
this rubric  served as the baseline data by which 
I constructed the survey instrument to measure the extent of integration of my target population. 
The integration rubric will be discussed in a later section. 
 
Further my discussions with my key informants as well as my review of the literature highlighted 
the need to look at the individual trajectories of the would-be respondents. This included the 
need to look at their educational attainment for instance as well as their motivations for migration 
and their intents for the future. While from the literature we can expect that many came as 
entertainers, it is very interesting to also know other instances of individuals who moved to Japan 
as dependents or as students.  
 
Also because of the idea that integration is an investment, I also looked at various employment 
questions. From my discussions with my key informants, I learned that many still work as 
entertainers and to my surprise, even those who are already holding permanent resident visa. I 
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decided then to ask more detailed questions about their jobs. While the results, as what will be 
discussed much later on, support this, I also saw from the data various other jobs that the 
respondents engage in, implying that though the market seems limited to certain low-skilled 
industries, the respondents are still engaging in more varied jobs than expected.  
 
The instrument was constructed in an electronic platform. Doing so allowed the survey to 
progress faster as well as data encoding and transmittal to be conducted much faster than if I 
used paper questionnaires. I drafted this questionnaire in the Google Docs platform. With this I 
can simply use an electronic device such as a mobile phone or a tablet to find respondents and 
enter their responses while I interview them. 
 
The survey is composed of 71 questions. It was divided into eight sections complementing the 
literature review I have conducted as listed below: 
1. Demographic section 
2. Pre-migration and settling-experience section 
3. Employment and labor section 
4. Housing and health section 
5. Language proficiency section 
6. Civic participation section 
7. Transnational practices and ethnic ties section 
8. Intentions for the future section 
 
The demographic section asks respondents to provide information on their demographic 
characteristics such as age, sex, length of stay in Japan, current visa status, as well as their 
province in the Philippines. The second section looks at the pre-migration and settlement 
experiences of the respondents and as such asks question on their visa status upon arrival, 
whether they knew anyone when they arrived in Japan, whether they received any help from 
anyone in Japan when they arrived, as well as the problems they experienced when they arrived.  
 
The next four sections look at the integration outcomes of the respondents. The section on 
employment looks at whether they are engaged in any income-generating activity within the last 
three months and if they are not what they are doing. This is important to establish the activities 
of the Filipino residents because in Japan the visa categories of foreigners are based on what 
activities they are engaged in. Also in this section, I ask about working conditions, if the 
respondents are employed in a permanent job, if they earn the same amount monthly, if they feel 
that they earn enough, and if they feel that they are using the skills that they learned and 
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acquired in their current occupation. The next section looks at access to housing and health and 
asks about whether respondents have any problems with their current housing, whether they 
have access to any health insurance and if they have had to go to the hospital for some health 
concern, whether they experienced any difficulty getting treatments or consultations. In the next 
section, I look at their self-rated language proficiency, whether they are currently studying 
Japanese and what hinders them from studying the language. The sixth section looks at the civic 
participation of the respondents. In this section, I ask their level of participation in various 
organizations as well as their participation in local government events and what stops them from 
being more active in terms of civic participation.  
 
The last two sections look at transnational practices and intents for the future. I included these 
because of recent discussions in the literature which focus on the changing nature of migration. 
As has been noted and as will be noted in succeeding chapters, more and more people are 
migrating and more and more people are staying and engaging more than one place at the same 
time. With the advancements in ICTs, migration is becoming an endeavor that more and more 
people are engaging in. ICT advancements are allowing migrants to engage with their home and 
host countries at once. While arguments regarding the importance of national boundaries are 
many, I argue here that national boundaries still exist and are definitely important as we have 
seen in recent years. Increased migration also saw increased involvement of national and local 
governments, not just in monitoring the inflows and outflows of people, but in facilitating the 
improvement of the outcomes of these people, because improving their outcomes can positively 
impact the outcomes of the collective. I also previously discussed this in Chapters 1 and 2. In this 
regard then, I have asked questions on whether the respondents engage in various transnational 
activities such as sending remittances, visiting the home country and saving in the home country. 
Further I inquired about the regularity of these practices to be able to gauge the depth of their 
engagement. And finally, I inquired about their future intentions, as, what will be discussed later, 
future intentions, while not necessarily predicting what is going to happen in the future, can 
impact mindsets and help predict behavior and efforts respondents put in the task of integrating 
themselves into the host society. 
 
Administering the questionnaire took on the average 20 to 25 minutes. The original questionnaire 
had about 100 questions but pre-test rounds suggested cutting down the questionnaire as some 
of the questions did not work well and did not serve the purpose of the study.  
 
The draft questionnaire was circulated to a Filipino migrant organization for feedback in June 
2016 and after the initial comments were received, were revised and resent again. The final 
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version for pre-test became available in September 2016. I pre-tested a version of this survey 
instrument in September on two occasions.  First was on September 23, 2016 during an event 
hosted by the Philippine Embassy in Osaka held at the Aichi Prefectural Government. The 
consular event was meant to assist Filipinos in their filing of birth and marriage certificates and in 
renewing of passports and changing of status. The event drew a number of Filipino residents 
from the Chubu region. I tested the survey instrument on ten respondents and revised that 
version and pre-tested it again on September 24 during the Utawit, a national singing 
competition for Filipinos and Japanese in Japan which was initiated by three Filipino groups 
namely, Jeepney Press, Samahang Pilipino, and Teatro Kanto in cooperation with the Philippine 
Embassy. It has become an annual event ever since and has regional finals in Hokkaido, 
Morioka, Nagano, Shizuoka, Nagoya, Kyoto and Fukuoka. Winners of the regional finals 
compete in Tokyo. Events such as this always draw big numbers of Filipinos and this is where I 
conducted my second pre-test.  
 
After these two pre-tests, I established the first group of respondents which I utilized to initiate 
the snowball sampling method. I met with a member of the PSJ who I enlisted as an enumerator. 
I conducted enumerator training on September 25 and we officially began data collection on 
September 26. 
 
Stage 3. Conduct of survey operations 
The survey, excluding survey development, ran from September to November 2016. I conducted 
data checks twice a week to check the consistency of the responses. The enumerator filled in or 
guided the respondents in completing the survey questionnaires, responses of which directly 
goes into an online repository which I can access and check. My enumerator consistently 
provided me feedback regarding the implementation and I provided her feedback as well 
regarding the quality of the data through September to November until the data cleaning and 
processing period from November 2016 to April 2017.  
 
The survey operation was completed on November 06, 2016. Data checking and processing has 
been continuous since the beginning of the survey operations, as processing and making sense 
of the data helped me checked the consistency of the values I am getting. Data cleaning and 
processing was deemed officially completed by the end of April 2017. I exported the Comma 
Separated Values file from the online repository and exported it into a Stata file. I used Stata 12 
and 14, a general-purpose statistical software package by StataCorp to process and analyze my 
data.  
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E. Data 
A total of 491 individuals were approached to answer the questionnaire. A snowball sampling 
method that approximates random sampling was utilized. What it means is that the sampling 
method first proceeded as a normal snowball sampling method1. Given the specifications of the 
project, I had to conduct snowball sampling to be able to identify the target population of the 
project which are Filipino residents who have stayed for more than three months in Japan. In 
Japan, the difference between short-stay visas and long-stay visas is that short-stay visas are 
allowed to stay for a maximum of only 3 months in Japan.  
 
After identifying key informants with the help of Filipino migrant organizations I then proceeded to 
recruit participants through a snowball sampling method. I recruited the first group of participants 
through participating in events organized by Filipino migrant organizations. I picked out key 
participants from that group who recruited participants living in different wards in Nagoya. This 
approximated random sampling method and by the end of the survey operations, I have a map of 
respondents that look like this:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
1 At this point it is important to note of some issues encountered during the sampling process. Due to the 
nature of the survey, not everyone that we approached to answer the questionnaire had been very 
cooperative. Further, in the very first step, there had been an issue as to how to collect respondents. As I 
will discuss in more depth in the next sections, there are two main groups of Filipino migrant organizations 
in Nagoya City. While both groups were very accommodating, one group did make an effort to 
accommodate my research in their activities. Partly because of the differences in their approach towards 
migration issues as well as differences in their membership, I had formed more connections in one of the 
groups. Though of course there are overlaps in membership in both groups, I tended to include in my 
snowball sample people who tended to be more active in the activities of the group that had been 
accommodating me. Though at the end of the survey and upon comparison with the distribution of the 
Filipino population in Nagoya City, it can be said that the snowball sampling method resembled a random 
sampling method. 
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Chart 2.1. Map showing distribution of Filipino respondents by ward 
 
Legend: 
2.2%-3.49% 
3.5%-3.7% 
3.8%-4.4% 
4.5%-7.5% 
7.6%-23.0% 
 
This map reflects the distribution of the respondents. Comparing this with the actual distribution 
of Filipino respondents in Nagoya City by ward as of July 1, 2017 as is shown in Chart 2.2, we 
can say that it is a good enough approximation and is well-represented.  
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Chart 2.2. Actual distribution of Filipino residents by ward  
 
Source: Nagoya City, 2016 
 
As was mentioned, pre-tests began in September and data collection was initiated in the same 
month and was completed in November 2016. An average of 11 respondents was surveyed 
completely per day.  
 
Table 2.1. Data collection schedule and number of responses collected 
Month Magnitude Proportion 
September 31 6.31 
October 393 80.04 
November 67 13.65 
Total 491 100.00 
 
Table 2.2. Response rate 
Response rate Magnitude Proportion 
Agreed 480 97.76 
Refused 11 2.24 
Total 491 100.00 
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Table 2.3. Classification of respondents 
Classification Magnitude Proportion 
Not eligible 18 3.75 
Missing 3 0.63 
Complete 459 95.63 
Total 21 4.38 
 
From the 491 respondents approached to take part in the project, a little over two percent 
refused. 480 respondents were initially taken to be completed. But out of the 480 respondents, 
about 18 respondents were deemed ineligible, as some were less than 15 years old, and some 
have stayed in Japan for less than three months. After this initial process of cleaning and sorting, 
about 463 respondents were considered for the data processing but during the data processing, 
it was found out that three observations have incomplete responses and was therefore removed 
from the sample leaving 459 observations deemed complete and clean for data processing and 
analysis. 
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Chapter conclusion 
In this chapter, I endeavored to explain the conceptual and theoretical underpinnings of this 
research. Through this discussion, I explained how the framework being utilized in this study will 
address the gaps, both theoretical and methodological, that have been discussed in Chapter 1.  
 
To reiterate, this research aims to investigate the process of integration at the level of foreign 
residents, to understand how the interplay of individual and contextual factors can give rise to 
specific patterns and outcomes of integration, to know their integration outcomes and uncover 
patterns of integration. I argue that this research is timely as foreign residents, though 
constituting a relatively small percentage of the entire population in Japan, are continuously 
increasing. Most importantly, this research has significant policy implications. Understanding 
how a host so
foreign residents provides baseline information needed for evidence-based policy making.   
 
Further, I explained the methodology utilized in this project. I first delved into a discussion of the 
methodological approaches that have already been done in the literature. Doing so allowed me 
to assess the pros and cons of every approach. This led me to mixed-methods approach, an 
approach that combined both qualitative and quantitative approaches. I argued in this chapter 
that this approach fits the goals of this research which is to provide a more holistic understanding 
of the integration extent, including outcomes and processes of Filipino residents in Japan. I 
argued that doing so will have significant policy implications, facilitating possibilities of 
evidence-based policymaking.  
 
I also argued in this section that by doing mixed-methods I acceded to the limitations of both 
quantitative and qualitative approaches. On the one hand, what I want is to be able to provide a 
more general understanding of the integration extent of the Filipino residents while trying not to 
go down the route of overgeneralization which can put people at risk of being type casted. On the 
other hand, I want to be able to provide nuances within the discussion and show that while the 
data may show a coherent story, there are contradictions within that are important to note of 
while trying not to get bogged down by details. At the end of the day what I really wanted to be 
able to do is provide baseline information that can facilitate better policymaking.  
 
In the next sections I outlined how I carried out my research. Being that the methodology that I 
utilized is mixed-methods, the research has two components, qualitative and quantitative, that 
were implemented in three stages. In summary, I conducted key informant and stakeholder 
interviews, participant observation, archival research and policy analysis to understand the 
48 
 
context by which I will assess integration outcomes and patterns. From this I implemented a 
survey among Filipino residents in Nagoya City aiming to measure their integration outcomes as 
well as to gather information on various individual factors. This chapter concludes Part I of this 
research. In Part II, I will proceed with a discussion of the various contextual factors including the 
Japan and the approach, policies and programs currently being implemented by Nagoya City.  
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Part II. 
This part is composed of three chapters. The data presented in this part was gathered during the 
first stage of the methodology. As such this part of the research project serves to establish the 
context, or the structural frames by which agential outcomes come about.  
 
The first chapter will focus on the immigration in Japan. The second chapter will focus on the 
Philippine migration to Japan and the last chapter of Part II will provide a discussion on the 
specific context of Nagoya City, the focus of this study.  
 
The goal of this part is very simple. It aims to set the scene whereby I conduct my research. 
Doing so will allow me to present a more thorough and exhaustive illustration of the integration 
outcomes and process of the Filipino residents. 
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Chapter 3: Immigration in Japan 
Japan has often been seen as new  to the immigration of foreign people. However, people have 
moved in and out of Japan even before the economic boom in the 1980s. Though relative to 
other OECD countries, Japan has a fairly small population of foreign residents, we see that 
population growing and growing each year. Foreseeing a bigger need for workers for the 
upcoming Tokyo 2020 Olympics, Japan is poised to open its doors to more foreign workers. 
What the country fails however to recognize is that time and again, it has seen that many people 
do not simply go back once their contracts end, many of the foreigners who came to Japan 
during the 1980s stayed and never came back to their country.  
 
In this section, we look at the growth of the foreign population to Japan to better understand the 
weight of the issue of immigration in a country often seen as inexperienced  when it comes to 
matters of immigration. In the first section, we will look at the growth in numbers and compare its 
foreign population with that of other migrant-receiving countries. We will trace how this growth 
came about and discuss the two categories of foreign residents: the so-called old comers and 
the new comers. In the next section, we look at the evolution of policies in relation to Japan s 
experiences with the foreign population to shed light on its current approach to foreign resident 
integration. And finally, we look at the roles national and local governments take in addressing 
the issues of the ever-growing foreign resident population in Japan.  
 
A. Immigrants to Japan in numbers compared to other migrant-receiving countries 
Among the OECD countries, Japan is still considered as having a relatively small proportion of 
foreigners relative to its population (Chart 3.1). In terms of number it seems that Japan has more 
foreigners as compared to other European Union countries such as France and Germany but the 
density of the population in Japan makes the share of foreign resident population considerably 
small. Interestingly, the rise in the numbers of the foreign population in Japan follows the same 
pattern as in other OECD countries. The chart below shows the gradual increase in the stocks of 
foreign population in Japan. While Chart 3.2 shows that in terms of share in the population, 
foreign residents in Japan comprise a little over one percent in 2005 (1.6%) and has not 
increased that much in the next ten years (1.8% in 2015). This is the same as in South Korea 
regardless of the constant increase in the foreign resident population from 2005 to 2015. 
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Chart 3.1. Stocks of foreign population into selected OECD countries (in thousands) 
 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
France 3541.8 3696.9 3731.2 3773.2 3821.5 3892.8 3980.6 4083.9 4177.7 4351.0 4399.7 
Germany 6755.8 6751.0 6744.9 6727.6 6694.8 6753.6 6930.9 7213.7 7633.6 8153.0 9107.9 
Japan 2011.6 2083.2 2151.4 2215.9 2184.7 2132.9 2078.5 2033.7 2066.4 2121.8 2232.2 
Korea 510.5  660.6  800.3  895.5  920.9 1002.7  982.5  933.0  985.9 1091.5 1143.1 
United 
Kingdom 
3035.0 3392.0 3824.0 4186.0 4348.0 4524.0 4785.0 4788.0 4941.0 5592.0 5951.0 
United 
States 
20836.0 21696.3 21843.6 21685.7 21641.0 22460.6 22225.5 22115.0 22016.4 22263.4 22426.2 
Source: OECD International Migration Outlook 2017 
 
arguments pointing to this depopulation and aging as an important reason why immigration laws 
should be tightened, as the share of the foreign resident population can suddenly shoot up and 
overtake the rapidly declining local population. However this is also the same reason often cited 
by proponents of heightened immigration, that issues of depopulation and rapid aging bring with 
it other issues such as labor shortage and local public finace crisis that a foreign resident 
population can help address. However, up to now, the Japanese government remains 
ambivalent about accepting foreign residents permanently as a measure to tackle depopulation 
and rapid aging issues. But that it remains open to foreigners who will stay temporary (Akashi 
2009, Oishi 2013).  
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Chart 3.2. Proportion of foreign population of the total population of selected OECD countries 
 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
France  5.8  6.0  6.0  6.1  6.1  6.2  6.3  6.4  6.5  6.8  6.8 
Germany  8.3  8.3  8.3  8.3  8.3  8.4  8.6  9.0  9.5  10.1  11.3 
Japan  1.6  1.6  1.7  1.7  1.7  1.7  1.6  1.6  1.6  1.7  1.8 
Korea  1.1  1.4  1.7  1.8  1.9  2.0  2.0  1.9  2.0  2.2  2.3 
United 
Kingdom 
 5.0  5.6  6.3  6.8  7.0  7.2  7.6  7.5  7.7  8.7  9.2 
United 
States 
 7.0  7.3  7.2  7.1  7.0  7.2  7.1  7.0  6.9  7.0  7.0 
Source: OECD International Migration Outlook 2017 
 
We see this play out in the relatively small inflow of permanent immigrant in the case of Japan. 
As of 2013 Japan has 57,317.0 total permanent resident inflows to the country. This is about one 
fourth of the inflows to countries such as Germany (468,822.9), France (255,584.0) and Canada 
(262,773.0). About five times less than the United Kingdom (310,504.0) and about 17 times less 
than the United States (990,753.0) (see Chart 3.3). 
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Chart 3.3. Total permanent resident inflows, 2013 
 
Source: OECD (2017), Permanent immigrant inflows (indicator). doi: 10.1787/304546b6-en 
(Accessed on 22 August 2017) 
 
Comparing the types of inflows, we see that work-related inflow dominate the total number of 
total inflows. In 2013 there are more work-related inflows to Japan (25,050.0) than to Germany 
(24,293.0) and France (20,831.0). Japan in fact ranks seventh among the OECD countries in 
terms of work-related inflows. We see that family-related inflows are much less at 20,639.0 
compared to France (105,208.0) and Germany (56,046.0) (see Charts 4.4 and 4.5) 
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Chart 3.4. Work-related permanent immigrant inflows, 2013 
 
Source: OECD (2017), Permanent immigrant inflows (indicator). doi: 10.1787/304546b6-en 
(Accessed on 22 August 2017) 
 
Chart 3.5. Family-related permanent resident inflows, 2013 
 Source: OECD (2017), Permanent immigrant inflows (indicator). doi: 10.1787/304546b6-en 
(Accessed on 22 August 2017) 
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B. Foreign population in Japan over time 
In Japan, the foreign population is generally categorized into two: old comers and new comers. 
Old comers pertain to entrants before the industrialization and economic booms of the 1980s. 
Mostly Koreans, Chinese and nationals from former Japanese colonies, the migration of the old 
comers were driven by various factors: colonization, labor, family reunification among others. By 
the late 1970s and early 1980s, the so-called boat people or refugees from the Indo-Chinese 
region began arriving in Japan. Though rather small in number, compared to the succeeding 
arrival of foreign workers, it is said that it is the arrival of the boat people which prompted Japan 
to begin changing discriminatory parts of its constitution (Kawakami et al 2014).  
 
Those previous arrivals are in comparison with the almost purely economic drive behind much of 
the 1980s migration to Japan. The arrival of half a million foreigners by the late 1980s is often 
Southeast Asia, South Asia and South America (Yamanaka 2008). It was only in the first half of 
the 1990s that Japan began to accept foreign workers officially as temporary workers under the 
so-
Japan will eventually go back to their home countries. The 1990s saw 100,000 Nikkeijin 
1980s recession in South America. On th
company trainees, pre-
as tourists, who then sought employment by over-  
 
Chart 3.7 continues this and shows that from 2006 to 2016 the story is not as consistent. We see 
that from 2006 to 2008 there was a rapid increase from less than 2.1 million to more than 2.2 
million. However, we see this increase disappear after 2008 when numbers dropped from 2.2 
million to less than two million in a span of four years. This decrease can be attributed to the 
global financial crisis in 2008 and the subsequent Tohoku earthquake in 2011 which saw the 
return of a number of the foreign resident population back to their home countries. Further, 
changes in regulations, introduction of new policies all contributed to the changes in the foreign 
resident population in this period as we will discuss in a later section.  
 
By 2012 however, we see a sharp increase in the total number of foreign residents from leading 
up to 2016. The increase from 2012 to 2016 had been steep and rapid and is half of the total 
increase from 1991 to 2007 which in terms of time is just one fourth of the period from 1991 to 
2007. 
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Chart 3.6. Foreign residents in Japan, 1991-2007  
 
Source: Ministry of Justice 2016. http://www.moj.go.jp/housei/toukei/toukei_ichiran_touroku.html 
 
 
Chart 3.7. Foreign residents in Japan, 2006-2016 
 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Total 2,084,919 2,152,973 2,217,426 2,186,121 2,134,151 2,078,508 2,033,656 2,066,445 2,121,831 2,232,189 2,382,822 
Source: Ministry of Justice 2006-2016 
http://www.moj.go.jp/housei/toukei/toukei_ichiran_touroku.html 
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Looking at the nationalities of the foreign resident population, we see that majority are still 
comprised of foreign residents considered old comers. In 2016, Chinese (695,522) and Koreans 
(453,096) make up majority of this population and recently Filipinos (243,662) have overtaken 
Brazilians (180,923) as among the most populous foreign resident population in Japan. We see 
that most of the nationalities experienced a decline in numbers by 2008 which continued until 
2012 when most of the population numbers picked up again. We do not see the same pattern 
however with Koreans as Koreans continue to decrease until 2016.  
 
Chart 3.8. Foreign population by country 
 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Philippines 193,488 202,592 210,617 211,716 210,181 209,376 202,985 209,183  217,585  229,595 243,662 
China 560,741 606,889 655,377 680,518 687,156 674,879 652,595 649,078  654,777  665,847 695,522 
Korea 
(N&S) 
598,219 593,489 589,239 578,495 565,989 545,401 530,048 519,740  501,230  457,772 453,096 
Brazil 312,979 316,967 312,582 267,456 230,552 210,032 190,609 181,317  175,410  173,437 180,923 
Source: Source: Ministry of Justice 2006-2016 
http://www.moj.go.jp/housei/toukei/toukei_ichiran_touroku.html 
 
What makes up most of the foreign resident population? Chart below shows the increase in the 
foreign population in Japan from 2006 to 2016. We see that almost all categories of residency 
increased over time except for special designated activities, a group of visa categories that 
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pertain to very specialized activities such as sports, research and information processing and 
other countries such as Indonesia and the Philippines.  
 
The most interesting group or groups of categories however involve categories that pertain to 
more long-term stays in Japan such as permanent residents, long-term residents, special 
permanent residents, spouses of Japanese Nationals and permanent residents and dependents. 
We see these categories increase gradually but consistently from 2006 to 2016. In fact, we see 
that permanent residents make up majority of the foreign population by 2016, and that overall 
permanent-stay categories of visas make up about 60 percent of the total foreign population.   
 
Chart 3.9. Foreign population in Japan, by visa categories, 2006-2016 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Permanent 
resident 
394,477  439,757 492,056 533,472 565,089  598,440  624,501  655,315  677,019  700,500  727,111  
Spouse of 
Japanese 
260,955  256,980 245,497 221,923 196,248  181,617  162,332  151,156  145,312  140,349  139,327  
Spouse of 
Permanent 
resident 
 12,897  15,365 17,839 19,570  20,251   21,647   22,946   24,649   27,066   28,939   30,972  
Long-term 
resident 
268,836  268,604 258,498 221,771 194,602  177,983  165,001  160,391  159,596  161,532  168,830  
Special 
permanent 
resident 
443,044  430,229 420,305 409,565 399,106  389,085  381,364  373,221  358,409  348,626  338,950  
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Entertainers  21,062  15,728 13,031 10,966  9,247   6,265   1,646   1,662   1,967   1,869   2,187  
International 
students 
131,789  132,460 138,514 145,909 201,511  188,605  180,919  193,073  214,525  246,679  277,331  
Trainees - - - - 100,008  141,994  151,477  155,206  167,626  192,655  288,588  
Intra-company 
transfers 
 14,014  16,111 17,798 16,786  16,140   14,636   14,867   15,218   15,378   15,465   15,772  
Engineers, 
international 
relations 
92,458  106,447  119,564  119,888  115,059  110,488  111,994  115,357  122,794  137,706  161,124  
Family stay  91,344  98,167 107,641 115,081 118,865  119,359  120,693  122,155  125,992  133,589  149,303  
Special 
designated 
activities 
 97,476  104,488 121,863 130,636  72,374   22,751   20,159   22,673   28,001   37,175   47,039  
Source: Source: Ministry of Justice 2006-2016 
http://www.moj.go.jp/housei/toukei/toukei_ichiran_touroku.html 
 
This provides a very interesting backdrop for how Japan approaches immigration and the 
corresponding issues related to settlement, rootedness, householding and livability. We see 
based on earlier assertions that Japan is rather hesitant when it comes to accepting foreigners 
though its doors have been open for work-related flows. However, what we see is that most of 
the foreigners staying are staying not so much for work-related and temporary reasons but more 
for family-related reasons and seem to be more permanent in duration. In the next section, we 
look at how Japan has historically approached its foreign resident population.  
 
C. Immigration policies and approaches to foreign resident integration  
who are to be employed for their special skills are admitted as much as possible, while various 
p.2). Further he 
mentions three tenets which act as bases for Japanese laws on immigration. First, admitting 
foreign workers should be a last resort; second, unskilled workers should not be admitted; and 
third, all foreigners are admitted on a temporary basis only. Kondo (1995) further notes that 
Japan is one of the few countries which maintain strict rules on immigration.  
 
According to Kondo (2002), even though Japan has had a foreign population after it opened up 
after the seclusion period in the 1850s Japan has never had an immigrant policy before that 
period. The first immigration-related policy is the Immigration Control Order promulgated in 1951 
which was heavily influenced by the United States. Interestingly, the Immigration Control Order 
had a visa category for permanent residents, which is comparable to the immigrant category in 
the immigrant policy system of the United States though no one had been given this residency 
until the Immigration Control Order was replaced with the 1982 Immigration Control and Refugee 
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Recognition Act (ICRRA). 
 
Kondo (2002) notes that the development of policies pertaining to immigration control and 
douwa which 
literally means assimilation governed most of the period from the Second World War to the 
beginning of the industrialization and economic booms. The second period is characterized by 
kokusaika , covered the period from the economic boom of the 1980s to the 
1990s. The third period, which has often been the focus of much of Western scholars studying 
immigration in Japan saw the emergence tabunka kyousei
co-existence. In this section, we look at each of this period and the associated approaches in 
turn.  
 
Douwa and the aftermath of the Second World War 
douwa ilized before the Second World War, it has 
been utilized more for internal assimilation in the context of the Burakumin and the Ainu people 
and other ethnic minorities such as the Ryukyuan. The pre-war government referred to the 
Youwa or conciliation policy as a policy for internal assimilation until in 1940 when the name was 
changed to Dou Douwa is an abbreviation of Douhou 
Ichiwa all citizens should assimilate  
 
The same concept was also then eventually deployed in the context of external assimilation 
during the period after the War to the beginning of the industrialization period. It was during this 
time when the 1951 Immigration Control Order was renamed the Immigration Control Act in 1952 
(Kondo 2015). This period has been heavily characterized by assimilation, exclusion and 
discrimination. Foreign residents, most of them old comer Koreans and Taiwanese who were 
previously granted residency, lost their citizenship after the end of the Second World War and 
uncertainty removed access to many social rights and services. For many Zainichi Korean old 
comers, to be able to work in public office they had to naturalize and change their names which 
many did not want. The term zainichi itself implied impermanence of their stay in Japan as after 
losing their citizenship they were treated as foreign residents who were temporarily staying in 
Japan. There was widespread discrimination during this period stemming from the assimilation 
policy that aims to present Japan as homogenous (Weiner 2000). 
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Kokusaika and the 1980s 
In the 1980s however, the approach shifted. This period is still characterized by strict immigration 
but the economic booms and Japan s accession to the United Nations Convention Relating to 
the Status of Refugees in 1981 saw a marked improvement in the way the national government 
approached migration. Indo-Chinese refugees, or so-called boat people, are often compared 
with the American which brought the opening of Japan to the world (Kondo 
2015). The arrival of the Indo-Chinese refugees made the accession of Japan to the UN 
Convention on Refugees almost a natural progression2. Acknowledging that ratifying the UN 
Convention on Refugees would require the country to amend various social security laws 
pertaining to foreigners3, Japan enacted in 1981 and enforced in 1982 the Immigration Control 
and Refugee Recognition Act (ICRRA, Kondo 2015). Interestingly, the enactment of the ICRRA 
 influenced by G7 summit member states  
and most importantly,   identity and solidifying its 
 (Kondo 2015). This period brought to the fore the concept of 
internationalization or kokusaika (Komai 1999, 2006).  
 
According to Flowers (2012) in the 1980s, the Japanese government promoted the term 
kokusaika or literal
For Kondo (2015), kokusaika 
became somewhat an excuse of a substitute for Japan s integration policy in that while there is 
no actual integration policy as amendments in the Citizenship act to acknowledge principle 
patrilineal and matrilineal jus sanguinis instead of just the former had a -product in the 
abolishment of the assimilative naturalization procedure to waive et  
 
                                            
2 According to Kawakami et al (2014), the initial status given to the so-called boat people were Special 
Japan upon their arrival prompted them to treat the refugees as people being rescued at sea. As their 
numbers increased, Japan started building government-supported infrastructures in order to provide 
passively and reactively to the unfolding situation rather than proactively in finding solutions to the problems, 
due in part to the governm  
3 
regulations that provide for differential treatment between Japanese nationals and non-Japanese. Such 
discriminatory laws and regulations included restrictions on eligibility of applications, eligibility for social 
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By the end of the 1980s however, Japan s bubble economy began, encouraging debates as to 
whether more foreign workers should be allowed. At the same time kokusaika as the concept 
governing immigration has been riddled with criticisms. In terms of national policies for foreigners, 
Kondo (2015) notes that indeed citizenship requirements were eliminated from the National 
Pension Act, the Child Allowance Act among others
 . As an approach, kokusaika 
these programs made under the banner of kokusaika shared the same understanding that the 
movements of people that were being encouraged were temporary. Further, kokusaika has been 
used interchangeably with the Japanese word for globalization on the belief that Japan needed 
to internationalize itself to remain competitive in an economically connected world (Lovell 2010).  
 
Tabunka kyousei and the 1990s period 
The end of the 1980s has sparked a debate about whether the labor shortage brought about by 
the economic boom in the 1980s should be reason enough to allow entry of more foreign 
workers. In response to the ever-growing labor shortage problem stemming from the 
created a demand for unskilled labor (Vogt 2007). The government gave in and while it did retain 
strict immigration laws, it has allowed loopholes. Vogt (2007) illustrates this perfectly in saying 
that 
Side doors 
and backdoors allowing entry of unskilled foreign workers were both intentionally and 
unintentionally created even though entry of unskilled workers goes against the pillars of 
immigration mentioned earlier (Yamanaka 1993, Kondo 2015, Vogt 2007). Kondo (2015) notes 
that three loopholes were established: first Nikkeijin mostly from South American countries were 
allowed through the front door and were given unrestricted access to work; second, side door for 
trainees who came mainly from China and other Asian countries and; third back door for irregular 
migrants from South Korea and the Philippines.  
 
Despite the increasing number of foreigners, the national government remained ambivalent. 
Initially viewing foreign workers as temporary, the national government remained in denial even 
as these foreign workers began staying longer and longer than expected. The Immigration 
Bureau in the Ministry of Justice is the central agency on matters relating to immigration whose 
functions include general affairs, policy, entry and status, adjudication, enforcement, registration 
(Kondo 1995), all relating to inflows, outflows and labor issues. Under the Employment Security 
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Law discrimination based on the citizenship is prohibited in occupation introduction and 
vocational counselling, however companies cannot be policed one by one (Kondo 1995). Further, 
we see that even if citizenship clauses were eliminated from the National Pension Law, the Child 
Dependency Allowance Law, the Special Child Dependency Allowance Law and the Child 
Allowance Law, among others, Kondo (1995) argues that there are still problems within the 
 welfare. The Livelihood Protection Law covers permanent 
residents, or spouse or children of Japanese residents and children of permanent residents or 
quasi-permanent residents for medical care but other foreign residents which do not fall under 
said categ
(Kondo 1995). 
 
Japan has established social integration policies for foreign workers in the Comprehensive 
Policy on the Lives of Foreigners under the Liaison and Coordination Committee of the Ministries 
Related to the Lives of Foreigners (Kitawaki 2010). However, as Kitawaki (2010) 
policy is not a true social integration policy for coping with the structural inequality that foreigners 
are confronted with, but rather an adaptation of the present policies and institutions to individual 
 
 
These developments implied two key issues: first, there is still a restrictive national government 
who does admit that it is accepting foreigners, ignoring the increasing number of foreigners, 
many of whom are unskilled given the loopholes in ICRRA. In 2008, the Liberal Democratic Party 
(LDP), headed by then Secretary General Nakagawa Hidenao submitted a new immigration plan 
that aims to accept 10 million immigrants in the 50 years after 20084. It was an ambitious plan, 
and a plan that held so much potential according to migration scholars but the plan was largely 
ignored (Lam 2009).  
 
Secondly, foreigners who increase in number because of these loopholes and become 
immediate issues for local governments who, without a more comprehensive integration policy 
coming from the central government, may be inexperienced but have started introducing policies 
                                            
4 se the number of incoming foreign students and increase the number of 
accepted asylum seekers to 1,000. The plan also focused on immigrants, not on foreign residents and it 
staying longer and longer 
than expected. Further, the plan included family reunification programs which were key features of many 
immigrant receiving countries in the West such as Canada, the United States and Germany (Roberts 2013). 
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to address foreign resident lives.  
 
Given these two issues, local governments have stepped in and began rallying around the 
concept of tabunka kyousei or literally multicultural co-existence (Yamawaki 2002, Menju 2003, 
Flowers 2012). We have begun seeing multicultural plans as common fixtures in local 
government websites (Baba and Fukuda 2009). 
, a promise that simply means 
going beyond kokusaika. Ashley Carruthers (2004) makes a distinction between consumed and 
lived multiculturalism. On the one hand, consumed multiculturalism looks at the consumer as the 
agent and the migrant subjectivity as denied. This according to Flowers (2012) had been the 
effect of many kokusaika policies. Researchers have criticized Japan for its kokusaika policies, 
thus a shift to a more socially just concept promoting diversity, tabunka kyousei, has been 
adapted as part of policy discussions. The concept puts the focus on foreigners as the central 
element (Flowers 2012).  
 
In 2006, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication (MIAC) created a Model Plan for the 
Promotion of Intercultural Cohesion (Multicultural Co-existence) in Local Communities 
highlighting the role of local governments in promoting tabunka kyousei as the government s 
platform for migrant integration (MIAC 2006). The MIAC report specifies that local governments 
are (Nagy 2008):  
1. Immediate interface for foreign residents and thus the locus of multicultural coexistence 
policy implementation.  
2. The communiqué stressed the importance of securing the human rights of foreign residents 
in an effort to abide by all international conventions.  
3. As a tool to revitalize local municipalities. 
 
Th
. The national government has 
acknowledged the capability and need of local governments to address contacts and clashes 
between migrants and local Japanese residents. These contacts and clashes between locals 
and foreigners are mostly felt at the local level and local governments are left with a task they 
themselves cannot seem to define.  
 
What we have seen here are the shifts in how Japan approaches immigration and integration. 
Interestingly, we note that these shifts coincide with the earlier paradigm shifts that we have 
noted from the literature review in Chapter 1. We saw that while douwa was used initially in the 
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context of internal assimilation, during the process of assimilating colonized subjects such as 
Taiwanese and Koreans, it had evolved to mimic the concept of assimilation as used in the West 
when it became popular in assessing the in
the Italians. As with the West, the negative connotations of douwa made many allergic to the 
 to the UN Refugee Convention, douwa lost its appeal and 
paving the way for kokusaika to become the buzzword when referring to all things international. 
Though slightly different in terms used, kokusaika reflected the key ideas about multiculturalism, 
and with it, its negative connotations. Both used in the context of an increasing diversity in the 
world, both kokusaika and multiculturalism fell prey to the problems of diversity left on its own. In 
the West, there has been seen a backlash against multiculturalism, and in Japan kokusaika was 
replete with negative meanings that soon many saw the increasing movement of local 
governments under the banner of tabunka kyousei. Tabunka kyousei, a rather more grounded 
and more diversity-centered approach is currently being utilized and has resulted to a number of 
municipalities releasing multicultural co-existence plans. This coincided with the call for a new 
concept in the West to describe this process of migrant incorporation. Recently then there has 
been a lot of debate as to how integration can be measured, as measuring it has the been the 
first thing on the agenda in the hope that it will help avoid the pitfalls of multiculturalism.  
 
much of migrant-receiving states in the Western part of the world, understanding integration 
becomes a much more bearable undertaking.  
 
D. Local governments and the integration of foreign residents 
What we have done so far is to examine the development of Japan s immigration policy and how 
it relates to the integration of the foreign residents. What we have seen is that while Japan opens 
doors, albeit reluctantly, it assumes that all foreigners it lets in will eventually leave once they 
fulfill their contracts. However, that is not what is happening. The numbers of permanent and 
long-term residents continue to increase, and not everyone came through proper channels. 
Many of them are foreigners who were categorized as so-called unskilled.  
 
Not acknowledging that many foreigners are staying longer and longer and more permanently as 
we have seen allows the government an excuse to not initiate a comprehensive integration 
policy. It has used the mono-ethnic  and inexperienced  excuses time and time again to deny 
the existence of immigrants. What this led to is the passing off the responsibility to local 
governments whose jurisdiction and legal powers may not be enough to address the livability 
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issues of foreign residents.  
 
Local governments have begun to implement multicultural policies in response to the growing 
number of foreign residents, promoting tolerance and co-existence between foreigners and local 
residents (Yamamoto and Matsumiya 2007). Since the 1990s, particularly after the 
Hanshin- tabunka kyousei has often been used by some 
local governments in Japan to support foreign residents in areas such as Japanese language, 
 Municipalities began actively supporting the 
concept of kokusaika and tabunka kyousei mmittee for 
 2010). This Committee was 
formed in 2001 in response to the call made by Hamamatsu City. Hamamatsu City houses 
globalized companies such as Honda, Yamaha and Suzuki, and has attracted Nikkeijin. This 
symbiotic society based on the respect of rights and fulfilment of duties that are mandatory for 
healthy urban life, amid deepening of mutual 
 2010, p.5), the intention 
 2010). Local 
governments have also established various consultation services for foreigners such as labor 
consultation centers and medical translation services (Shipper, 2011). Baba and Fukuda (2009) 
also note of the proliferation of English translation of local government websites in response to 
tabunka kyousei. Language classes for adult and children learners became a normal feature for 
many local governments adopting tabunka kyousei, as well as recently, foreign advisory 
committees.  
 
As the initial applause for tabunka kyousei begins to die down, speculations as to how lasting 
such an arrangement could be start sprouting. While some local governments want a more 
progressive integration policy such as allowing foreign residents local voting rights as in the 
case of Kawasaki City (Green 2013) its limitations prove that at the end of the day what is 
needed is an integration policy from the central government. 
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Chapter conclusion: 
This chapter is the first chapter of the second part of this project. Part II discusses in-depth the 
contextual factors that may impact foreign resident integration. In this chapter, we looked at the 
changing landscape of Japan in terms of immigration. What we see is that numbers do change, 
suggesting a continuous increase in the stock of foreign population in the country. While the 
increase is not so dramatic, it is steady and for a country that is supposedly inexperienced  
when it comes to foreign population, having almost two percent of its entire population as 
foreigners already warrants a discussion.  
 
We saw in this chapter how Japan fares compared to other OECD countries. It was noted that 
most of the migration into Japan are work-related as was shown by the OECD statistics, which is 
contradictory to countries like France and Germany of which majority of inflows involve 
family-related migration.  
 
In this chapter, I also outlined the development of the immigration approach in Japan. What we 
saw is that regardless of the increase in numbers, the national government still refuses to 
acknowledge that many foreigners are staying longer and more permanently. What this led to is 
a lack of governing policies at the national level. This reluctance by the national government 
opened a role for local governments and take charge of livability issues. What we see is that in 
the absence of services and policies aimed to address livability issues of foreign residents at the 
national government, local governments are trying to fill in this role to facilitate a more 
harmonious co-existence between foreign and local residents. However, to create a lasting 
harmonious co-existence, simply delivering services may not be enough. We see from the 
development of the approaches to foreign-related issues that immigration is something that if can 
be avoided should be avoided. Issues therefore ran much deeper than simply providing services. 
 
It becomes interesting then to see how these contextual factors impact the integration of foreign 
residents based on their own individual experiences. More so, how this particular approach to 
integration as it interacts with the histories and individual factors of foreign residents impact their 
integration extent and levels. In the next chapter, we will look at the specific focus of this project: 
Filipinos in Japan and specifically, Filipinos in Nagoya City. 
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Chapter 4: Filipinos in Japan 
In this chapter, I illustrate the magnitude of the Filipino resident population in Japan by providing 
recent statistics. I also map the migration of the Filipinos to Japan and trace the many different 
occupations and roles that Filipinos have assumed in the Japanese society. 
 
A. Statistics Filipinos in numbers 
According to the Ministry of Justice as of 2016, there are 243,662 Filipino residents currently 
living in Japan. As mentioned in previous chapters, Filipinos are among the top three foreign 
population in Japan, preceded by Chinese with 695,522 residents and Koreans with 453,096 
residents. We saw from the previous chapter that their numbers have increased constantly from 
2006 to 2016, except for a slight dip in 2012. It should be noted however that the number of 
foreign residents in Japan have overall decreased in 2012, mostly attributed to the aftermath of 
the Tohoku Earthquake in 2011. However, numbers continue to increase after 2012 and by 2016 
the numbers have been the highest it has ever been.  
 
This is the same for Filipinos. Chart 5.1 below shows the available data from the Ministry of 
Justice. The available data dates from 2006 and 2016 and shows the changes in the number of 
Filipino residents in Japan from that period. The year 2016 records the highest number of 
Filipinos at 243,662. This is about 26 percent increase since 2006.  
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Chart 4.1. Filipino residents in Japan, 2006-2016 
 
 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Total 193,488  202,592 210,617 211,716 210,181  209,376  202,985  209,183  217,585  229,595  243,662  
Source: Source: Ministry of Justice 2006-2016 
http://www.moj.go.jp/housei/toukei/toukei_ichiran_touroku.html 
 
Filipinos fall into the newcomer category. Filipino residents are scattered unevenly all over Japan, 
with majority centered in high-density population areas such as Tokyo, Kanagawa, Saitama, 
Aichi, and Gifu, cities that have historically attracted migrants such as Tokyo, Osaka, Kyoto and 
Nagoya (Ministry of Justice 2016).  
 
We also see from the chart below that the Filipino migrants are aging. Comparing 2012 to 2016 
we see that Filipino residents aged 55 years old and above have grown while those aged 35 to 
44 years old have shrunk. This population is being replenished, however. But even though the 
population aged less than 15 years old seem to remain constant suggesting a continuous 
replenishment, the replenishment cannot seem to catch up to the evening out of the age groups. 
However, in general, from earlier statistics, we see that Filipino residents in Japan continue to 
grow.  
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Chart 4.2. Filipino residents, by age groups, 2012-2016 
 
Year 
Less than 15 
years old 
15-24 years 
old 
25-34 years 
old 
35-44 years 
old 
45-54 years 
old 
55-64 years 
old 
Above 65 
years old 
2012 19,677 21,025 52,300 64,434 38,894 5,969 686 
2013 20,366 21,865 51,351 63,002 44,517 7,264 817 
2014 21,136 23,219 51,596 61,621 50,157 8,890 963 
2015 22,090 25,244 54,308 60,671 55,083 11,023 1,175 
2016 23,193 27,268 58,352 60,857 59,362 13,156 1,473 
Source: Source: Ministry of Justice 2006-2016 
http://www.moj.go.jp/housei/toukei/toukei_ichiran_touroku.html 
 
In terms of gender, statistics from the Ministry of Justice from 2012 to 2016 show that Filipino 
women continue to outnumber men at 177,205 versus 66,457. We see that the number of males 
continue to grow, however, the number of females also continue to grow. The difference 
between the two sexes seems to remain consistent from 2012 to 2016. We see however that the 
number of males has grown by almost 46 percent and that the number of females only grew by 
about 12 percent from 2006 to 2016. Now looking at the composition of the Filipino residents, we 
see that over 60 percent of the total foreign residents are permanent and long-term stayers 
which raise issues related to population, reproduction, householding and integration. Permanent 
and long-term stayers grew by almost 45 percent in ten years. Most of the Filipino residents in 
Japan seem to be in Japan for the long haul, though of course some of them may eventually 
leave. But what the numbers tell us is that contrary to what has been expected, most of the 
d longer and more 
permanently.  
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Chart 4.3. Filipino residents by sex, 2012-2016 
 
Year 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Male  45,423   48,275   52,508   59,309   66,457  
Female  157,562  160,908  165,077  170,286  177,205  
Source: Source: Ministry of Justice 2006-2016 
http://www.moj.go.jp/housei/toukei/toukei_ichiran_touroku.html 
 
Chart 4.4. Permanent and long-term stayers compared to the total Filipino resident population, 
2006-2016  
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 Total Permanent 
and long-term 
stayers 
Permanent 
resident 
Spouse of 
Japanese national 
Spouse of 
Permanent 
resident 
Long-term 
resident 
2006 193,488 140,936 60,225 49,195 1,570 29,907 
2007 202,592 153,613 67,131 51,076 2,032 33,332 
2008 210,617 164,017 75,806 49,980 2,472 35,717 
2009 211,716 170,375 84,407 46,027 2,765 37,131 
2010 210,181 174,823 92,754 41,255 2,899 37,870 
2011 209,376 180,575 99,604 38,249 3,347 39,331 
2012 202,985 183,930 106,399 33,123 3,648 40,714 
2013 209,183 188,606 111,952 30,561 3,889 42,156 
2014 217,585 193,280 115,857 29,150 4,229 43,997 
2015 229,595 198,365 120,390 27,701 4,546 45,680 
2016 243,662 203,708 124,477 26,687 4,834 47,663 
Source: Source: Ministry of Justice 2006-2016 
http://www.moj.go.jp/housei/toukei/toukei_ichiran_touroku.html 
 
We see that compared to the total number of Filipino residents, permanent residents make up 
majority of the population. We see that as other visa status relating to permanent and long-term 
residency decline, the number of residents with permanent resident visas increase. For instance, 
the number of Filipinos with Spouse of Japanese National reached its peak in 2008 and slowly 
declined from there. The increase in permanent residents can be attributed to the changing of 
residency status of other Filipino residents.  
 
B. Mapping the Philippine Migration to Japan 
According to Tullao and Corez (2003), Japan is the Philippines  leading commercial partner , as 
well as, in terms of official development assistance (ODA), the Philippines draws from Japan a 
considerable amount to finance various infrastructure and human development efforts in the 
. 
 
Japan continues to be the major source of ODA contributing approximately 45 percent of the 
total ODA received by the Philippines from 1992 to 1999. By 2008, ODA received by the 
Philippines is at 914 Million of which 33 percent or 302.54 Million is from Japan (Embassy of 
Japan in the Philippines, 2008). Also, in 2002, of the total 667,226 OFWs deployed by the 
Philippines, some 77,870 OFWs went to Japan (POEA 2016). Out of the significant foreign 
exchange remittances in 2002, OFWs from Japan sent approximately USD 443 million (BSP 
2003).  
 
Chart 4.5 below shows the stock estimates of Filipinos in Japan by category from 1997 to 2013. 
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We see it peaking in 2004 and experienced a decline until 2007 which peaked again in 2010. In 
2013 there was about 182,917 Filipinos in Japan both permanent and temporary. The important 
thing to notice is that while the numbers of temporary and irregular stocks experience sharp 
declines and continue to declines, the number of permanent stocks continues to increase. The 
numbers more than tripled from 1997 to 2013.  
 
Chart 4.5. Stock estimates of Filipinos in Japan, by category, 1997-2013 
 
 Permanent Temporary Irregular Total 
1997 36,262 116,000 48,000 200,262 
1998 48,939 128,465 48,000 225,404 
1999 53,158 105,308 39,235 197,701 
2000 59,626 133,631 16,369 209,626 
2001 65,647 138,522 36,379 240,548 
2002 71,381 138,522 76,573 286,476 
2003 77,310 197,268 30,100 304,678 
2004 83,303 238,522 31,430 353,255 
2005 114,980 139,791 30,619 285,390 
2006 124,722 103,555 30,700 258,977 
2007 133,528 38,329 30,700 202,557 
2008 141,210 60,020 30,700 231,930 
2009 146,488 29,559 34,570 210,617 
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2010 150,254 127,264 12,840 290,358 
2011 154,219 57,333 9,330 220,882 
2012 158,978 77,248 6,910 243,136 
2013 163,532 12,475 6,910 182,917 
Source: Commission on Overseas Filipinos 1997-2013 
 
On the other hand, Chart 4.6 shows OFWs who travelled to Japan by sex. We see that while the 
number of females decline, the number of males increase. We see a sharp decline by 2005, 
coinciding with the release of the Trafficking In Persons (TIP) Report of the United States. We 
will have a more detailed discussion on that as we go along in this chapter. As of 2016, female 
OFWs travelling to Japan are 28,800 while males are almost double the number at 48,880. 
 
Chart 4.6. Overseas Filipino Workers who travelled to Japan by sex, 1997-2016 
 
 Total Male Female 
1997 71000 45000 26000 
1998 67000 38000 29000 
1999 82000 49000 34000 
2000 86000 51000 36000 
2001 94000 49000 45000 
2002 87000 41000 46000 
2003 103000 49000 54000 
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2004 97000 42000 54000 
2005 112710 53440 59130 
2006 90900 51068 39728 
2007 97832 63190 35137 
2008 102102 64108 37752 
2009 86040 60600 26129 
2010 89892 68352 21450 
2011 90636 66434 23736 
2012 75480 53956 21440 
2013 78030 47314 31948 
2014 67280 49407 16380 
2015 85645 61047 23750 
2016 78400 48880 28800 
Source: Philippine Statistics Authority 1997-2016 
 
In this section, I will address how there eventually came to settle a significant number of Filipinos 
in Japan as shown in the previous section. To be able to do this, I will map the Filipino migration 
to Japan. I will begin with a discussion on how a culture of migration was created in the 
Philippines following the labor export policy issued by the Marcos government in the 1970s. I will 
then discuss how Japan became a leading destination for many of the Filipino migrants, in 
particular women. I will then trace the changes in the work Filipinos engage in Japan to show that 
these occupational changes are often a reflection of what Japan needs  in the 1980s to 1990s, 
because of a shortage of unskilled labor in the entertainment and construction industry following 
the economic booms; in the 2000s, the increase in migrating nurse trainees and caregivers 
following rise in the number of aged population and decrease in birthrate; and how this 
feminization of migration to Japan have led to an increase in the number of Filipino women 
holding spouse visas and in the increase of Filipino-Japanese children. 
 
 
The literature on Filipino migration shows that migration between the 1970s and 1980s were 
generally undertaken by few people and were more permanent in nature (Paul 2011). The 
migration of Filipinos abroad was in waves: first in 1903, which reached its peak in the 1920s and 
1930s (Tolentino, 1996), second was from 1945 to the 1960s (Tolentino, 1996); and the third 
which was 
present.  
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The export of Filipino labor became an official government policy in the 1980s (Semyonov and 
Gordzeisky 2004). According to Battistella (1999), the 
the well-known intent of participating in the construction projects in the Middle East in the early 
Labor Code of the Philippines via President 
residential Decree 
 (Battistella 1999). The 
labor export policy was f
Docot 2011, p. 5).  
 
According to Asis (2006) a culture of migration has developed in the Philippines. Paul (2011) 
argues that this was spurred by four major factors: es, the 
institutionalization of the migration industry through the labor export policy, the large volume of 
remittances sent back each year and the substantial Filipino diaspora spread throughout the 
world.  
 
Patterned after South Korea s strategy on exporting labor temporarily to build a skilled and 
experienced work force, the labor export policy was supposedly a temporary measure. However, 
researchers lament that what started as an interim strategy for debt payment and response to 
inflation became institutionalized as a permanent government program for development (Asis 
2006, Paul 2011, Docot 2011) 
 
What it did was to entrench the culture of migration, it developed the mindset that it is acceptable 
to want to migrate and work, especially if it is for the betterment of the family since there is no 
available opportunity in the home country, forgetting that opportunities should be made by the 
government within the home country and not outside. By 2005, in a survey asking adults whether 
they want to migrate abroad, Paul (2011) notes that about 33 percent of adults expressed intent 
to migrate abroad.  
 
Who wouldn t want to migrate? The promises of migration are many. In a country where people 
believe that there are no opportunities available, with a government that promotes out migration, 
add to this the continuous heralding of overseas workers by the government through tagging of 
various heroic names, years since the first wave of migration began, more and more people have 
gone abroad. Currently the Philippines are among the top sources of migrant workers all over the 
world.  
 
Back in the home country, migrants are often lauded with praises since the 1980s by different 
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government administrations. From -  in the 1980s,  in the 
1990s, and in the 2000s. What these did is to 
further entrench migration as a source, not just of economic development, but as pride and honor. 
However, this does not take into account that majority of the Filipino migrant workers are 
engaged in low-skilled jobs, jobs many would not otherwise do given their educational attainment 
and skills. According to the results of the 2016 Survey on Overseas Filipinos, one in every three 
Overseas Filipino Workers (OFW) is engaged in elementary occupations, occupations which 
consist of simple and routine tasks. 
 
 occupations in Japan 
We have seen earlier that Filipinos have constituted a big bulk of the foreigners coming to Japan. 
In the 1970s to the 1990s, many came in as entertainers, tourists and trainees. The introduction 
of the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) between Japan and the Philippines saw the 
arrival of Filipinos coming in as nurse trainees. While, the extension of the Japan Exchange and 
Teaching (JET) Programme to Filipinos saw the increase of Filipino Assistant Language 
Teachers, and through various scholarships provided by the Japanese and Philippine 
Governments, as well as other private and international organizations, more and more Filipinos 
have been coming in as students. In this section, we discuss the various occupations available to 
Filipinos. I argue in this section that the compounding and meeting of the demand and supply 
sides of migration have allowed the stocks of Filipino residents in Japan to increase. On the one 
hand, on the supply side, given the culture of migration, a big bulk of Filipinos aspired to migrate 
and became available and willing to take up occupations that other Japanese people would not. 
While on the other, the economic boom in the 1980s in Japan has opened up doors for the 
Filipino labor export supply. The succeeding concerns with age and depopulation have 
continued to create a market for Filipino labor. However, I note that the relationship is never 
equal and that the occupations allowed to Filipinos is a reflection of the different needs of the 
demand side. Coupled with restrictions and ambivalence of the national government to accept 
and recognize the many foreign bodies coming into the country, this created a very particular 
context to integrate into for Filipinos who stayed and became residents. 
  
Amid increasing structural impediments and economic crises, the recent years saw a continuous 
increase in Filipino migration. New trends have become salient, one of which is the increase in 
women migrants. Dubbed as the feminization of migration, more and more women have been 
employed as overseas domestic workers, caregivers, nurses and entertainers in the United 
States, Middle East, Europe, Japan and Singapore (though feminization goes beyond the 
increase of women migrants for it also include the increase in men migrants engaging in work 
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considered feminine). In particular domestic and entertainment work proved to be lucrative and 
easier to penetrate because of lesser skill requirements. From 1979, Filipina entertainers under 
contracts as Overseas Performing Artists (OPAs) began entering Japan and in 1989, Filipina 
entertainers who were admitted to Japan reached over 100,000. The year 1989 became known 
in Japan as Japayuki Year One. While on the other hand Filipinas began entering Japan as 
hanayome or docile brides in 1987.  
 
The entry of hanayome and the japayuki are often seen as a response to a reproductive need. 
The economic boom in the 1980s in Japan saw massive out-migration of many rural young 
women from agricultural municipalities to urban areas to work in more diverse industries. This 
. 
According to Satake (2000), this prompted Japan to allow recruitment of women, as brides and 
as entertainers, from Asia, mainly from the Philippines, Korea, China and Vietnam. This became 
resembled an official policy, as local governments began organizing trips to the Philippines to 
find women willing to be brides. And at the national level, the amendments in 1989 Immigration 
Control and Refugee Recognition Act, enacted in 1991, allowed entry of entertainers by adding it 
in the new ten categories of visa given to foreigners, bringing the total to twenty-eight under 
which foreigners could enter and remain in Japan legally as mentioned in a previous section. It 
also simplified visa application procedures while instituting criminal penalties for the recruitment 
and hiring of illegal unskilled foreign workers (Yamanaka 1993). Included in the added categories 
which are considered professional is the entertainer visa. The length of stay allowed for a 
foreigner with an entertainer visa is three months to one year according to the new law passed in 
1989.  
 
and golf courses in the Philippines catered to a group that Ventura (2006, cited in Docot, 2009) 
has ca  (Docot, 2009, p.6)5. Sellek (1996, cited in Docot, 2009) 
argues that the development of tourism to facilitate the needs of sex tourists was established in 
response to the internationalization of the sex industry. These forms of local entertainment were 
hidden under the guise of international migration and cooperation during the Marcos period 
(Docot, 2009). This deployment of Filipino workers became a pillar of foreign policy and the 
immigration of women workers became rhetoric for female empowerment (Docot, 2009).  
 
                                            
5 It is also argued that the increase in the number of entertainer in Japan is in response to the limiting to sex 
tourism abroad. 
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[with] Japan being their almost exc  1999). Entertainment work 
specifically proved to be desirous for many women as requirements were less (Suzuki 2003; 
2005; 2008; 2011). 
 
As demand for cultural dancers, singers, entertainers, and brides grew so did the number of 
Filipina entertainers and brides coming to Japan. Filipina entrants to Japan with entertainer visas 
ballooned from 8,505 in 1980 to 51,252 in 1992. In 1982, Filipina entertainers comprise 24 
percent of registered Filipinos in Japan. The proportion of Filipina entertainers against all 
registered Filipino migrants grew to 42 percent in 1987, to 48 percent in 1988 until the category 
comprised more than half of registered Filipinos in Japan in 1990 (51%) to as much as 66 
percent in 1992 (Office of the Labor Attaché, Philippine Embassy, 1991, cited in Anderson 1999). 
Further, the number of intermarriage between Japanese men and Filipino women toped the 
number of intermarriages between 1992 to 1996 and continued to do so until the early 2000s 
(Satake 2004). 
 
In 2001, there were more than 120,000 entertainers in Japan, and it almost reached its 140,000 
criticism of Japan engaging in human trafficking through the entertainer and trainee visas 
Trafficking Report as the only economically developed country involved with human trafficking, 
the Japanese government implemented stricter screening and requirements for incoming 
entertainers. Coupled with the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA) also tightening 
its regulation, by 2005 the number of Filipinos leaving with entertainer visas dropped significantly. 
We also saw this effect in the Chart 4.7 showing the number of female OFWs travelling to Japan. 
Chart 4.7 below shows that from 2006 s 14,149 entertainers, the numbers went down to only 548 
entertainers in 2016. 
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Chart 4.7. Population of entertainers from 2006-2016 
 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Total 14,149 11,065 9,199 7,465 6,319 4,188 344 367 436 388 548 
Source: Source: Ministry of Justice 2006-2016 
http://www.moj.go.jp/housei/toukei/toukei_ichiran_touroku.html 
 
Filipina entertainers in Japan were often labeled japayuki or japayuki-san (Fuwa 1998). Created 
at the beginning of the 1980s, it recalls the karayuki-san or literally, one who has traveled to 
China, a derogatory term coined to refer to Japanese women who, from the end of the 19th to 
the early 20th century, were prostitutes in China (Mihalopoulos 1994). What the label attaches to 
the entertainers is the use of sex (Faier 2007, Suzuki 2005) for often Filipino women in hostess 
heir unsavory  
 
general public questioned the reputations of all Japayuki
lauded in public as heroes and saviors of the nation by presidents and labor secretaries, in 
 1999, p.11). Isolated 
cases of those like Maricris Sioson were highlighted and are often used to generalize to create 
shameful images of Filipina entertainers in Japan.  
 
Also in Japan, the Filipina entertainers are also viewed negatively through reports showing the 
mid- and late 1980s the data for apprehended immigrants show that the largest single country of 
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Filipinas. In 1980, 8505 Filipina entertainers were apprehended, in 1985, along with the increase 
of entertainer entrants, apprehended entertainers also increased to 17,834. It reached 32,636 in 
1989; 42,738 in 1990 and 56,851 in 1991.  
 
hanayome, who in the beginning 
of th
as entertainers. However, 
sentiment negative image 
came from the commodification of the marriage process, where in later years increasingly 
became institutionalized with different actors involved such as professional fixers, marriage 
agencies and even local governments (Satake 2004). Interes
process was incorporated in the rhetoric of internationalization which looked at the recruitment 
 
 
Entertainers and spouses made up most of the earlier bulk of Filipinos who came to Japan. It is 
worth noting that the circumstances of their arrival and stay have impacted the way Filipinos are 
often viewed in Japan. Their role was to fulfill a sexual and reproductive need, and as such has 
implications not just in terms of householding but of child-rearing and integration. The issue of 
the Japanese-Filipino Children (JFC) is a field that is being given attention recently by scholars 
studying Philippine-Japan relations. The largely feminized migration of the 1980s has resulted to 
an increase in intermarriage and reproduction. From data collected by the Ministry of Health, 
Labour and Welfare (MHLW), as of 2013 Filipino women-Japanese men marriages comprise the 
second most numerous mixed marriage in Japan (20.1%), preceded only by Chinese 
women-Japanese men marriages (40.4%). With intermarriages come also the increase of 
Japanese-Filipino children, live births of which counted to 2,138 in 2013 which is less than one 
percent of the total number of live births in that year. This does not count however the number of 
children that have been born in the Philippines and those who may or may not be recognized by 
their Japanese fathers. Especially those who were born out of wedlock and were born in the 
Philippines, the fight to be recognized by their Japanese fathers to either gain citizenship or to 
receive child support is very difficult (Celero 2015, Suzuki 2015).  
 
If entertainers and hanayome were admitted to Japan because of a reproductive need, it is 
 need to import nurses and careworkers and how 
Language teachers to Filipinos and other various jobs.  
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Japan's superaging status by 2007 prompted the migration of careworkers from the Philippines 
and Indonesia under their economic partnership agreements (EPA) with Japan. The first batch of 
candidate nurses and careworkers consisting of 93 nurses and 217 careworkers were deployed 
to Japan in 2009. Numbers dropped by 2010 due to the worsening economic conditions in Japan 
and by 2011, many have cancelled their commitment to be deployed because of concerns 
regarding the Great East Japan Earthquake. In 2011 a total of 569 Filipino candidates were 
already deployed in Japan (Ohno 2012). In June of 2016, 60 nurses and 276 careworkers were 
deployed as part of the 8th batch, while 333 Filipino candidates were deployed in hospitals in 
November 2016 (Embassy of Japan to the Philippines 2016). 
 
In June 2016, the POEA released a cal
Welfare Services (JICWELS) need to fill up vacancies for 48 nurses and 585 careworkers. 
Qualifications needed are high and requirements are considerably strict. Needed qualifications 
for nurses include having passed the Nursing Board Licensure Examination in the Philippines 
with at least three years of hospital experience, while qualifications for careworkers include 
degree holders and certification by the Technical Education and Skills Development Authority 
(TESDA). Accepted candidates are to undergo a six-month language training in Japan, 
on-the-job training in a hospital in Japan, and are required to pass the licensure examination 
before they can start working as registered nurses. In total, nurse candidates have three 
chances to take and retake the licensure examination in Japan. While carework candidates can 
only take the exam once in every four years (Ohno 2012). 
 
One oft-cited criticism of this program is that since the Japanese government does not regulate 
the hours spent on learning versus the hours spent on daily work, conditions for each foreign 
nurse or carework candidate vary. Further, conflicting interests within the organizations involved 
in the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) often hinder higher passing 
rates for Filipino candidates. For instance, Ohno (2012) cites the negative attitude of the Japan 
Nursing Association towards foreign candidates, depriving Japanese nurses a number of 
opportunities. Licensure passing rates are shown in Chart 4.9. 
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Chart 4.8. Number of Filipino candidate nurses and careworkers, by takers and passers, by 
batch, 2009-2016 
 
Notes:  
1. Careworkers:Takers and Careworkers:Passers data from the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare 
uukoku nendo betsu kouho-sha no ruiseki goukaku-ritsu accessed from 
http://www.mhlw.go.jp/file/04-Houdouhappyou-12004000-Shakaiengokyoku-Shakai-Fukushikibanka/0000157
129.pdf 
2. Nurses:Takers and Nurses:Passers data from the Ministry of Health, Labour and W
kyoutei (EPA) ni motozuku gaikokujin kankoshi kouho-
http://www.mhlw.go.jp/file/04-Houdouhappyou-10805000-Iseikyoku-Kangoka/0000157982.pdf 
3. Data for 2014 for both nurses and careworkers may change, data for nurses batch 2014 are only for three trials, 
one more chance for batch 2014 to take the exam (appeal) while corresponding batch for careworkers are still 
under trainings 
4. Data for batch 2015 for nurses only for two trials, careworkers still under training 
5. Data for batch 2016 for nurses only for one trial, careworkers still under training 
 
On the other hand, the Philippines was not initially tapped as a source of assistant language 
teachers or ALTs for the JET Programme. The JET Programme was part of the kokusaika 
initiatives launched by Japan with the goal of globalizing the country. There is not much data 
available on the number of Filipino ALTs in Japan. The Philippines only began sending ALTs in 
the early 2000s (San Jose and Ballescas 2010).  
 
According to San Jose and Ballescas (2010), the rapid increase in Filipino ALTs in Japan was 
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only seen in the mid-2000s. This can also be attributed to the increase in ALTs hired by private 
companies. They note that overall, the increase in the number of Filipino ALTs can be attributed 
decision to award placements to private organizations with the lowest bids; and fourth, the 
aggressive recruitment of Filipino ALTS by placement agencies, even paying shokai or 
introduction fees amounting to as much as 30,000 yen (300USD) to participants who can 
introduce other Filipino ALTs to the agency. 
 
Statistics from the Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) as shown above showed 
that OFWs travelling to Japan are increasingly being dominated by males. This is in contrast to 
what has been previously discussed that majority who first migrated were females. More males 
are travelling to Japan to work as intra-company transfers, trainees and construction workers. 
Indeed, less and less females are travelling to Japan as OFWs, but we also see in the data that 
more and more females have become permanent and long-term stayers.  
 
This is the context whereby Filipino residents integrate. It is a context where Filipino women have 
dominated the scene, since most of the first Filipino foreign workers to Japan were entertainers, 
and hanayome, if being a bride is to be taken as an occupation. This context is also replete with 
stereotypes, stereotypes that may work against the Filipino residents in Nagoya City.  
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Chapter conclusion 
This chapter has shown the history of migration of the Filipinos to Japan. On the one hand, we 
conditions. The boom in the 1980s created a need for workers willing to work in jobs considered 
as 3Ds. Coupled with reproductive and aging needs, Japan has allowed entry of thousands of 
Filipino women to work in Japan as entertainers and to be hanayome. Aging and 
internationalization needs further opened the market to careworkers and English teachers 
allowing possibilities to diversify industries where Filipinos are. However, problems in passing 
examinations still prevent many from entering these fields and many still remain in jobs 
considered as 3Ds.  
 
What is shown in this chapter is that many of the Filipinos in Japan entered the country to work in 
one of the many 3D jobs that were made available during the 1980s and that many of them 
worked as entertainers. The argument that entertainer jobs are classified as unskilled and 
involved in prostitution created a not-so-savory image of the Filipino women in Japan. Together 
with those who migrated to marry, these women were often accused of marrying for the yen and 
this has contributed to the negative stereotypes of Filipino women in Japan. This is made much 
more complicated by the addition of Filipino-Japanese children in the equation. 
 
This, again, is the context whereby Filipino residents integrate. Having stereotypes such as this 
can complicate the integration of the Filipino residents and may impact their integration 
outcomes which may give rise to specific patterns of integration.  
 
In the next chapter, we look at the policies and programs at the level of Nagoya City. Chapters 3, 
4 and 5 complete Part II of this project which focuses on the contextual factors that may impact 
integration.  
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Chapter 5: Nagoya City 
 
According to Penninx (2005), urban cities are where the friction and tension between native-born 
and foreign residents are mostly felt because it is the urban areas that become the entry point for 
many foreigners. Nagoya City, one of the most important port cities in Japan, with its increasing 
foreign resident population, as well as the host to majority of the Filipino residents, is in the 
middle of this friction and tension. Before I proceed, let me reiterate the reasons why Nagoya 
City is the focus of this research. The first reason pertains to the importance of the City in the 
experience of the Filipino residents. Nagoya City, with its large entertainment district and it being 
a port city, has naturally attracted foreign workers. Currently, Filipinos ranked third in the most 
populous number of foreign residents in the City, third only to Chinese and Koreans. Further, as 
of 2016, there were more Filipinos in Aichi prefecture than in Tokyo which is in itself very 
interesting considering that Tokyo is the capital of Japan. The second reason is more for the 
improvement of the literature, as migration studies on Japan has attracted scholars to study 
migrant populations in more popular cities such as Tokyo, Osaka and Kyoto and thus 
understanding the issue as it happens in Nagoya City will help further enrich the literature6. In 
this chapter, I look at the context of Nagoya City and discuss the policies and programs being 
implemented by the City. This is important to set the stage or the context where Filipino residents 
integrate. We have mentioned again and again that contexts are frames whereby individuals 
exercise their agency. Understanding this will provide us important information in understanding 
the Filipino residents  integration outcomes, how these outcomes come about and what patterns 
of integration arise specifically from these.  
 
In this chapter, I will first discuss the increasing number of foreign residents in Nagoya City with a 
particular focus on the Filipino residents. I trace the changes over time to understand the context 
by which the City government began implementing policies and programs aimed at facilitating 
multicultural co-existence. In the next part of this chapter I discuss the policies and programs in 
terms of the dimensions of integration they facilitate.  
                                            
6 There are also other areas in Aichi prefecture that have significant number of Filipinos such as Komaki 
and Toyota City, but the majority of the foreign residents there are different. For instance, in Toyota City, 
even though there were many Brazilians who left in 2012, Brazilians still outnumber Filipinos. Further, the 
literature suggests that cities are the first point of interaction between foreign and native-born residents, and 
though Toyota City is indeed a big city, it is Nagoya City which is the capital of the prefecture and thus the 
frictions that may arise between native-born and foreign residents are made observable more saliently.  
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A. Foreign resident population and the Filipino resident population 
Nagoya City is the largest city in the Chubu region. It is among Japan s most populous urban 
areas along with Tokyo, Osaka and Kyoto. Nagoya City is the capital of Aichi prefecture and is 
one of Japan s major ports. The main industry in Nagoya City is automotive and the City houses 
headquarters of big automotive brands such as Toyota and Lexus. Nearby cities house factories 
for different companies such as Toyota City and Okazaki City. As of 2016, there are 2,311,553 
people living in Nagoya making up about 1,085,067 households, of which 74,180 are foreign 
residents. This makes up 3.21 percent of the total population of the City (Nagoya City 2017).  
 
The position of Nagoya as a port area has ensured that it is aware of international influences. 
Since the late 1980s statistics from the Aichi prefectural government tell us that there were more 
or less 5,000 foreign residents living in Aichi. Most of these foreigners were Koreans who have 
mostly settled during the colonization period until the end of the Second World War. By 1991, we 
see a dramatic rise in the increase of Brazilians, mostly Japanese descendants or Nikkeijin as a 
result of the amendment to the ICRRA in 1991 allowing entry of Japanese descendants 
commonly from South America. By 1997 we see that the number of Brazilians in Nagoya City 
have doubled from 24,296 to 42,917. Interestingly, Chinese foreign residents, one of the biggest 
population of foreigners in Japan and among the oldest together with the Koreans, have not 
increased in numbers dramatically until 2005. By this time, we see a slight drop in the number of 
Koreans in the prefecture but this drop was being compensated by an increase in the number of 
Filipinos and Peruvian Nikkeijin. This is most noticeable in the case of Filipinos whose numbers 
grew from 6,431 in 1997 to 19,771 in 2005 (Chart 5.1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
88 
 
Chart 5.1. Growth overtime of different foreign population in Aichi Prefecture, 1988-89, 1991, 
1995, 1997, 2005-2016 
 
 Brazil China Korea Philippines Peru Vietnam Others Total 
1988 248 3,219 55,396 1,208 15 - 2,881 62,967 
1989 1,626 4,477 55,315 1,638 89 - 3,484 66,629 
1991 24,296 6,711 55,207 3,273 3,262 - 5,614 98,363 
1995 29,787 10,389 52,407 4,650 3,366 - 7,332 107,931 
1997 42,917 11,999 50,180 6,431 4,040 - 9,180 124,675 
2005 71,004 30,532 43,434 19,771 7,532 - 22,375 194,648 
2006 76,297 35,522 42,922 21,844 7,957 - 23,972 208,514 
2007 80,401 41,605 42,252 24,065 8,292 - 25,569 222,184 
2008 79,156 46,167 41,598 25,829 8,542 - 27,140 228,432 
2009 67,162 47,099 40,643 25,923 8,067 - 25,922 214,816 
2010 67,162 47,099 40,643 25,923 8,067 - 25,922 214,816 
2011 48,475 46,787 36,454 25,968 6,983 - 27,374 192,041 
2012 48,475 46,787 36,454 25,968 6,983 - 27,374 192,041 
2013 48,730 46,680 36,569 27,519 7,279 - 31,031 197,808 
2014 47,695 45,914 35,114 29,095 7,315 9,140 26,400 200,673 
2015 48,008 45,481 34,185 31,171 7,479 13,130 29,897 209,351 
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2016 51,171 46,283 33,436 33,390 7,571 17,882 34,691 224,424 
Source: Aichi Prefectural Government, Aichi ken'nai no gaikokujin juumin-suu no joukyou 
1988-2016 
 
By 2005, most of the foreign resident populations have reached their peaks. For Filipinos, the 
rise was continuous but minimal. This slow down can be attributed to the 2005 TIP Report of the 
United States. Most of the foreign resident population gradually increased again after 2005 until 
2008 when, as we see in the chart below, the number of Koreans dramatically decreased as well 
as the Brazilians. These declines however were compensated by increases in the population of 
Chinese and Filipino residents. By 2011, there was an overall drop in the number of foreign 
residents in the prefecture owing to the 2011 Tohoku earthquake which saw many foreign 
residents from all over Japan going back to their home countries, most notably Brazilians whose 
numbers dropped to 48,475 in 2011 from 67,162 in the previous year. However, the numbers 
picked up again the following year and by 2016 we see the differences in the number of the 
foreign residents decline as Koreans and Brazilians constantly decrease, while Filipinos, 
Chinese and Vietnamese increase in number.  
 
Zooming in on Nagoya City, we see the same scenario. The City houses majority of the foreign 
resident population in Aichi prefecture. In Nagoya we see that the main foreign resident 
population include Chinese, Koreans, Filipinos and Brazilians. Both the Chinese and the Filipino 
population started to overtake Koreans and Brazilians in 2008, and this continued until 2011 
when both groups reached their peaks and slightly dipped at the end of the year. The population 
of Koreans continued to decline while the Brazilian population began increasing again in 2015. 
As of 2016, the most populous groups is Chinese, followed by Koreans, Filipinos and Brazilians. 
There are other groups of foreign residents composed of a growing number of Vietnamese and 
Peruvians, who are mostly Nikkeijin.  
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Chart 5.2. Growth overtime of different foreign population in Nagoya City, 2005-2016 
 
 Total China Brazil Philippines Korea 
2006 61,060 17,271 5,989 6,425 21,383 
2007 64,482 19,552 6,213 6,842 21,217 
2008 66,983 21,352 6,187 7,129 20,934 
2009 67,819 22,670 5,740 7,378 20,433 
2010 67154 23,250 5,016 7,446 19,928 
2011 64,355 23,630 4,589 7,563 19,313 
2012 64,355 22,652 4,109 7,207 19,105 
2013 66,289 22,454 3,989 7,409 18,769 
2014 67,122 21,944 3,935 7,620 18,158 
2015 69,320 21,764 3,897 8,011 16,501 
2016 74,180 22,478 5,530 8,568 16,165 
Source: Aichi Prefectural Government, Aichi ken'nai no gaikokujin juumin-suu no joukyou 
2006-2016 
 
Focusing particularly at the Filipino foreign resident population, we see that they are mostly 
concentrated in Nagoya City, the most populous city in Aichi prefecture. However, the chart 
below shows us that there are also relatively big concentrations of Filipino residents in other 
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cities in Aichi such as Toyohashi City, Okazaki City, Toyota City, Komaki City, Ichinomiya City 
and Anjo City. Interestingly we see a sudden increase in the number of Filipino residents in 
Toyohashi City from 2012, the same year when we see a dip in the population of Filipino 
residents in Nagoya City. However, by the end of 2012 we see the population of Filipino 
residents in Nagoya City picking up and increasing until 2016. Currently, Filipinos are the third 
biggest population of foreign residents in Nagoya City, and comparing Tokyo City with Nagoya 
City, there are still more Filipinos in Nagoya City than in Tokyo City.  
 
Chart 5.3. Top seven cities and municipalities populated by Filipino residents, 2006-2016 
 
Year Total Nagoya Toyohashi Anjo Okazaki Toyota Ichinomiya Komaki- 
2006 21,429 6,425 1,319 838 1,081 1,003 1,255 685 
2007 23,701 6,842 1,715 989 1,223 1,087 1,275 723 
2008 25,341 7,129 1,867 1,111 1,315 1,162 1,300 751 
2009 25,457 7,378 1,880 1,071 1,306 1,233 1,229 818 
2010 25,781 7,446 1,896 1,129 1,384 1,216 1,240 845 
2011 26,436 7,563 1,967 1,247 1,529 1,254 1,232 893 
2012 26,246 7,207 2,025 1,386 1,504 1,227 1,163 894 
2013 27,519 7,409 2,209 1,446 1,511 1,335 1,210 946 
2014 29,095 7,620 2,426 1,532 1,546 1,425 1,271 1,022 
2015 31,171 8,011 2,794 1,589 1,610 1,593 1,340 1,102 
2016 33,390 8,568 2,996 1,729 1,696 1,678 1,437 1,209 
Source: Aichi Prefectural Government, Aichi ken'nai no gaikokujin juumin-suu no joukyou 
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2006-2016 
 
 
There are a number of foreign resident associations in Nagoya City. In terms of the Filipino 
residents, there is a considerable number of Filipino migrant organizations in Nagoya City. The 
Chubu Philippine Friendship Association (CPFA) and the Filipino Migrants Center (FMC) are 
considered the biggest and are often contacted by the City and Prefectural governments to 
address certain issues regarding Filipino migrants. A number of other organizations also exist 
but are usually connected to one of the two organizations. For example, the Ecumenical 
Learning Center for Children (ELCC), a school that teaches Japanese to Filipino children who 
were brought to Japan by their parents, have connections with FMC. Another organization linked 
with FMC is the Philippines Society of Japan (PSJ), which provides consultation for Filipinos in 
need, visa programs and domestic violence. On the other hand, the Nagoya International 
Association (NIA), Ikebana International Nagoya Chapter and other cultural clubs have linkages 
with CPFA. Usually, lead organizers of the two organizations also act as resource persons and 
officers of other organizations.  
 
In terms of the goals of the organizations, it can be said that the organizations can be grouped 
into two depending on the majority of the issues they address. While the FMC, the ELCC and the 
PSJ deal with more legal and political issues such as illegal migrants, documentation, assisting 
victims of domestic violence among others, the CPFA and NIA deal with the more cultural 
aspects such as cultural exchange and internationalization. The FMC, established in 2000, was 
created as a support group for Filipino women who are victims of domestic abuse and violence. 
Aside from legal consultations they provide help to those Filipinos who feel isolated from their 
families and communities.  They are also active in coordinating with other Filipino organizations 
in addressing various problems experienced by Filipinos in Japan such as disaster and 
emergency needs especially during the 2011 earthquake.  
 
On the other hand, the oldest among those groups, CPFA was initially created in 1981 as the 
Association of Intermarried Couples. It later changed its name to its current name in 1984. 
According to former CPFA chairman, Mrs. Linda Taki, who is married to a Japanese man, the 
organization was initiated mainly to bring together intermarried couples to share their 
experiences in dealing with cultural differences. As the membership grew to include students and 
professionals, and as the issues that they have to address also grew, they decided to change the 
name. The CPFA annually holds the Philippine Festival and usually gets sponsorship from 
Philippine government agencies and embassies as well as the Aichi Prefectural Government and 
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the Nagoya City Government. The governor and mayor of Aichi and Nagoya City respectively 
even gave speeches during the 31st annual event. The CPFA also regularly conducts outreach 
programs in coordination with the municipal and prefectural governments.  
B. Local government plans and policies 
The focus of this project is Nagoya City. As has been outlined previously, the most number of 
Filipinos in Japan can be found in Nagoya City. And has been mentioned in the previous chapter, 
the way most Filipinos came to Nagoya mirror the way most of the Filipinos came to Japan. What 
this means is that Nagoya acts as a microcosm of Japan in terms of the Filipino migration 
experience to Japan. Understanding now the importance of focusing on Nagoya, it becomes 
important to understand fully the context of Nagoya City to understand better the integration 
experiences of the Filipino residents. We have previously argued that when migrants come into a 
host country, they assume an unequal relationship. Host societies can be accommodating or 
restrictive, and whether they are welcoming or not are reflected in their policies and programs. 
The succeeding sections will set the scene whereby Filipino residents experience integration by 
looking at how the City government of Nagoya understands integration and what policies and 
programs are being implemented in terms of structural, cultural and interactive integration.  
 
In this section, I aim to look specifically at multicultural co-existence plans and policies. Before I 
proceed to discuss the plans being implemented by the City government of Nagoya, I first 
discuss the plans and policies being implemented by the prefectural government of Aichi 
because structurally, Nagoya City remains under the jurisdiction of the Aichi Prefectural 
Government and as such, the multicultural plans that are implemented at the prefectural level 
also affect migrants at the city level.  
 
The Aichi Multicultural Society Promotion Plan was first established in 2008 in response to 
negative impacts of the Great Hanshin Japan Earthquake and the Global Financial Crisis on the 
foreign resident population in Aichi. While a number of foreigners in Aichi left due to the effects of 
the two crises, many stayed and the number of foreigners holding permanent resident visas 
increased and is constantly increasing as we have seen from the charts above. The Aichi 
Government, through their plan, notes of the fact that foreigners are living in the prefecture 
permanently and acknowledges that a number of issues that come with this have to be 
addressed. The prefectural government notes that the key areas where intervention is important 
are on work, education, disaster prevention and on health and hospitalization. The 2013 
Multicultural Plan has three policy objectives: 
1. Build a community in which everyone can participate 
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2. Foster awareness of the significance of multiculturalism 
3. Build a community that everyone can comfortably live in 
 
The prefectural government emphasizes the active roles foreign residents have to play in the 
community. To be able to be actively engaged with the community, the plan highlights the need 
to study the Japanese language to better communicate with the locals. Further, the plan 
emphasizes the need to include more players such as non-profit organizations, companies, 
universities, schools, neighborhoods, international associations, and both foreign and local 
residents.  
 
On the other hand, the Nagoya City has also launched the Nagoya Multicultural Coexistence 
Promotion Plan in March 2012. The plan is effective from April 2012 to March 2017. Compared 
to the definition of the Aichi prefectural government of the multicultural society which focuses on 
encouraging active participation from foreign residents, the Nagoya plan highlights the need to 
highlights the importance of communication in creating bonds in the community. It has three 
policy directions which are: 
1. Communication support 
2. Livelihood support 
3. Creating a multicultural communal society. 
 
As with many other cities and prefectures in Japan there is no overarching integration plan. This 
is because there is no such integration plan at the national level. All the plans and programs 
being implemented under this multicultural co-existence plan are outlined in a rubric in Table 5.1 
below. Given the definitions of the dimensions of integration we have outlined in previous 
chapters, I have categorized the plans and programs into structural, cultural, interactive and 
identificational dimensions. We will discuss each in turn. 
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Structural integration 
The goal of the City to structurally integrate the foreign residents can be seen in one of its policy 
directions, which is livelihood support. In terms of this policy direction, the Nagoya City 
the education system, the improvement of the working conditions of foreign residents and 
information on health care.  
 
Most important of all the policies that the City government implements in terms of structural 
facilitate entry of 
foreigners into the labor market. By having this charter, the labor market is open not just to 
native-born residents but to foreign residents as well, provided their residency permits them to 
work. As we will see later in the next chapters, most of the Filipino residents do not find it hard to 
look and secure a job that can provide them a stable source of income. Further, the Nagoya 
Employment Service Center for Foreigners provide various job information to foreigners, 
facilitate language classes for employed individuals, and provide support to foreigners in writing 
their rirekisho (employment history) which is a big hurdle to many foreign workers who cannot 
read and write Hiragana or Katakana, let alone Kanji. Foreign residents can consult with the 
Nagoya Employment Service Center in various languages including English, Portuguese and 
Chinese.  
 
There are also consultation centers for legal and human rights concerns that foreign residents 
can go to. Foreign residents can go to the Nagoya Legal Affairs Bureau to consult on legal and 
human rights concerns. While consultations on human rights are free and are available in 
English, Portuguese and Chinese, consultations on legal issues are only done in Japanese and 
the City government advises foreign residents to bring a Japanese friend or someone who can 
translate. Legal consultation services require some fee 5,400 or less for half an hour. 
 
The Nagoya City government also provides consultation services specific to certain sectors such 
as women and children. For women, to address issues of domestic violence and abuse, the 
Nagoya City Domestic Violence Consultation Support Center is being operated by Nagoya City 
Child and Youth Affairs Bureau and provides consultation only in Japanese. There is also a 
domestic abuse hotline but is available only in Japanese. Various centers providing protective 
care against child abuse, consultation for child delinquency and truancy are being provided 
through different Child Guidance Centers situated in various wards. The Nagoya City Child and 
Youth Affairs Bureau also manage the Nagoya Children SOS which is a hotline for reports of 
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child abuse. Again, consultations are only available in Japanese in these services. The health 
centers of every ward in Nagoya City also provide counseling and guidance for parenting and 
child raising but as the case with many of the consultation services, this is available only in 
Japanese.  
 
In terms of housing, the City provides in its website some information on finding housing in Japan. 
It also provides information on how to be able to rent municipal housing. Compared to regular 
apartments rented through real estate agents, municipal housing managed by the Nagoya City 
Housing Supply Corporation, along with Urban Renaissance (UR) housing and prefectural 
housing managed by the Aichi Prefecture Housing Corporation, mostly called danchi, are often 
cheaper as these do not require hefty amounts of key money and rents are usually considered 
cheaper than going through private real estate. The City provides information on how to apply for 
municipal housing through the Tenancy Application Guide which is available in English, Chinese, 
Korean, Portuguese and Spanish. There is also a private real estate that is endorsed by the Aichi 
Prefectural Government because it accepts foreign residents. Information is also being provided 
by the City government on this however it is only available in English.  
 
In terms of health services, the Nagoya City government provides medical translations through 
the Nagoya International Center (NIC), a non-profit organization that is working closely with the 
Nagoya City government for all issues related to foreign residents. The NIC provides information 
on emergency clinics in Nagoya that are open in the evenings, on Sundays and on holidays as 
well as information on pregnancy tests, costs of these tests and delivery. Beginning April 01, 
2009, the City increased subsidies for health checks for women who already registered their 
pregnancy and have a Maternal and Child Health Handbook from their local Public Health Center. 
Subsidized health checks increased from five to 14. Further in 2012, the City also added 
subsidies for additional ultrasounds providing two more ultrasounds to the already subsidized 
two before 2012. Also, foreign residents who are covered by the Japanese health insurance 
system are also given lump-sum reimbursements of ¥350,000 to ¥380,000 in cases of delivery. 
 
The NIC also provides information on English-speaking dental clinics in Nagoya and provides 
useful phrases in Japanese related to dental problems. Also, the Nagoya City provides to all, 
both local and foreign women residents, vaccination against cervical cancer since October 1, 
2010. 
 
These programs support the much larger medical interpretation program of the prefectural 
government. The most important program of the prefectural government is the AIMIS, or the 
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Aichi Medical Interpretation System which provides telephone interpretation services, on-site 
interpretation services and translation of medical referrals and other medical documents. AIMIS 
was launched in October 2011. This service is available in English, Chinese, Portuguese, 
Spanish and Filipino. The charges for the interpretation are divided between the patient and the 
medical institution and, in case of interpreter dispatch services (on-site interpreters) the fee 
ranges from ¥1,500 to ¥2,500.  
 
The Nagoya City, through the NIC, also provides important counseling services to various 
foreign residents including counseling for refugees and asylum seekers, educational and 
personal counseling sessions that are available upon appointment and that can be conducted in 
English and in some cases Portuguese.  
 
Summing it up what we see is a very comprehensive list of programs that facilitate structural 
integration that are available not just to native-born residents but to foreign residents as well. 
What this implies are two things: first, that having such a comprehensive and developed 
approach to structural approach can positively impact the structural integration outcomes of the 
foreign residents, and in the case of this study, of the Filipino residents. Second, what this 
implies is that the efficiency and comprehensiveness that we see is because of the fact that 
these services are already in place because these services are the same services offered to 
native-born residents and that delivery is simply extended to the foreign residents. Except for 
making available some counseling services in various other foreign languages and the medical 
interpretation services, most of these services are nothing new.  
 
I argue that the efficiency and comprehensiveness stem from two things: first, rationally, foreign 
residents need to be structurally integrated to be able to contribute to the society. As per my 
correspondence with Mr. Kyle Serra from the International Relations Division of the Bureau of 
Tourism, Culture and Exchange of the City Government, the City has the responsibility to 
-fo . 
While it treats the residents equally, it also extends its services by providing some of it in various 
languages. In this way then we see it approaching the issues of foreign residents from a 
multicultural lens but only in so far as the language differences are acknowledged and some 
efforts to bridge these differences have been done. Further discussions will be provided as we 
progress in this chapter.  
 
Second, the provision of services to integration foreign residents structurally are in line with the 
MIAC s platform on tabunka kyousei, that it is a tool to revitalize local municipalities. As 
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mentioned, depopulation and aging have brought to the fore issues of local public finance crises 
in many municipalities and cities in Japan. The most famous case is Yubari City in Hokkaido 
which bankrupted in 2007. The national government, in one way or another, acknowledges some 
of the benefits of integrating foreign residents and sees this as a way to revitalize municipalities, 
therefore putting the task of structurally integrating them to local governments such as Nagoya 
City.  
 
Cultural and interactive integration 
The City also aims to integrate foreign residents culturally and interactively as can be seen from 
its policy direction of providing communication support. The plan highlights the importance of 
cases of people being unable to receive necessary information and governmental services 
because of difficu
encourage foreign residents to participate in exchange events and projects in t
which foreign residents are not in a position of always being supported but rather become 
 
 
The foci of the programs implemented to facilitate cultural and interactive integration dimensions 
are twofold: first, to promote communication by language support; and second, to facilitate 
interaction by providing venues and opportunities for interactions between foreign and 
native-born residents. Let us look at each of these in turn.  
 
We have seen from the previous discussions that the City government makes a number of 
services available in different languages to improve access to various services by foreign 
residents. Complementing that, the City also aims to improve access to more services and to 
improve communication among foreign and native-born residents by offering language classes 
for different age groups. Classes for both young and adult learners are made available through 
the NIC. Various lessons are offered for varying fees. For instance, Japanese Conversation 
Classes held at the NIC can cost up to ¥3,900 for 13 lessons, while private lessons can be had 
for ¥2,800 for five hours. There also group lessons that are free but these are rather few and 
when offered are only for basic Japanese. Most of the language classes being offered are held 
on weekdays, mornings to afternoons and in cases when they are offered on weekends, are 
usually held from mornings to afternoons.  
 
Language is seen to be very important for the children of foreign residents hence various 
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guidance counseling and notices as well as intensive language classes for children are being 
offered, usually at certain fees that are still more affordable than regular private classes. 
Elementary and high school education is accessible for children of foreign residents however, 
the big hurdle is language. Many foreign children, knowing nothing of the language, when they 
come to Japan are immediately enrolled to public schools based on their age. This can be a big 
challenge to children and their parents, most of whom also do not know the language very well, 
and so doing homework, school projects and attending parent-teacher meetings can be a difficult 
task for both parent and child.  
 
To improve the participation and social inclusion of foreign residents, the Aichi prefectural 
government has created the Opinion Exchange Meeting for Foreign Residents in Aichi. It is a 
forum that aims to encourage foreign residents to participate in planning, examining and 
implementing relevant and pertinent measures and programs. According to my interview Mr. 
Keita Suzuki, representative from the Aichi Prefectural Government Multicultural Promotion 
Office, there are two ways by which foreign residents can participate in the planning of programs 
aimed at addressing the needs for foreign residents. The first way is open to all foreign residents. 
They can simply go to the prefectural government and submit their opinions and 
recommendations at a given time. The second one is more sophisticated. A group of foreign 
residents are invited to form the Opinion Exchange Meeting to discuss with representatives of 
the local governments. This meeting has been held since 2002, with the number of meetings 
varying in a year. Last 2014, four meetings were conducted in total. In 2015, nine foreign 
residents were invited by the prefectural government. According to the Multicultural Promotion 
Office, each year, the themes are arbitrarily decided and for 2016 the theme was on disaster 
management. Disaster drills have been conducted aimed at informing the foreign residents 
where to go during the instances of earthquake and fire. A video promoting the importance of 
joining these drills were uploaded in different languages by the prefectural government in the 
internet which is easily accessible. One informant who was then a member of the Opinion 
Exchange Meeting said that basically during the meeting everything is already prepared, 
including the talking points so there is really nothing that foreign residents should do or can do. 
 
Nagoya City on the other hand, has implemented the Foreign Resident Discussion Meetings and 
has encouraged foreign residents to participate in neighborhood and resident associations. As 
with the Aichi Opinion Exchange Meeting, the themes are decided beforehand by the City 
government and participants are asked about their opinions in the case of the Foreign Resident 
Discussion Meetings. Interestingly, there is promise of going beyond being a simple discussion 
meeting as the City notes that opinions brought up during the meetings will be considered for 
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implementation in city policies. The Foreign Resident Discussion Meetings are held only thrice a 
year and are conducted in Japanese though the City can provide interpreters if necessary. 
Residents who cannot speak Japanese that well but want to participate are encouraged to bring 
their own interpreters. Remuneration is available at ¥4,000 per meeting.  
 
In terms of facilitating civic participation and mobilization of groups, the Nagoya City government 
hosts a greater number of programs for foreign residents compared to the prefectural 
government, including support for foreign resident organizations through networking and renting 
out facilities that they can use for their events. According to the Multicultural Promotion Office, 
the Aichi pre It 
complements the city government plan. For example, the AIMIS program is something that only 
the prefectural government can implement, since most hospitals are managed at the prefectural 
level. 
 
What we see here is that regardless of the strong indication to provide communication support, 
we see that the programs are not enough. For one, language classes, even those provided 
through the NIC, require some money and for many foreign residents, in particular Filipino 
residents, the enrolment fees are still considered high. Further, we see that the schedules for 
language classes may be difficult to accommodate for working foreign residents since foreign 
residents cannot afford to not work and go to classes and have money to pay for these classes. 
This is highly related to the lack of an overall integration program at the national level. 
Migrant-receiving countries such as France, Italy, Germany and Canada make language 
learning a priority and provide language classes for free for a specific period of time. In Quebec, 
Canada for instance, the government is investing in proper classrooms and materials to be used 
to teach French language to arriving immigrants.  
 
On the other hand, the interaction that we see is mostly unequal. The Foreign Resident 
Discussion Meetings and the Opinion Exchange Meetings show how this relationship is unequal. 
With themes being set by the local governments, meetings held few and far in between and the 
language of the discussion being set to Japanese it immediately limits, first, the kind of foreign 
residents who can participate and second, the concerns that can be raised. As was shown in the 
previous chapters foreign residents come from different countries and are engaged in different 
occupations in Japan. Their connections with Japan vary and hence when we put all these 
together we can say that their concerns would most probably be different from each other. This is 
understood by the City government and that is the reason why they propose themes that are 
very general and applicable to all such as disaster management or children s education to be 
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able to cater to most. Representation then is not the main goal of these discussion meetings. 
While the current programs aimed at improving communication and interaction exist, the impacts 
may not be maximized in the absence of an integration framework at the national level.  
 
Identificational integration 
Identificational integration is being facilitated by the policy directions pertaining to promoting and 
creating a multicultural communal society. As we see from Table 5.1, the policies tend to be 
outlined in very broad strokes. The focus of the City government is first, to increase awareness of 
multicultural co-existence and to facilitate an environment where people who perceive that they 
belong can co-exist harmoniously. The word harmonious  and co-  however, from 
what we will see in the succeeding discussions are confused as to whether non-conflict means 
the same as non-engagement.  
 
Participation in the planning of policies and programs is key in creating perceptions of 
belongingness which is what identificational integration stresses. It puts focus on representation 
and how representation is important in creating an identity as a member of a community. There 
are two trends in how the City government try to facilitate this: first through internationalization 
seminars and holding of multicultural events such as festivals; second, through inviting foreign 
residents to participate in events that will give them voice in relation to planning and crafting 
policies and programs and third, tapping foreign resident associations in disseminating 
information and in holding events.  
 
The City holds events that facilitate interactions between foreign residents and native-born 
residents such as various internationalization seminars. As well as particular programs such as 
Children s Story Book Time where foreign volunteers read through a selection of children s 
books in their native language as Japanese residents listen, or exhibits showcasing foreign 
residents  art works. Also included here are expositions and events that showcase traditional 
cuisine, costumes and festivals of foreign resident groups. 
 
On the other hand, more substantial participation and representation is aimed to be facilitated by 
programs that involve foreign residents expressing their opinions and making suggestions on 
what should be done. Aside from the Discussion Meetings, the Nagoya Regional Seminar is 
something that can help facilitate interaction and representation of foreign residents in the 
community. The current multicultural plan of Nagoya City was set to be effective for five years, 
from 2012 to 2017. In preparation for the drafting of the 2018 plan, they held the Nagoya 
Regional Seminar in February 6, 2016 attended by both foreign and local residents to discuss 
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the future of the City in terms of diversity issues.  
 
Among the problems cited by the Nagoya City government during the Nagoya Regional Seminar 
when it comes to addressing migrant needs is the lack of local government facilities needed to 
accommodate and provide the needs of the children of foreign residents. Because many of these 
parents have problems with their visas, many of them encounter problems with their work 
therefore creating a need for local governments to provide children a place for when their parents 
have to work. Further, many of them lack information about existing programs for learning 
Japanese. Further they note that different groups of foreigners have different concerns and thus 
knowing how the local government can address everything becomes much more challenging. 
Therefore, they noted that there is a need to work with migrant organizations to more sufficiently 
address the varied issues that are important for foreign residents. However, contrary to this the 
theme for the Regional Seminar and for the next multicultural plan has already been decided. 
The focus of the workshop was how to properly address the education of foreign children, 
especially those so called 1.5 generation who arrive as children and adolescents in Japan. 
 
And finally, the City government, as well as the prefectural government, has tapped into foreign 
resident associations to assist in disseminating information, recruiting participants and 
organizing events. As was previously mentioned, in the case of the Filipino residents, migrant 
groups can be divided into two categories. One of the groups, mostly led by PSJ and FMC, 
focuses more on the situation of the Filipinos in Nagoya City and concerns itself with negotiating 
for the rights of different sectors such as illegal migrants, children and women. They tend to have 
more activist agenda. While on the other hand, the second group with the CPFA as the center, 
focuses more on the relationship between Filipinos and the Japanese and as such endeavors to 
change the image of the Filipino which is often to be understood low-skilled and bad girls  owing 
to the large number of Filipino women entertainers who entered the country in the 1980s to the 
1990s. To do this, the second group holds their events in upscale venues and treats this image 
as a stain that has to be erased . It is precisely because the organizations have different agenda 
that the City government also separately coordinates with them depending on a case by case 
basis. For example, when it comes to problems with documentation and illegal work permits, the 
Nagoya City government and the Aichi prefectural government direct the migrants to the FMC. 
When it comes to multicultural promotion then the local governments coordinates with the CPFA.  
 
For instance, during the Nagoya Regional Seminar, the City government invited representatives 
from different migrant organizations to speak about their experiences and their organization, how 
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the Filipino community, they invited Mr. Nestor Puno as a representative from ELCC and PSJ 
since he is currently the head of PSJ and a teacher at ELCC.  
 
From the above example, we can see that the local governments coordinate with migrant 
organizations based on the issue that has to be addressed. In an interview with Mr. Puno, he 
said that they act as madoguchi or literally ticket window  or contact person where Filipino 
migrants can inquire about certain issues on visa procedures, working permits, and other similar 
issues. As a madoguchi they relay this to the local government and inquire about possible 
solutions. Conversely, when the local government receives inquiries regarding such matters, 
they direct them to the FMC.  
 
The Nagoya City government and the Aichi prefectural governments have also tapped them 
when it comes to cultural activities. The CPFA have established links with the NIC. Mrs Taki, the 
founder of CPFA, is one of the founding members of NIC. They hold seminars, workshops and 
various cultural events that introduce Filipino culture, cuisine and fashion at the NIC complex. 
The events that the CPFA holds are aimed at an international audience who wants to know what 
Filipino culture is. When I asked Ms. Abigail Principe, current president of CPFA, as to why they 
women specifically so they can be accepted more easily into the Japanese community. This 
image, one of my interviewees said, is mostly limited however to those actively working in Sakae 
which can be translated as  
 
On the other hand, the local governments have also asked migrant organizations to facilitate 
information dissemination, for example, when it comes to interpretation needs, such as recording 
of Filipino versions of educational materials on disaster management. According to Mr. Puno 
they are also tapped to invite more Filipino residents when the local government hosts seminars 
and workshops on important community issues such as waste segregation, what to do during 
earthquakes, and events pertaining to the Japanese school system. The FMC and its connected 
organizations are also recruited for cultural events. Mr. 
 
 
On the other hand, Mr. Puno also works closely with the chounaikai (neighborhood association) 
in Sakae-Higashi. It is important, according to him, to help those who are working in the 
Philippine pubs in the Sakae-Higashi area to develop good connections with the local community 
through the chounaikai. Further, it is the chounaikai which regulates the use of certain public 
spaces such as parks which are often used by Filipino migrants for cultural events.  
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Through these programs we see a step-by-step method of facilitating identificational integration. 
Programs aimed at promoting multiculturalism and awareness of having different cultural groups 
existing in the City is the first step. In here, native-born residents and foreign residents are made 
to acknowledge each other s presence in the City. Through festival and internationalization 
seminars, residents, both foreign and native-born, are made to acknowledge that their cultures 
are different and that respect is necessary to be able to create a multicultural communal society. 
This is the very basic approach to multiculturalism. By focusing on the different aspects of culture 
which are often showcased through festival, food and fashion native-born residents are 
encouraged to understand cultures. But this runs the risk of essentializing a culture into simply a 
sum of its festival, food or fashion, or what is called 3Fs multiculturalism (Carruthers 2004). 
 
The second and third steps show us a more inclusive approach, an approach that is supposed to 
go beyond the 3Fs. By providing venues where foreign residents can express their opinions and 
concerns and by involving foreign resident organizations, the City somehow aims to go beyond 
the 3Fs and address actual issues that foreign residents are experiencing. However, we see two 
issues come up: first, the relationship is unequal; and second, the migrant organizations 
themselves are somehow divided.  
 
We have argued time and again that the relationship is unequal. In the case of the Foreign 
Resident Discussion Meetings and the Opinion Exchange Meetings, we have seen that it is the 
local government who set the agenda regardless of whether this is considered the most urgent 
issue by the foreign residents or not. We also saw this again in the Nagoya Regional Seminar 
where, while representatives from different foreign resident groups have been invited and were 
allowed to express their issues, the theme of the seminar has already been decided. For 
instance, the Chinese representative of a Chinese migrant group talked about the problems of 
Chinese wives in Japan; an American representative talked about business opportunities and 
the need to develop more, and Mr. Puno, the Filipino in the panel talked about the Filipino 
children and the difficulties they face in studying. Regardless of the diversity in their topics, the 
seminar topic has already been decided even though the topic that they decided on is indeed 
very important, especially for Filipino residents.  
 
The current unpublished draft of the 2018 multicultural plan actually puts in as policy direction the 
need to involve foreign residents in the planning process. This suggests a move in the right 
direction, but we would have to wait and see how this will play out and if once implemented 
whether it will have the desired outcome. 
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Chapter conclusion 
In this chapter, I endeavored to discuss the policies and programs of Nagoya City using a 
multidimensional approach. As has been shown, the policies and programs can be assessed in 
four dimensions: structural, cultural, interactive and identificational. What we see are varied 
results. In terms of structural integration policies, it would seem that Nagoya City has a 
comprehensive list of policies and programs it implements. It was argued that the relative ease 
and efficiency was brought about by two reasons: first, that the services needed by foreign 
residents in terms of structural integration do not differ from those needed by native-born 
residents and hence delivery is only a matter of extending the services to the foreign residents. 
And second, integrating foreign residents structurally is recognized as contributing to the 
revitalization of municipalities.  
 
On the other hand, in terms of cultural and interactive integration, we see that regardless of the 
strong indication to provide communication support, the programs are not enough. The lack of an 
overall integration program at the national level has affected the accessibility of language 
classes. Having a national program may free up some budget to improve access, especially for 
foreign residents who may have lower earnings. And the interaction that we see being promoted 
in programs supposed to facilitate interactive integration is mostly unequal. In terms of 
identificational integration, we saw a step-by-step method of facilitating identificational 
integration. First is acknowledgment of culture and the second pertains to improved 
representation. However, while the City does promote cultural exchange, I argued that this 
exchange stops at the first step. This runs the risk of essentializing cultures, a problem we have 
previously raised in discussing multiculturalism and its variants. There is a tendency to conflate 
non-conflict with non-engagement.  
 
This is the context where foreign residents integrate. Chapter 5 is the last chapter of Part III. And 
together with Chapters 3 and 4 I have endeavored to establish the contextual factors where 
individual foreign residents exercise their agency. In the next chapters, we see how, given this 
context whereby Filipino residents exist, it impacts their integration process by looking at their 
outcomes in terms of the different dimensions of integration and how these outcomes can give 
rise to specific patterns of integration.  
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Part III. 
This part is the last of the three parts of this research project. This is composed of three chapters. 
The goal of this part is to present and analyze the data collected. As previously mentioned, I will 
be presenting both qualitative and quantitative data convergently. What it means is while I did my 
data collection for both the qualitative and quantitative elements of my research, I am going to be 
discussing the results side by side. All statistical data that is going to be presented from this point 
on comes from the quantitative element of the project while anecdotes come from the qualitative 
aspect of the design. I do this in an effort to evaluate the results of both methods and provide 
explanations and nuances as to how possibly such data from the qualitative and quantitative 
aspects arise. Further, I do this to show inconsistencies within the two types of data that I 
gathered. By jointly displaying the data side by side I show that what may be depicted in 
numbers and that suggest a particular interpretation can be understood differently when we look 
at the anecdotes of the foreign residents themselves.  
 
The first chapter of this part will focus on detailing the demographic characteristics, individual 
trajectories and various other characteristics of the respondents. In the next chapter, I will 
discuss the integration outcomes and in the last chapter I will discuss the patterns of integration 
and what can possibly impact pattern membership.  
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Chapter 6: The survey respondents 
 
In this chapter, I present the findings of the research. In the first part of this chapter I will 
introduce the survey population, focusing on their demographic characteristics such as age and 
gender. In the following section, 
include pre-migration experiences and reasons for migration. Then I will focus on ethnic social 
ties, transnational practices and intents for the future. The purpose of this chapter is to display 
the individual characteristics of the respondents and discuss how this can possibly impact 
integration outcomes and patterns of integration.  
 
A quick note on the presentation of data from this chapter to the succeeding ones: how I present 
it follows the convergent style of mixed-methods research design. All statistical data that is going 
to be presented from this point on comes from the quantitative element of the project while 
anecdotes come from the qualitative aspect of the design. I do this in an effort to evaluate the 
results of both methods and provide explanations and nuances as to how possibly such data 
from the qualitative and quantitative aspects arise. Further, I do this to show inconsistencies 
within the two types of data that I gathered. By jointly displaying the data side by side I show that 
what may be depicted in numbers and that suggest a particular interpretation can be understood 
differently when we look at the anecdotes of the foreign residents themselves. However, for this 
particular chapter, as this is more on the survey respondents I present more quantitative data. 
 
A. Demographic characteristics 
A total of 459 Filipino residents living in Nagoya City were covered in the survey. All 16 wards 
were covered. Majority of the respondents reside in Naka (22.7%) and Nakagawa (14.6%) wards. 
These two wards have the most number of Filipino residents in Nagoya City. While Naka ward 
draws a big number of Filipinos because it is where majority of the jobs are, Nakagawa ward, on 
the other hand, has cheaper housing blocks. While other wards provide cheaper housing than 
 (refer to 
Chart 3.1. in Chapter 3). 
 
The respondents covered in the survey come from different locations in the Philippines. Majority 
of the respondents however come from the Luzon group of islands, which makes up the northern 
part of the country. About 32 percent come from the National Capital Region (NCR, Manila Area), 
located in Luzon. About 15 percent come from the Southern Tagalog region, located immediately 
south of Manila and about 18 percent come from the Central Luzon region, which is located 
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immediately north of Manila area. 
current outcomes in the host society rather than when they were still living in the Philippines. 
Therefore, from what we can glean from the information regarding their hometowns, we can say 
that many of them came from the capital or areas near the capital of the Philippines. One 
informant said that she came first to Manila to look for a job and there she met her promoter who 
eventually helped her secure a job as an entertainer in Japan. The literature has talked about 
two-step migration, in that many would-be migrants first move to the capital and from there 
migrate to the destination country. Probably perhaps because of the costs associated with such 
two-step migration, we can see that most of the respondents originated from areas near the 
capital, considerably lowering migration costs. Further, as what we will see from the succeeding 
discussions, many had been able to work in the Philippines before leaving for Japan. However, 
one limitation of this study is to focus more on the occupations that they have in Japan rather 
than on the occupations that they had in the Philippines.  
 
The qualitative part of the study however showed me that many of the respondents may have 
had experience in various types of jobs from the Philippines. There were some who had 
experience working as sales clerks, as office workers and as professionals. Therefore, we can 
say, at least for this group of people, we cannot generalize their background.  
 
Majority of the respondents coming from these regions are concentrated in Naka and Minato 
wards. Further, while respondents from the National Capital and the Central Luzon regions have 
concentration of population in Nakagawa ward, respondents from the Southern Tagalog region 
seem to also settle in the Chikusa ward.  
 
About three-fourths of the respondents have visas granting them long-term residency such as 
permanent and long-term residents, spouses. 
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Table 6.1. Visa status, N=459 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Age 
The literature noted of how important it is to look at age at migration. Studies such as Safi (2008) 
Aslund et al (2009) and Erdal and Ezzati (2015) suggest that migrating at a younger age has a 
correlation with better integration outcomes, supporting the arguments that show that special 
attention have to be given to migrants who migrate at a young age, as more often than not these 
young migrants face multiple risks compounded by other factors such as gender, lack of 
educational attainment, lack of skills and blurry motivations for migration.  
 
Looking then at the age of the respondents, we see that majority are below 45 years old. The 
bulk of the respondents are in the age group 25 to 34 years old. This implies two things: first that 
majority of the population are young adults and have consequences for reproduction and that 
second, majority of the population are in the working age category.  
 
Table 6.2. Age in years, N=459 
 
Current visa status Magnitude Proportion Female (%) Male (%) 
Permanent 140 30.50 39.31 10.64 
Spouse 4 0.87 1.26 0.00 
Entertainer 100 21.79 30.19 2.13 
Long-term 96 20.92 13.52 38.30 
Trainee 69 15.03 7.55 31.91 
Working 21 4.58 3.14 7.80  
Student 18 3.92 3.77 4.26 
Citizen 5 1.09 0.94 1.42 
Overstay 6 1.31 0.31 3.55 
Age in years Magnitude Proportion Female (%) Male (%) 
15-24 years old 91 19.83 25.47 7.09 
 15-18 years old 4  0.87  1.26  0.00  
 18-24 years old 87  18.95  24.21  7.09  
25-34 years old 178 38.78 36.48 43.97 
35-44 years old 120 26.14 22.64 34.04 
45-54 years old 57 12.42 12.58 12.06 
55 years old and above 13 2.83 2.83 2.84 
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Majority of those who reported arriving as entertainers during the 1990s are in the 35 to 54 years 
old age groups, while those that are in the younger age groups arrived after most of the previous 
generation of entertainers have already settled in the City. Majority of those in the younger age 
groups came as dependents. Some are newly arrived entertainers working in the entertainment 
industry in Nagoya City.  
 
Table below shows at what age groups respondents were in when they travelled to Japan. These 
values were stipulated based on the length of time they reported to have spent living in Japan. 
Table below shows that majority have begun their migration process to Japan at a relatively 
young age. Mean age at migration is 25.78 years old. This finding coincides with the discussion 
on the profile of Filipino immigration to Japan. Many of those who travelled to Japan in the 1980s 
to 1990s were young women in their early to mid-twenties working in the entertainment industry.  
 
Table 6.3. Age at migration, N=459 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The data also showed that the minimum age at migration captured by the survey was zero and 
that about two percent have migrated to Japan before they turned 15 years old. The assertions in 
the literature regarding the effect of age on integration outcomes vary. Therefore, we test how 
age impacts integration outcomes in the succeeding chapters. 
 
Gender  
The importance of gender in the literature of migration and migrant integration has never been 
stressed enough (Joppke 2007, Scholten et al 2012 and Kofman et al 2013). In many 
migrant-receiving countries, women make up a substantial proportion of the migrant population. 
While men and women do share integration hurdles, according to studies, women can 
significantly face more hardships because of three important considerations:  
 
First, Kofman et al (2013), summarizing the literature, argues that with women migrants come 
issues such as transnational marriages, sexual relations, reproduction and child rearing. What 
Age at migration Magnitude Proportion 
Less than 15 years old 11 2.40 
15-25 years old 205 44.66 
25-35 years old 203 44.23 
35-45 years old 36 7.84 
45 to 55 years old 4 0.87 
Total 459 100 
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studies show us is that women migrants who usually come from poorly educated groups of 
societies do not necessarily have the skills to educate their children on how to succeed in society 
(Joppke 2007). Aslund et al (2009) for instance found out in their study on the integration 
outcomes of migrant youths in Sweden that their parents  integration outcomes can be inherited. 
This is a pressing issue in the context of Japan as women are often viewed through the ideology 
of the ryousai kenbo, literally good wife, wise mother  whose role is central to the rearing of 
children who can contribute to the economic development of the country (Nocedo 2012).  
 
Foreign women, majority of whom came through visa categories considered as unskilled, are 
often described as unable to emulate this ideology. Suzuki (2011) notes that there are two 
prevailing images of the Filipina in Japan: as an entertainer (Japayuki) and as an Asian bride 
(hanayome) both of which were discussed in Chapter 5. Women who have come to Japan 
through these visa categories are often seen as lacking skills to educate and bring up their 
children in a way that would help them succeed in the Japanese society.  
 
Second, especially in the case of many European countries, gender issues have become 
significant in the backlash of  (Kofman et al 2013). Migrant women in particular 
have served to demarcate the boundary between the civilized Westerner and the uncivilized 
outsider . This is parallel to the case of the Filipino women in Japan. Studies such as Suzuki 
(2003, 2005, 2008, 2011) have situated Japanese men and Filipino women relationships as a 
developed North- undeveloped South divide, suggesting the inequality and rather economic 
nature of these relationships which have been raised previously in Chapter 5.  
 
Establishing the importance of gender in the discussion of migrant integration in the global 
literature as well as in the literature of Filipino migration to Japan, it becomes important then to 
look at the distribution of the population by gender in the data. As expected given the population 
distribution in Nagoya City, more females participated in the survey than males. While females 
account for about 69 percent of the respondents, males account for about 31 percent.  
 
Majority of the female respondents are single. This is also the same case for male respondents. 
Married respondents also make up a big chunk of the data. Females who are either married or in 
cohabitation with a partner make up about 43 percent of all female respondents. The remaining 
57 percent are either currently single or have never been married.  
 
 
 
 113 
 
Table 6.4. Selected demographic variables, N=459 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On the other hand, about 50 percent of the respondents reported having children and about 67 
percent of those with children have children studying at various education levels. Majority of 
those with children who are attending school have children aged below 15 years old as about 65 
percent of those children are in junior high school and below.  
 
Table 6.5. Selected demographic variables for respondents with children, N=229 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Characteristics Magnitude Proportion 
Sex 
Female 318 69.28 
Male 141 30.72 
Civil status 
Single/Never married 227 49.46 
Married 191 41.61 
Divorced 14 3.05 
Widowed 13 2.83 
Cohabitation/Live-in 14 3.05 
Variables Magnitude Proportion Female (%) Male (%) 
With children 229 49.89 48.74 52.48 
With studying children  153 66.81 67.10 66.22 
 Level of schooling   
College 22 14.38 14.42 14.29 
Elementary education 44 28.76 22.12 42.86 
High school 28 18.30 20.19 14.29 
Middle school/Junior high school 31 20.26 23.08 14.29 
Preschool/Day Care 25 16.34 18.27 12.24 
Technical/Vocational 3 1.96 1.92 2.04 
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Given the assertions in the literature, we would expect that gender would impact the integration 
outcomes of the respondents. We can also expect a significant impact of gender based on the 
highly gendered migration that has happened between the Philippines and Japan as was 
previously discussed.  
 
B. Motivation and individual trajectories 
In this section, I discuss the results of the survey in terms of the variables linked to the 
respondents  motivation and individual trajectories. 
 
Length of stay  
Classical assimilation theories have postulated that as length of stay and residence increase, the 
differences between foreign and local residents decrease. While as we have discussed earlier, 
most of the arguments presented by classical assimilationists have been proven inapplicable to 
current migration flows, many studies still see a correlation with length of stay and better 
integration outcomes. For instance, de Palo s (2006) study on various migrant groups in Europe 
show that length of stay can impact a migrant s social assimilation, especially in terms of 
increased social relations with local residents. Safi s (2008) study on the immigrant integration 
process in France also echoes this result. Further, di Belgiojoso (2016) on her study among 
immigrants in Italy found that longer length of stay is associated with attachment to the host 
country.  
 
Majority of the respondents have stayed in Japan for more than five years (50.32%). As 
stipulated earlier, many of the respondents who have stayed for more than ten years have 
arrived in the 1990s as entertainers and have eventually settled down in Nagoya City. From the 
data, we can also see that 23 percent have been in Nagoya City for less than a year during the 
time of the survey. Majority of these respondents are entertainers, many of whom are 21 to 24 
years old.  
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Table 6.6. Length of stay in Japan, N=458* 
*One missing value 
 
Looking at proportion of life spent in Japan, we see that the mean proportion of life spent in 
Japan is about 20 percent, suggesting that majority of the respondents have spent less than half 
of their lives in the country.  
 
Table 6.7. Proportion of life spent in Japan, N=458* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*One missing value 
 
Following assertions in the literature, it is hypothesized that lesser time spent in Japan and 
consequently, lower proportions of life spent in Japan can predict lower integration outcomes.  
 
Education and work experience 
There is a general agreement in the literature that education can impact integration positively 
(Safi 2008, Aslund et al 2009, Luthra et al 2014). Higher educational attainment levels are 
significant in predicting better integration outcomes. Luthra et al (2014) note that higher 
educational attainment can provide a migrant with more human capital to be able to be more 
economically mobile in their destination country. In their study, they found that circular migrants 
tend to have lower educational levels, implying that education can lead to better and more stable 
jobs. This is also confirmed by the OECD-European Union (OECD/European Union 2015) report 
on the settling in process of migrants. They note that having a higher educational attainment 
makes it easier to penetrate the labor market, though compared to local residents, many foreign 
Stay in Japan in years Magnitude Proportion Female (%) Male (%) 
Less than a year 106 23.09 24.21 20.57 
1 year to less than 3 years 83 18.08 17.61 19.15 
3 years to less than 5 years 39 8.50 8.49 8.51 
5 years to less than 10 years 84 18.30 14.47 26.95 
10 years to less than 20 years 97 21.13 23.27 16.31 
20 years and above 50 10.89 11.95 8.51 
Proportion of life spent in Japan Magnitude Proportion 
Less than a quarter 301 65.72 
A quarter to less than half 121 26.42 
Half to less than three-quarters  33 7.21 
Almost whole 3 0.66 
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residents still struggle more. 
 
In terms of education, more than half of the population has college undergraduate and graduate 
degrees. Respondents aged 25 to 44 years old seem to have higher educational attainment than 
those in the older age groups. This is affirmed if we look at the length of stay. Respondents who 
have stayed the longest tended to have lower educational attainment than those who had just 
stayed for less than three years. However overall, majority of the respondents can be considered 
highly educated, as more than 50 percent have spent at least one year in college.  
 
Table 6.8. Educational attainment, N=459 
 
The impact of pre-migration experiences to the integration process has not been extensively 
researched. While Luthra et al (2014) note of the possible relationship between work experience 
from the home country and better integration outcomes, they note that this may vary depending 
on other variables such as motivations for migration. They found out that many temporary 
migrants, those who do not intend to stay, are most likely to have some work experience before 
coming to the host country, and while they are integrated economically, their integration levels in 
terms of the other dimensions of integration vary.  
 
Given this it becomes interesting to see the relationship between work experience from the home 
country and integration outcomes. From the data, we see that majority of the respondents have 
some form of job experience before leaving the country to either work or join spouses or relatives 
in Japan. About 82 percent reported having experienced working in the Philippines, with majority 
of those with work experience aged 25 to 44 years old. More males, about 89 percent, have 
experienced working in the Philippines prior their migration to Japan, while about 79 percent of 
females had such experience.  
 
Table 6.9. Work experience from home country, N=459 
Highest educational attainment Magnitude Proportion Female (%) Male (%) 
High School 145 31.59 35.53 22.70 
Technical Vocational 68 14.81 15.41 13.48 
College 244 53.16 48.74 63.12 
Grad School 2 0.44 0.31 0.71 
Has work experience from home country Magnitude Frequency Female (%) Male (%) 
Yes 377 82.14 78.93 89.36 
No 82 17.86 21.07 10.64 
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Though I was able to collect data on the availability of their work experience from the home 
country, due to the limitations of the survey, I was not able to extrapolate the actual jobs the 
respondents had been engaging in the Philippines before they left for Japan. As was previously 
discussed, many of the respondents do have high educational attainment which is kind of the 
norm during the 1980s, 1990s in the Philippines as majority of Filipino then have higher 
educational attainments compared to its neighbors in the Southeast Asian region. From here 
then we cannot really say what kinds of jobs the respondents have engaged in. From the 
qualitative interviews with key informants, we can say that they did a variety of jobs, from sales 
clerks, office workers to professionals. Again, the data limited in knowing the kinds of jobs that 
the respondents did before travelling to Japan. This can be something that can be added later on 
as a way forward or as a continuation of this project. What we do know however is that salaries in 
Japan, and the promise of a better life for them and for their families most probably exceeded the 
salaries they were getting from their jobs in the Philippines hence the move to Japan. This is 
most probably the case for those who moved to Japan mainly for economic reasons.  
 
Reasons for migrating 
A recent shift towards a more agential rather than institutional approach to migrant integration 
has provided more insights in understanding how the integration process happens. For instance, 
Cerdin et al (2013) notes that among highly qualified migrants, their success is dependent in 
large part to their motivation to integrate which is largely explained by their reason for migration. 
This is also demonstrated to be applicable to other migrant types. Dustmann (2000) notes that a 
migrant whose goal is to accumulate resources fast are less likely to invest in their social 
integration in the destination country. Luthra et al (2014) also note that a migrant wanting to 
accumulate resources fast are less likely to be concerned about gainful employment.  
 
Luthra et al (2014) further notes that migrants migrating because of family reunification purposes 
will tend to have lower economic integration outcomes than those who migrated for work. They 
argue that this is because of two things: first, they are less likely to be selected based on their 
labor market characteristics and second because of their actual reason for migration. Other 
non-economic reasons can also contribute to lower integration outcomes as described by Guo 
and DeVoretz (2006) in their study on Chinese immigrants in Canada. They note that 
non-economic reasons have led to poor economic performances. However, they are quick to 
note that this happened coupled with the devaluation of the immigrants  acquired Chinese 
education qualifications and experiences.  
 
From the dataset, we see that majority travelled to Japan because of economic reasons. As was 
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previously mentioned, the institutionalization of migration in the 1970s has instilled the idea that 
working abroad can help in improving lives back home. This culture of migration has imprinted an 
economically-driven migration. It is no wonder then that majority of the respondents in the survey 
reported that the main reason for their migration to Japan is to work or to look for work. Looking 
at the table below we also see that about 17 percent migrated to Japan because of family 
reasons, either to be with relatives or to be with spouses.  
 
Table 6.10. Reasons why migrated to Japan, N=459 
 
These reasons for migrating are reflected in the visa status the foreign residents received upon 
arrival to Japan. About 45 percent came as entertainers, 22 percent came as trainees and some 
seven percent came with various working visas such as intra-company transfers, humanities and 
engineers among others.  
 
Table 6.11. Visa status variables, N=459 
 
There is no available data at the national level on the profile of Filipino who became permanent 
residents. From the data however, comparing current visa status with status upon arrival we can 
say that majority of the current permanent residents entered as entertainers and dependents, at 
least in the case of Nagoya. We see that those who are current permanent residents who arrived 
Reasons Magnitude Frequency Female (%) Male (%) 
To work/look for work 339 73.86 72.96 75.89 
To train/study 42 9.15 6.92 14.18 
To marry/be with spouse 27 5.88 7.86 1.42 
To be with relatives 50 10.89 11.95 8.51 
Tour 1 0.22 0.31 0.00 
Status upon arrival Magnitude Frequency Female (%) Male (%) 
Spouse 12 2.61 3.77 0.00 
Entertainer 205 44.66 59.75 10.64 
Trainee 103 22.44 11.01 48.23 
Working 31 6.75 3.77 13.48 
Student 18 3.92 3.77 4.26 
Dependent 60 13.07 12.58 14.18 
Japanese 4 0.87 0.63 1.42 
Tourist 26 5.66 4.72 7.80 
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as entertainers have stayed in Japan for more than ten years, confirming that majority of those 
who arrived as entertainers in the 1980s eventually became permanent residents. Chart below 
shows this.  
 
Chart 6.1. Previous visa status of current permanent and long-term residents 
 
 
On the other hand, those who are currently permanent residents who arrived as dependents 
have stayed in Japan for about five to ten years, suggesting that most of them arrived after the 
migrants who arrived during the 1980s to 1990s have settled down and have started bringing 
relatives from the Philippines under dependent residency statuses.  
 
The chart below on the other hand show the visas received upon arrival vis-à-vis current visa. 
We see that many of the Filipinos who arrived as entertainers are currently permanent residents. 
These are those who arrived much earlier, before 2005. While those that are still currently 
entertainers are those who arrived recently. On the other hand, we see that those who arrived as 
dependents either become long-term or permanent resident visa holders. Interestingly, those 
who came with working visas tend to not apply for permanent nor long-term visas. As compared 
to those who came with tourist visas majority of whom had already secured permanent residents.   
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Chart 6.2. Current trajectories of visa status received upon arrival  
 
 
C. Transnational practices 
We have previously discussed in Chapter 1 how the literature of transnationalism developed. 
Reiterating, proponents of transnationalism studies have argued that migration processes are 
changing and that the assumption that people will stay and live in only one place no longer holds. 
What transnationalism researchers argue is that migrants exist in many contexts at once and 
have various affiliations that are not contradictory to each other. Therefore, the core of 
transnationalism lies in the continued interaction of migrants with their home country while they 
settle and establish new relations in their destination countries. To be a transnational migrant 
then is to live across international borders  (Glick Schiller et al 1999, Portes 1999, Portes et al 
1999, Levitt and Glick-Schiller 2004, Guarnizo et al 2003).  
 
Transnationalism can be seen in the various transnational practices that migrants engage in. 
Transnational practices according to Portes (1999) refer to an individual migrant s border 
crossing activities. These activities can be economic, political or socio-cultural. Further, these 
activities can be categorized as those that involve the physical movement of people such as 
visits to home country, and those that do not, such as sending remittances. In light of these 
developments, two strands of opposing beliefs have come up: on the one hand transnationalism 
scholars argue that there is nothing to be feared and that transnational practices have long been 
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an exercised practice among migrants. An increasing number of empirical researches celebrate 
these transnational practices as helping to facilitate a much more connected world (Portes 1999; 
Sheringham 2009; Van Bochove et al. 2010); while on the other hand, some researches warn 
that migrant integration and transnational practices can be a recipe for disaster arguing that 
living in two different societies can create conflicts of interest between home and host countries 
(Snel et al. 2006), and more especially when the host country becomes the home country 
through naturalization and permanent residency. 
 
Studies linking these two concepts together tend to be limited. While studies such as Snel et al. 
(2006) on migrant groups in the Netherlands, Sheringham (2009) on Brazilian immigrants in 
Ireland, de Haas and Fokkema (2011) on African immigrants in Spain and Italy and Carling and 
Pettersen (2014) shed some understanding on how these two concepts interact, their results 
demand further investigation. 
 
In this project, I aim to look at how, given the context of the Filipino residents in Japan, can such 
transnational practices impact integration outcomes in the host country. To be able to do include 
this in my analysis, I looked at economic and socio-cultural transnational practices. The table 
below shows the proportion of respondents who travels to the home country. Majority of the 
respondents travel back to the home country (67.54%). About 30 percent travels regularly, 
whether it be every half year, every year or every two years.  
 
Table 6.12. Visits to the home country, N=459 
 
The spatial proximity of Japan and the Philippines makes it easier and more affordable for many 
Filipino residents to regularly travel to the home country. The recent proliferation of Philippine 
low-cost carriers (LCCs) such as Cebu Pacific Air and Philippine Airlines Express (PAL Express), 
as well as other LCCS such as Air Asia and JetStar have made travelling much more affordable. 
Fare prices have gone down by almost half since the introduction of Cebu Pacific Air flights from 
Manila to Tokyo and Osaka as compared to when Philippine Airlines was the only Philippine 
carrier flying to Japan. The expansion Cebu Pacific Air did in the recent years have also made it 
Magnitude Frequency Female (%) Male (%) 
No 149 32.46 28.93 40.43 
Not regularly 172 37.47 39.94 31.91 
Every 2 years 39 8.5 5.35 15.60 
Every year 33 7.19 18.24 5.67 
Every 6 months 66 14.38 7.55 6.38 
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much more affordable for Filipino residents living outside Tokyo. The carrier has introduced 
direct flights from Manila to Nagoya City in 2014 and direct flights from Manila to Fukuoka City in 
2015 where many Filipinos reside. This has reasonably lowered the costs compared to previous 
years when Filipino residents have to travel from Nagoya City to Tokyo to be able to board the 
plane.  
 
The table below shows whether the respondents have savings in the home country. We see that 
of the 87 percent who reported having savings, about 89 percent of this maintains savings either 
exclusively in the Philippines or in both Japan and the Philippines. Only about 10 percent saves 
exclusively in Japan.  
 
Table 6.13. Savings in the home country, N=459 
 
On the other hand, we see that, as with savings, about 83 percent send remittances to the 
Philippines. Of these, about 56 percent send regularly either monthly or every one to three 
weeks. We see in the table that among those who are sending remittances both regularly and 
irregularly, 87 percent of them send remittances for the daily consumption of their families back 
home. About 41 percent send it for education and about 39 percent send it for savings. 
 
Table 6.14. Remittance variables 
Savings Magnitude Frequency Female (%) Male (%) 
Yes 399 86.93 86.48 87.94 
No 60 13.07 13.52 12.06 
Where? 
Japan 41 10.28 11.64 7.26 
Philippines 147 36.84 37.82 34.68 
In both Japan and the Philippines 211 52.88 50.55 58.06 
Magnitude Frequency Female (%) Male (%) 
Remit?
No 79 17.21 18.55 14.18  
Yes 380 82.79 81.45 85.82 
How often 
Every one to three weeks 5 1.32 1.93 0.00 
Monthly 209 55.00 51.35 62.81 
  
Irregular, only when needed, when there 
is money 
166 43.68 
46.72 37.19 
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*Reasons for remittance by sex all 100 percent 
 
It is important at this point to raise some key ideas about these two practices. In the literature of 
remittance and savings, when remittances are used to fund for education of other household 
members, remittances are often seen as a form of investment because of the potential human 
capital it can add to the household (Lopez et al. 2007; Calero et al. 2009). Further, utilizing 
remittances to fund for housing construction or to fund enterprises are seen as a form of capital 
accumulation (Osili 2004). What these suggest is that accumulating capital in the home country 
can create incentives for migrants to go back eventually and not incorporate fully into the host 
country. 
 
The role of remittances in the context of the Philippine migration has been stressed enough 
(Alburo 1993, Asis 2006, Docot 2009, Reyes et al 2014). The role of remittances in spurring local 
development is still largely in dispute on the one hand, researches have shown that because 
most recipient households use remittances for consumer goods, remittances cannot spur 
long-term development; while on the other hand, especially in the Philippine context, remittances 
when used to invest in education and housing hints at the potential use of remittances in 
acquiring better human capital (Reyes et al 2013).  
 
Regardless of whether remittances can spur development or not, the literature agrees that 
remittances serve a role in reconnecting migrants with their home country. Remittances in cash 
and in kind have been argued to play a  with their 
families and co  (Alburo 2005). As gifts, remittances signal their -entry into 
Philippine society since gift-giving implies a relationship between the giver and the 
(Alburo 2005). Suzuki goes further and connects this to the idea of utang na loob (Suzuki 2005). 
 interaction between Filipinos potentially renders a site in which they 
engage in the  therefore utang na loob is not 
simply an economic exchange but a social bond (Ileto 1982).  
 
Why remit   
Daily consumption 331 87.11   
Education 154 40.53   
For celebrations/birthdays/fiesta 114 30.00   
To pay for loan 81 21.32   
Savings 150 39.47   
To pay for land, house 53 13.95   
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In the context of the Filipino women who travelled to Japan to work as entertainers, Suzuki 
(2011) of the dutiful daughter , or those who still have to send remittances to support their 
families back in the home country regardless of whether they have their own families or not in the 
host country. Supporting families back home is seen as a duty, for it is this duty that was the 
driving force behind their migration. Migration is still an expensive endeavor and in most cases 
families had to sell or loan assets to be able to fund the endeavor. This is often seen as a 
sacrifice, a sacrifice by the family to be able to give at least one member a chance to migrate and 
experience a better life. This is where utang na loob comes into play. To pay back the sacrifice 
given by the family, the migrant member sends back remittances. 
 
The literature has often pointed to the disconnection between how migrants and remittance 
recipients understand the work done and effort given just to be able to send remittances. Often 
seen as living the better life, migrants are often assumed to have more resources than their 
counterparts back home. Japan is often seen as the America of Asia, modern and developed. 
What this view often disregards is the fact that many of these dutiful daughters are engaged in 
jobs categorized as 3D and to be able to accumulate resources and send back remittances, 
many of the Filipino respondents continue to work regardless of job conditions. This ties in with 
the argument made earlier citing Dustmann (2000) that a focus on resource accumulation can 
impact integration outcomes. This becomes much more interesting when coupled with the 
possible impacts of transnational practices. 
 
D. Ethnic social ties 
The literature suggests that aside from human capital, there is another form of capital that 
migrants can mobilize to overcome hardships in the host country. While the literature has put 
emphasis on different forms of social capital such as trust, group solidarity and networks and ties, 
there is an agreement that social capital  possessed 
. Therefore, social capital can be measured 
by looking at the membership of an individual to various groups (Woolcock 1999, Portes 2000, Li 
2004).  
 
The literature differentiates between homophilous and heterophilous social ties (Lin 2001). While 
homophilous social ties pertain to social connections among people that are similar, 
heterophilous social ties refer to social capital among actors that are dissimilar. Often used as a 
basis for similarity is ethnicity. In the case of the Filipino migrants, this ethnic social tie is their ties 
as was previously discussed. The usefulness of attachments based on 
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ethnicity has been discussed in the literature, though findings have not been conclusive and 
have been actually contradictory. Researchers drawing from the more classical assimilation 
perspective notes of the ethnic mobility entrapment (Wiley 1967, cited in Li 2008). The ethnic 
mobility entrapment thesis suggests that over reliance on the ethnic community can result in 
missed opportunities. This entrapment thesis has been evidenced by studies showing the huge 
income disparity between native-born and foreign-born population, as well as the ease of 
penetration of the labor market by foreign residents.  
 
On the other hand, the immigrant enclave thesis theorized by Wilson and Portes (1980, cited in 
Li 2001) and Wilson and Martin (1982, cited in Li 2001) suggest that ethnic ties can be a source 
of economic success. In immigrant societies with limited resources, ethnic enclaves can provide 
positive returns. What this means is that immigrants can use ethnic ties, resources and 
 
 
At the outset, these two theses are conflicting, but further investigation suggests that the ethnic 
enclave thesis is an extension of the entrapment thesis. What this means is that since migrants 
are given access to certain resources through their ethnic social ties, there is no incentive to go 
beyond the community. What this leads to is entrapment within the ethnic community, as 
migrants stay longer and rely on their ethnic enclaves they become further entrenched in their 
own community. Further, what this suggests is that in one way or another, ethnic social ties can 
impact  
 
In the data, I only measure ethnic social ties which limits the discussion to homophilous social 
ties. This is to further understand how possibly existence of ethnic social ties can impact 
integration outcomes. Given the limitations of this project I focused on existence of social ties 
and not how deep or to what extent foreign residents rely on their ethnic social ties. To further 
deepen the discussion, I utilize the differentiation between bonding and bridging social capital 
ties.  
 
In the case of social ties, homophilious bonding social ties refer to tight or strong ties, or those 
ties that people have with their family members, relatives, friends and neighbors. Often tight ties 
are seen as sources of norms, values and family-mediated benefits (Portes 2000) that people 
and, bridging social ties refer to the more 
expansive social capital often called loose or weak ties that include ties with work colleagues, 
a clearer distinction between tight (strong) and loose (weak) ties by stating that while both types 
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of ties provides resources, emotional support is often provided by tight ties. In the context of the 
Filipino residents, the ethnic social ties pertain to  -
Outside of the Philippines, to be referred to as kababayan means one is seen as coming from the 
same country, that one is a Filipino. This is what is referred to here as co-ethnics, hence ethnic 
social ties. Given the distinction based on capability to promote emotional and psychological 
support on the one hand and as sources of norms and values, I distinguish between strong/tight 
ties as composed of ties that include family, close friends, neighbors and church, while 
weak/loose ties are composed of ties that include co-workers, organization members and 
acquaintances. In short, both types of ties being discussed here only refer to Filipino ties, the 
only distinction is that strong ties pertain mostly to blood-related co-ethnic ties but that also 
include very close friends and neighbors and even church members as these are sources of 
emotional and psychological support while weak ties pertain to more expansive co-ethnic ties 
which can include Filipino acquaintances, workmates or organizations. 
 
According to Woolcock (1999) different combinations of bridging and bonding social capital can 
bring about different outcomes. These networks view of social capital according to Woolcock 
(1999) suggest that social capital is a double-edged sword in that while it can provide access and 
siderable non-
, I do not aim to 
argue in what way ethnic social ties can affect integration outcomes. The purpose is to simply 
understand whether ethnic ties can impact integration outcomes, whether it be positive or 
negative, or no impact at all.  
 
The impact of ethnic social ties is much more pronounced at the settling in stage. Studies have 
shown that the settling in stage can affect the direction of the integration process (OECD-EU 
2015). Following earlier arguments, very tight ties can impact integration outcomes from the 
settling in stage. The settling in stage is among the hardest stages of the migration process. 
Studies have shown that migrants often choose a place based on whether they already know 
someone in that place. And those people that they know serve as resources and assets that help 
them to have a smoother transition from immigrant to settler.  
 
In the data, we see that majority of the respondents already know someone upon their arrival. 
Majority of these respondents know people that can be categorized as tight ties. About 41 
percent of respondents who already know someone upon arrival reported having family, relatives 
and or friends already in Japan when they arrived in Japan. Further, about 24 percent reported 
that someone being acquaintances and former co-workers.  
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Table 6.15. Social ties upon arrival, N=459 
 
Though the respondents have accessed help from different types of social ties such as family, 
friends, organizations among others, upon categorizing the ties accessed, we see that 
primary help came from family members, close friends, and church mates, social capital ties that 
are categorized as strong or tight ties. On the other hand, about seven percent pointed to 
organizations and acquaintances as their primary help during the settling in period.  
 
Table 6.16. Primary help  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The help received during the settling in period had been useful in the face of many problems a 
foreign resident who is not yet accustomed to the life in the destination country may face. For 
instance, we see in the data that majority of the respondents pointed to language (91.72%) as 
the main problem experienced upon arrival and during the settling in stage. Having another 
person who knows what words to use in specific circumstances encountered during the settling 
in stage is very important. For instance, language is very important in finding a job, looking for a 
house or even in understanding the transportation system.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Magnitude Frequency Female (%) Male (%) 
Strong/tight ties 188 40.96 42.45 36.17 
Weak/loose ties 110 23.97 19.50 34.04 
None 162 35.07 38.05 29.79  
Received help from: Magnitude Frequency 
Strong/tight ties 282 61.44 
Weak/loose ties 30 6.54 
Both strong and weak ties 0 0.00 
None 147 32.03 
Total 459 100.00 
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Table 6.17. Experienced problems upon arrival, N=459 
 
We see from the table below how ethnic social ties are important in the settling in stage. Majority 
of the respondents received information on daily life from both bridging and bonding social ties 
(56.64%), as well as psychological and emotional support which is very important for a foreign 
resident who is away from his or her family (53.16%). It would seem that for foreign residents 
who received help from weak/loose ties, more received support such as information on daily life 
and job during the settlement as compared to other types of help. On the other hand, for foreign 
residents who received help from strong/tight ties, more received emotional and psychological 
support that any other support. This supports 
and weak/loose social types.  
 
Table 6.18. Distribution of respondents living in areas with many Filipinos, N=459 
 
 
Further, I look at whether the respondents live in area where there are many Filipinos. 
Neighborhood and small communities are often seen as places where tight social capital thrives. 
The existence of small enclaves can suggest a tighter community. The table above shows that 
about 80 percent live in areas where there are many Filipinos.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Experienced problems upon arrival on: Magnitude Frequency 
Language 421 91.72 
Looking for housing 77 16.78 
Looking for a job 62 13.51 
Looking for a friend 29 6.32 
Transportation 14 3.05 
Culture 1 0.22 
Homesickness 1 0.22 
Magnitude Frequency Female (%) Male (%) 
Not many Filipinos 93 20.26 19.81 21.28 
Many Filipinos 366 79.74 80.19 78.72  
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Table 6.19. Selected variables on help received upon arrival, N=320 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
After settling in, having access to ethnic social ties is considered still very important. It is 
accepted that while there may be possibilities of ethnic entrapment, ethnic social ties can still 
ethnic social 
ties they have. In terms of existing social bonding social ties, we see that 98 percent of the 
respondents have either Filipino relatives and family members in the same area, live in a 
neighborhood with many Filipino residents, or who have friends they met in their neighborhood 
and in the church. While about 92 percent of the Filipinos have access to weak ties characterized 
by friends they met at work, at organizations and at other various ways such as through the 
internet or through other friends. About 90 percent of the respondents have access to both loose 
and tight social ties.  
 
Table 6.20. Existing social ties by type 
 
According to Woodcock (1999) the different combination of social ties can have significant 
impact on the different outcomes of an individual. Thus, I look at the possible combinations of 
ethnic social ties and found that while about 90 percent have access to both strong and weak 
social ties, about nine percent have access to exclusively strong ties and about two percent have 
access exclusively to weak ties.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Type of support received Magnitude Frequency 
Monetary 91 19.83 
Information on daily life 260 56.64 
Housing information 141 30.72 
Job information 138 30.07 
Psychological and emotional support 244 53.16 
Access to: Magnitude Frequency Female (%) Male (%) 
Strong/tight social ties 452 98.47 97.80 100.00 
Weak/loose social ties 420 91.50 89.94 95.04 
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Table 6.21. Combination of social ties accessed by respondents 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It becomes interesting how the existence of strong and weak ties can impact their integration 
outcomes and how the depth of these ties can affect the integration process.  
 
E. Intents for the future 
Skepticism regarding the use of intent to stay can be expressed in the same way that skepticism 
on the use of intent to return abounds in the literature. Researches suggest that intent to return is 
an intent that often never gets fulfilled. Studies have shown that intentions are being revised 
again and again. Studies have shown that different factors can impact intention to stay such as 
job and residence, and even policies relating to integration (Waldorf 1995, Carling and Pettersen 
2014, Luthra et al 2014, Geurts and Lubbers 2016, Belgiojoso 2016)  
 
Intent to stay can be read in the same way, however, I refer to C
who intend to return end up not returning, among those who will return will always be included 
those who intended to return. The same argument can be made for intent to stay among those 
who will stay will be those that initially expressed intent to stay.  
 
Luthra et al(2014) notes regardless of whether a migrant actually stays or not, their intention, 
especially at the beginning of their migration can have impact on their integration outcomes. 
They argue that different intentions are associated with different patterns of integration (p.5). 
T
subjective orientation towards the receiving society and perceptions of its hospitality and have 
 
 
In the same way, a migrant expressing no intention to stay permanently can create for him or 
herself no incentive to invest in integration. What having such a mindset does is deter a person 
Magnitude Frequency 
Only strong/tight ties  39 8.50 
Only weak/loose ties 7 1.53 
Both 413 89.98 
Total 459 100.00 
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from investing in relationships and in human capital that can improve his or her outcomes in the 
(2014) second argument in 
migration experience, and can affect behaviour other than return itself  for instance about 
intent to stay can affect behavior and experiences related to migration, such as integration and 
developing affinities with the host country.  
 
Third, complementing earlier argument, as somewhat a possible predictor of behavior, intention 
to either stay or return can inform us of the possibilities of a smoother and easier integration as 
staying can encourage development of affinities with the host country. A spate of research has 
argued that staying permanently and eventually naturalizing in the host country have big impacts 
on migrant integration (Penninx 2005, Geurts and Lubbers 2016, di Beligiojoso 2016). Belgiojoso 
(2016) noted that intentions are related to attachments in the host and home countries and 
Geurts and Lubbers (2016) found that among migrants who decide to stay permanently invest 
better in the language. Bijwaard et al (2011) found that intentions to stay are shaped by 
experiences in the host country. Intentions to stay can thus be seen as a summary of the 
experiences of a foreign resident in the home country. Understanding it in such a way, the 
intention to stay of a permanent resident who has lived a long time in the destination country thus 
becomes doubly important as it can inform us of how he or she has experienced the country so 
far. What is not being argued here is that intent to stay is equal to actual staying. What is being 
argued is that it is precisely because intent to stay can change that it becomes important to study. 
A foreign resident may intend to stay one day and intend to not stay the next, but what it means 
is that following Bijwaard et al (2011) this change can be attributed to what is happening to him 
or her in the destination country and thus can inform us of the complexities of the processes of 
integration.  
 
And fourth, looking at intent to stay can also help address another problem in the literature of 
migrant integration  
Morawska 2003). Intent to stay accepts this implication of a cohesive structure, because it is in 
this structure which migrants decide to stay with, while accepting that this cohesive structure is 
argue that 
intentions to stay can inform us of the experiences in the destination country. What this means is 
that intention to stay can be seen as anchored to the cohesive structure into which the foreign 
residents integrate.  
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In the data we see that about 87 percent have no intention to stay. What this implies, following 
arguments made, is that this non-intention has been shaped by their experiences so far. Only 
about 13 percent has intention to stay.  
 
Table 6.22. Intent to stay 
 
Among those who do not intend to stay permanently, majority intend to stay for more than five 
years. About 32 percent intend to stay for five to ten years and about 31 percent intend to stay for 
more than ten years. What this means is that even if majority of the respondnets do not intend to 
stay permanently, majority of the respondents still want to stay for much longer. Whether this 
desire to stay for a longer period of time will give the respondents the incentive to invest in their 
integration into the host society is one thing this project problematizes about.  
 
Table 6.23. Intended length of stay 
 
On the other hand, intention to stay is expressed much more strongly among those who already 
applied for citizenship. Only a small proportion of the respondents have applied for citizenship 
(3.92%). This proportion account for 31 percent of those who plan to stay permanently.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Intent to stay permanently Magnitude Proportion Female (%) Male (%) 
Has no intent 400 87.15 86.48 88.65 
Has intent 59 12.85 13.52 11.35 
How long will stay? Magnitude Proportion Female (%) Male (%) 
Less than a year 1 0.25 0.36 0.00 
1 year to less than 3 years 40 10.00 10.55 8.80 
3 to less than 5 years 110 27.50 29.82 22.40 
5 to less than 10 years 127 31.75 29.09 37.60 
More than 10 years 122 30.50 30.18 31.20 
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Table 6.24. Citizenship 
 
 
The literature on classical assimilation theories informs us that citizenship is one of the most 
important indicator of a successful assimilation. However, as recent developments in the fields of 
transnationalism (Portes et al 1999, Guarnizo et al 2003) show less and less foreign residents 
are naturalizing. The International Migration Outlook released by OECD this year ranks Japan as 
14th among the OECD countries in terms of naturalization rates. The report shows that majority 
of these naturalizations however still include only Korean tokubetsu eijyuusha (special 
permanent residents) but recent years saw the increase of naturalization among Chinese 
residents and other foreign groups. However, naturalization in Japan is still seen by many as a 
hard and long process.  
 
Among the respondents who expressed intent to stay permanently but does not want to apply 
citizenship, majority reasoned that they do not plan to naturalize because it would entail giving up 
their being Filipino (46.34%). This is the same finding discussed in Ehrkamp and Leitner (2006). 
these complex negotia
leading to differences among migrants in allegiances and dispositions towards acquisition of 
 
 
In the data we see about 14 percent saying that they do not want to change their citizenship 
because naturalization would have no difference with their current residency status. One 
important difference that the respondents did not seem to see is that once they have a Japanese 
citizenship they would be able to vote. What not acknowledging this difference entail is the 
possibility of being unattached to the current happening in Japanese society. Another possible 
Applied for citizenship Magnitude Proportion 
Yes 18 30.51 
No 41 69.49 
 Why not apply? 
Not going to live forever in Japan 11 26.83 
Would need to give-up being Filipino 19 46.34 
Process is very difficult 4 9.76 
No difference from current visa status 6 14.63 
Others 1 2.44 
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implication of this lack of acknowledgment is, as Ehrkamp and Leitner (2006) argue, that they do 
 
 
Given these arguments it becomes interesting to know and dig deeper as to how such intentions 
and plans for the future influence and impact their integration outcomes.  
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Chapter conclusion 
This chapter is the first chapter in Part III, the focus of which are the outcomes and patterns of 
integration based on the survey data. In this chapter I presented the individual characteristics of 
the respondents. I first discussed how important it is to look at demographic characteristics such 
as age and sex as these, the literature have shown, can impact the integration outcomes. We 
have seen from the data that most of the respondents are women and middle-aged. This 
confirms previous discussions in Chapter 3 regarding the Filipino migration to Japan.  
 
I have also looked at individual trajectories such as reasons for migration, work experience from 
the home country, length of stay in Japan and changes in visa. These factors have been 
discussed in the literature though as I have shown, there are disagreements in the impacts of 
these factors in the integration outcomes and patterns of foreign residents. The data showed that 
majority of the respondents have migrated for economic reasons, have stayed for almost ten 
years in Japan and that majority of those who are currently permanent and long-term residents 
initially entered Japan as entertainers. As we have previously discussed in Parts I and II, 
knowing these can help explain the outcomes of integration that we will later discuss in the next 
chapters.  
 
Finally in this chapter we looked at the transnational activities of the foreign residents, their 
ethnic social ties and their intents for the future. We saw from the data that majority engage in 
some form of transnationalism, both regular and irregular. We also saw that many have strong 
ethnic social ties and that a surprising majority do not intend to stay permanently in Japan.  
 
These are individual factors that may impact integration outcomes. Compounding contextual 
factors that we have previously discussed, it becomes interesting how the confluence of such 
factors can impact integration as both an outcome and as a process.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 136 
 
Chapter 7: Outcomes and Dimensions of Integration 
 
In this chapter, I present the integration outcomes of the respondents in terms of the four 
dimensions of integration. I discuss in this section the integration outcomes vis-à-vis the 
integration policies and approach of the local government discussed previously in Chapter 3 and 
5. I also situate the outcomes in the context of the Philippine migration to Japan as was 
previously discussed in Chapter 4. Again, as was previously mentioned, I present quantitative 
and qualitative findings jointly to provide a more wholistic understanding of the integration 
outcomes of the Filipino residents in Japan. At the end of this section, I would have argued that 
the numbers and statistics presented indicative of the integration levels of the respondents are a 
product of many contextual and individual factors including but not limited to the integration 
policies and approach of the local government, the context by which the Filipino residents came 
and settled in Nagoya City and the individual characteristics of the foreign residents.  
 
 
A. Structural integration outcomes 
Structural integration refers to the access to the core institutions of the host society (Heckmann 
2005) such as the labor market, housing systems, welfare and social protection systems, 
citizenship and residence, because -economic status, 
 (p. 15). 
Following then the definition of integration utilized in this research, integrating into these core 
they decided to migrate in the first place.  
 
At the outset, the survey data reveals very high rates of employment among the respondents. 
Among the 459 Filipino residents in Nagoya who responded to the survey, majority of them 
reported having jobs (91.72%, see Chart 7.1). Among those without jobs only three individuals 
are currently studying, some are either retired or waiting for rehire and majority are stay-at-home 
persons. Among those who are employed, jobs tend to be concentrated in the service sector 
where majority work as factory workers (45.84%) and as entertainers (30.64%). About 20 
percent work as professionals (such as engineers, nurses and caregivers, information 
technology specialists and assistant language teachers). Often, they get information about 
available jobs through their personal networks (54.16%). 
 
Though access to jobs is high and majority of the respondents feel that the amount of money 
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they receive for their wages are sufficient for their daily needs (97.39%), only about 72 percent of 
the respondents receive the same salary every month (Table 7.1). This informs us of the 
seasonality of jobs that many of them engage in. About 85 percent reported being gainfully 
employed meaning those who perceive that the skills they learned from school or from previous 
jobs match their current jobs, this is about seven percent less than the figures we got if we only 
look at those with jobs. This seven percent reported being employed but feel that their skills do 
not match with their current job.  
 
This is actually surprising and is actually very contradictory to what I got from the qualitative part 
of the study. My key informants from migrant organizations did say that many Filipino residents 
feel that their current jobs do not match their skills and that being engaged in such short-term 
unskilled jobs are kind of detrimental to the overall image of the Filipinos in the City. However, 
the data shows that many respondents feel that their skills match their current jobs, in that they 
are actually gainfully employed. Perhaps one possible reason is the untranslatability of the 
question, another probable reason is income has an effect on their responses because for a 
certain skillset a certain amount of income is associated with it, and in the Philippines the values 
are much lower compared to what they can get in Japan. Regardless, this is something that 
should be focused more in the future as an extension of this research project.  
 
Chart 7.1. Employment 
 
 
 
 
 
Employed Magnitude Proportion 
No 38 8.28 
Yes 421 91.72 
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Table 7.1. Selected economic variables, N=421 
 
Table 7.2. Selected economic variables, N=421 
 
Table 7.3. How found current job, N=421 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What the high employment rate seems to imply is that the labor market is easily penetrable. We 
see the same findings from the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX 2004) in that the current 
system is favorable for foreigners in finding work, but this only true for short-term work. Changing 
jobs and sectors for temporary workers is extremely difficult. This is exactly what is found out 
using the data as we will discuss in the next paragraphs. 
One contradiction that I noticed is that while my key informants told me that the most common 
job worked by respondents is being entertainers, we see that actually majority engage more in 
factory work. Though of course a very substantial group of respondents still work as entertainers 
and a sizeable number are permanent residents. One informant told me that many permanent 
residents still work in the entertainment industry because it still is very lucrative and compared to 
before clubs are less strict and allow more horizontal mobility across clubs.  
 
Job type Magnitude Proportion Female (%) Male (%) 
Entertainer 129 30.64 40.28 10.87 
ALT 22 5.23 6.36 2.90 
Nurse/nurse assistant/carework 35 8.31 8.13 8.70 
Engineers/Professionals 27 6.41 3.53 12.32 
Factory work 193 45.84 37.10 63.77 
Various services 15 3.56 4.59 1.45 
Variables Magnitude Proportion Female (%) Male (%) 
Receives same salary every month 303 71.97 66.78 82.61 
Feels that salary is sufficient for daily needs 410 97.39 96.11 100.00 
Feels that skills match with current job 390 92.64 91.17 95.65 
 How found current job Magnitude Proportion 
Philippine agency/company/POEA 45 10.69 
Personal connection 228 54.16 
Job advertisement 119 28.27 
Local government 26 6.18 
Migrant organizations 3 0.71 
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In terms of demographic characteristics, the data shows some interesting differences. In terms of 
sex, it would seem that more males are more involved in the labor market than women (Chart 
7.2). About 90 percent of males reported being employed in jobs where they can utilize their 
education and skills. Looking at the types of jobs where both sexes are involved in, more males 
(58%) are involved in jobs requiring more specialized skills such as engineering, information 
technology, nursing and carework, while only about 19 percent of females are working in such 
jobs. More females are working as entertainers, about 64 percent compared to 30 percent of 
males; and as assistant language teachers, about ten percent compared to eight percent of 
males. Age and civil status indicators on the other hand do not seem to have significant 
differences in terms of being gainfully employed.  
 
On the other hand, looking at differences by individual trajectories the results become more 
salient. Accounting for length of stay in years and proportion of life spent in Japan yield 
interesting findings. It would seem that being employed has a negative relationship with length of 
stay and proportion of life spent in Japan suggesting that those who have stayed longer in Japan 
and those who have spent a bigger proportion of their lives in Japan reported being not gainfully 
employed as compared to those whose length of stay is shorter and those who have spent less 
portion of their lives in Japan (Charts 7.5 and 7.7).  
 
It would seem that being active in the labor market has stronger correlations with indicators 
pertaining to individual trajectories suggesting that the human capital the Filipino residents have 
when they came to Japan can impact their structural integration. The differences are more 
glaring when we look at the differences in reasons for coming to Japan. Those who came to work 
and to train or study reported being employed, while there are more respondents that came to 
marry and to be with relatives and family members that were not employed during the survey 
(Chart 7.9). This ties in perfectly with the discussion in Chapter 7 regarding the integration into 
the labor market of those who came to the destination country because of family reunification 
purposes. In terms of educational attainment levels (Chart 7.6), the differences are more defined. 
We see the values gradually increasing as educational levels move from high school to technical 
vocational to college levels. Consequently, the proportion of respondents saying they are not 
employed also decreases as their educational level increases.  
 
Further, more respondents with previous work experience seem to be employed as compared to 
respondents who did not previously have any work experience from the Philippines (Chart 7.8). 
In terms of their transnational practices on the other hand, most respondents who engage in 
transnational practices seem to be employed in jobs that match their skills more than those who 
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do not engage in transnational practices. In particular, sending remittances and having savings 
in the home country seem to create an incentive or a drive to be active in the labor market, as to 
be able to continuously and regularly send remittances and savings, a foreign resident needs to 
be able to find a job that can provide sufficient income (Charts 8.10-8.12). 
 
While in terms of their ethnic social ties, interestingly, majority of those with jobs have found jobs 
through personal connection. In terms of numbers, more respondents who have jobs reported 
having strong ties than weak ties, but looking at proportion it would seem that more respondents 
who have jobs tend to have weak ties than strong ties (Chart 7.13). 
 
On the other hand, in terms of intentions for the future, interestingly, more respondents who have 
jobs tend to not have intent to stay permanently (94.25%). Further, more respondents who are 
gainfully employed also tend to not have any intention of staying in Japan permanently (87.75%, 
see Chart 7.14). 
 
What the data showed us are two things: first, that though access to jobs is high and though 
initial high rates of employment suggest a permeable labor market, many of the foreign residents 
are working in low-skilled short-term labor and may find it hard to be economically mobile. While 
demographic characteristics do not seem to have a relation with whether they are employed or 
not, their motivations and individual trajectories seem to have some interesting impacts on being 
employed. The perception of being not integrated into the labor market is expressed mostly by 
those who came to Japan because of family-reunification purposes. Recall from the previous 
chapter how Luthra et al (2014) claim that those who migrate for family-reunification purposes 
tend to be the least economically integrated because of first, they are less likely to be selected 
based on their labor market characteristics and second because of their actual reason for 
migration. We see these same dynamics at play in the survey results. Interestingly, following 
what I said regarding the contradictory results regarding gainful employment, those who 
migrated to work or to find work seem slightly content with engaging in their current jobs, though 
when looking at their contentment levels we see more variance.  
 
Further, regardless of length of stay, many of those who have stayed the longest are still 
engaged in low-skilled labor and in jobs that do not match the respondents  learned skills again 
confirming the difficulty in changing jobs and sectors as found out by MIPEX (2004). This is 
contrary to expectations that leng
her better job opportunities. Contrary to expectations that skills can be developed over time in 
the host country and thus can facilitate economic mobility, many of the respondents seem to be 
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trapped in a very particular economic activity which in the long-run can lead to them being 
inhibited or trapped in certain positions in the society. These activities comprise of activities that 
were initially opened for them during the Heisei boom by the Japanese government. It would 
seem however that regardless of the length of time they have stayed, there are still no new 
economic activities that had been opened and had become easily penetrable for them. Further, it 
would seem that there is a danger in being entrapped in the same low-skilled industry for 
respondents who always find jobs through personal connections. More than half of the 
respondents reported finding their current job through personal connections. Among these 
respondents, majority are employed as factory workers (53.07%) and as entertainers (35.96%). 
Also, interestingly, even though job advertisements, most of the jobs found were in the 
low-skilled category. Interestingly, one possible reason for the reliance on personal connections 
to find jobs is because rirekisho or curriculum vitae is something that many of the foreign 
residents do not know. For instance, one of my informants said that she has never written a 
rirekisho in her entire life. Even the jobs that she engaged in back in the Philippines she found 
through personal connections and she has never needed to write a CV. When there came a time 
that she decided to try apply for a full-time job in Japan that is different from her then current job 
as a factory worker, she had to write a CV and she complained how difficult it was.  
 
Second, the devaluation of their human capital in general has compounded this entrapment. 
Parreñas (2010) calls this which refers to 
improvement in their financial  (Fresnoza-Flot 2005). 
 
The data has shown that qualification and language problems remain to be barriers in looking for 
better jobs. Table 7.4 below shows that language (43%) and qualification (43%) seem to be big 
problems in looking for jobs. What this means is that while respondents have in general high 
education levels, it would seem that their educational qualifications from the home country are 
unusable when it comes to finding better jobs in the host society, suggesting devaluation of their 
human capital (Guo and DeVoretz 2006). While educational qualifications can be assessed to be 
matched with educational requirements in some jobs in Japan, technical qualifications are still 
not recognized. This is further made much more difficult by language qualifications. Many 
high-skilled jobs, where Japanese is required, entail some level of language proficiency and 
some knowledge of jargon used in specific fields, also in many cases knowledge of keigo 
(honorific, polite) speech and etiquette is required. Incompetence in the language can affect 
economic mobility.  
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Table 7.4. Problems encountered when looking for a job, N=459 
Problems  Magnitude Proportion 
Discrimination 21 4.99 
Personal constraints 27 6.41 
Language 182 43.23 
Qualification 184 43.71 
Visa 27 6.41 
Temporary contract 24 5.70 
Illegal 2 0.48 
 
 
This is illustrated by an experience one of my key informants relayed to me. She was scheduled 
for a job interview at the Bureau of Immigration in Nagoya City. While she was excited for a 
career change she was a university graduate after all and with her current work in a vegetable 
factory, she felt that she was not using skills and knowledge she had learned she was also 
hesitant to go. While she can speak and understand Japanese, she said her Japanese is very 
colloquial and casual, as she only learned some words when she arrived in Japan after marrying 
her Japanese husband. She eventually went to the interview but decided not to pursue it 
anymore as she felt that she was not qualified in terms of language fluency.  
 
It does not mean however that the human capital foreign residents brought with them from their 
home country are useless when they moved to Japan. The same informant, after she did not 
continue on with her application at the Bureau of Immigration in Nagoya City, went to get a job as 
an office worker at a mobile phone carrier. Her Filipino language proved useful as she was hired 
to manage Filipino clients. Some Filipinos also capitalized on their own ethnicity to improve their 
economic outcomes. One of my informants runs a restaurant where she cooks and serves 
Filipino food to a diverse clientele. She serves not just Filipinos but also Japanese customers as 
well, as well as other nationalities.  
 
Such examples show that by capitalizing on their being Filipino can improve their outcomes, 
though it is hardly the case for everyone. While in general jobs are easy to access, jobs that are 
accessible remain to be categorically low-skilled and short-term jobs. The market, while 
accepting foreigners, is not yet open for more foreign workers in more skilled positions.  
 
The story is slightly different for those already involved in high-skilled jobs. It would seem that for 
those in high-skilled jobs, their education and work experience from the Philippines matter more. 
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Language of course is still a concern but less so when compared to the situation of those in low 
skilled jobs. In fact, the language proficiency levels of those in high-skilled and low-skilled jobs 
are comparable. The main concern however for those in high-skilled jobs are the temporary 
contracts that they get. This can be attributed to two reasons: first, working visas have to be 
renewed usually every three years; and second, many Japanese companies are hesitant to 
of workers, it still cannot police each and every company. 
 
While finding any income generating activity does not seem to be a problem, being gainfully 
employed and findings jobs offering long-term contracts seems to be much harder. The data 
shows that being gainfully employed can be affected by such factors as motivation and individual 
trajectories because of how the host society, while accepting low-skilled workers, do not really 
recognize the need for them and their existence and in fact only accepts them for low-skilled 
short-term positions, and rewards those in high-skilled jobs but remain lukewarm to them.  
 
In terms of access to health facilities, about 96 percent have access to health insurance, whether 
it is through the kokumin kenkou hoken (National Health Insurance Program or NHIP), or through 
the shokuba kenkou hoken (Work Place Health Insurance System WPHIS) (see Table 7.5). The 
NHIP and the WPHIS are the two types of health insurance provided to residents in Japan. 
Defined by the National Health Care Act of 1958, being enrolled in either of these two health 
insurance schemes ensure that members can be protected from expenses incurred because of 
sudden illnesses, major medical operations, long term care and hospitalization. While WPHIS is 
for members employed by registered companies, NHIP is for members that cannot be covered 
by WPHIS (Nihon Kaikei Kiko 2017). NHIP members aged 69 years old and below excluding 
preschool infants pay 30 percent of medical costs incurred, while preschool infants pay 20 
percent and adults aged 70 to 74 years old pay 10 percent. Consequently, NHI pays 70 percent 
of costs for members aged 69 years old and below excluding preschool infants, 80 percent of 
costs for preschool infants and 90 percent for members 70 to 74 years old. NHIP premiums as 
computed by the municipality where 
and number of household members. 
 
NHIP is accessed by majority of the respondents (58.17%). The NHIP covers individuals not 
eligible for any employment-based insurance schemes. The premiums paid are dependent on 
the income of the individual. What the numbers imply is that many of the respondents are not 
eligible for WPHIS. This may be associated with the nature of work these respondents engage in. 
In many cases factory work and entertainment work are often considered as part-time jobs or 
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arubaito, and are usually paid by the hour. A worker is not enrolled in the WPHIS if his or her 
condition applies to one of the following: if his or her weekly working hours are less than 20 hours, 
or the employment is not expected to be longer than a year, or his or her monthly wage is less 
than 88,000 yen (800 USD), or he or she is a student, or the company does not regularly employ 
500 workers. If the worker falls in one of those categories then he or she is not covered by 
WPHIS and is then mandated by law to enroll to NHIP. However, what this implies is that, still, 
majority of the respondents are integrated into the social protection and insurance system. 
 
Table 7.5. Access to insurance, N=442 
Access to insurance Magnitude Proportion 
No 17 3.7 
Yes 442 96.3 
Type of access 
NHIP 267 58.17 
WPHIS 112 24.4 
Dependent 61 13.29 
Seikatsu hogo 2 0.44 
 
Access to insurance, regardless of type, does not really rely on the kind of job the respondent 
has as we have seen from the data. As discussed before access to the insurance system is 
immediately provided to foreign residents who are staying in Japan for more than three months 
since all residents, both local and foreign residents are required by law to have health insurance 
coverage. Not abiding by this law is punishable by law. Being part of the insurance then is a 
function of the residency permits. We see that those without either NHIP or WPHIS are those 
who are not eligible because of the stay qualifications. What this means is that in assessing the 
actual extent of structural integration, including insurance access can skew the assessment as 
enrollment and payments is required by law.  
 
Looking at their actual experience in using health facilities, we see that less than half of the 
respondents have experienced going to the hospital for any medical needs (Table 7.6). Among 
those, 60 percent experienced some difficulty, mainly because of language (52.40%). Here 
again we see the effect of language. Some respondents who have some language capability still 
reported experiencing difficulties in accessing health facilities because of language. Japanese 
medical terms are very specific which makes it extremely difficult for foreign residents to explain 
illnesses and pains to Japanese health care workers. This is the primary reason why Nagoya 
City includes in its programs deployment of medical interpreters to assist foreign residents. I was 
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not however able to access data on the take up rate of these medical interpretation services. 
 
Table 7.6. Experienced going to hospital, N=208 
Experienced going to hospital Magnitude Proportion 
No 251 54.68 
Yes 208 45.32 
Problems experienced 
None 83 39.90 
Lack of information 52 25.00 
Problems related to documents/visas 20 9.62 
Language 109 52.40 
Discrimination 7 3.37 
 
In terms of access to another core structure, housing, on the other hand, the data show that 
majority of the respondents seem to have no problems with their current housing. Everyone has 
access to housing, as foreign residents are required to register their address when they are 
issued their zairyuu kaado (resident card). Their addresses are also important when registering 
-digit identification 
number issued to all local and foreign residents. According to the Japan Agency for Local 
Authority Information Systems (n.d.), an organization operated by prefectures and municipalities 
in Japan, the kojinbango  designed to facilitate, first, 
incomes to prevent evasion of taxes and insurance payment responsibilities. Second, it 
facilitates improved administrative efficiency and third, enhances convenience on the part of the 
public by limiting required documents for various administrative procedures.  
 
With this in mind, we can say that access to housing is a function of their resident permits. In the 
data, we see that many Filipino residents live in danchi, a type of residential complexes managed 
by the prefectures. Rents are usually lower for such types of housing as compared to others. 
Because they are managed by the municipalities, there is usually no key money or contract 
renewal fees involved which lower the rents considerably. To be able to live in a danchi, 
residents have to apply to the municipality. Nagoya City for instance provides translations of 
guides in filling up housing application forms. Danchi housing units are also usually bigger than 
other private apartments, making them ideal for Filipino residents who often live together with 
relatives (28.98%, see Table 7.7). One informant explained to me how moving to a danchi has 
helped them. He lives with a number of relatives, as he himself has migrated to Japan as a 
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dependent. He said the rents are definitely much cheaper and the sizes are bigger which are 
more suitable for bigger Filipino households. 
 
Many Filipinos seem to congest in similar areas. Majority of the respondents found their current 
housing through personal connections (43.36%). This is in particular very true for those who are 
overstayers. They cannot look for housing through real estate or through other formal channels 
as their resident cards would have to be checked. That is why for all overstayers in the data, they 
found housing through personal connections. This is a common practice especially among 
foreign students. One Filipino friend of mine who is currently a student does not know for whom 
his current housing contract is addressed to. He said he got the apartment from a previous 
Filipino student who already moved out and he just continued the contract. That student who 
moved out also just continued the contract from someone else. This is a common practice 
because it avoids the need to pay various other moving in payments such as key money, thank 
you money, and additional deposits. What we see is that while access to housing can be a 
function of residency permits, it can also be a function of the existing ethnic social ties. And we 
see from Chapter 7 that majority of the respondents have access to ethnic social ties or to ties 
with kababayan.  
 
About 80 percent live in areas where there are many Filipino residents. One limitation of this 
research is that I do not touch upon housing segregation in a much deeper level. Some studies 
some form of housing segregation have happened in other danchi housing complexes in other 
municipalities, and this is being attributed to the lack of engagement of the local and 
neighborhood associations with the foreign residents. I would suspect that there would be some 
sort of housing segregation as according to one of my informants, they usually get information on 
available apartments from other Filipinos who are moving out. Further, during one of the events 
cooperation with some Japanese NPOs which I have introduced in a previous chapter, one of the 
speakers mentioned that in a housing complex with an attached nursery, about 80 percent of the 
children are Filipinos while there are five Japanese children. This illustrates how in many danchi 
the number of Filipinos and other foreign residents are increasing.  
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Table 7.7. Selected housing variables, N=459 
Variables Magnitude Proportion 
How found current housing 
Living with family/spouse 133 28.98 
Through personal connection 199 43.36 
Provided by work company 80 17.43 
Through own's effort 20 4.36 
Through local government 23 5.01 
Through migrant organizations 3 0.65 
Problems experienced 
None 411 89.54 
Lack of information 29 6.32 
Problems related to documents/visas 2 0.44 
Language 23 5.01 
Money 8 1.74 
Discrimination 1 0.22 
Distance 9 1.96 
 
 
It would seem from the results of the survey that access to the basic social structures was made 
easier by a combination of factors. On the one hand, the policies and programs of the City 
facilitate a situation where foreign resident engagement in such social structures is generally 
accepted. The thrust towards the participation of foreign residents in the labor market 
complements the goal of tabunka kyousei as the tool to revitalize local municipalities in light of 
depopulation, aging and local public finance crises. The migrant population has the potential to 
bring in income in the form of taxes and businesses and their active participation in the labor 
market can reduce economic burden on the host society (see Parkes & Pryce 2007; Heath & 
Demireva 2014). Further, service provision for foreign residents, if seen as an extension of 
service provision for local residents, is considered efficient. Structural integration policies involve 
the same services provided to Japanese citizens and are simply extended to foreign residents. 
Of course, there are some instances when new policies and programs are introduced that are 
use of medical interpreters or 
translation of notices. But it is in such instances when specific policies are required that we saw 
from the data that foreign residents experienced more difficulties.  
 
ethnic social ties seem to have contributed significantly in 
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their structural integration, especially in the case of respondents who are employed in low-skilled 
jobs. Chapter 6 showed that respondents already knew someone when they arrived in Japan 
who provided them help not just in monetary but in emotional and psychological terms. And the 
role of their ethnic social ties is further affirmed when majority reported finding jobs and housing 
through their personal connections. This is especially true for those who came as dependents as 
discussed by one of my key informants. He did say that if he did not know anyone then in Japan, 
he probably would not have made the move since Japan is a very foreign place with a very 
different language. 
 
What complicates the scenario however is the specific context of the Filipino residents. As we 
saw from the data, majority of the respondents are in low-skilled jobs. Jobs found through 
personal connections seem to be more concentrated in low-skilled sectors than jobs found 
through job advertisements, local government and migrant organization fairs. Most of the 
respondents who found jobs through personal connections are in jobs that run the risk of 
entrenching such negative images of the Filipino resident as low- -
permanent residents still engage in entertainment work arguing that the job is a lucrative source 
of income since a permanent residency allows them more movement in terms of choosing a mise 
(pub) where pay and working conditions are better. What we see here corresponds to what has 
been called ethnic mobility entrapment (Li 2010) which impacts can be much more detrimental in 
the long run because in a way what it does is inhibit the value of any skill they have which 
somehow puts them at a disadvantage when they negotiate the terms of their position and 
membership in the society. 
 
Respondents in low-skilled and in high-skilled jobs both experience immobility which is very 
surprising. For low-skilled respondents, regardless of how long they have been in Japan, it 
seems that breaking into different sectors is difficult. Language and qualifications seem to be the 
biggest hurdle, entrenching them into jobs that are considered 3D and are often short-term. On 
the other hand, for high-skilled respondents, visa and temporary contracts are the biggest issue 
which hinders their mobility. Knowing that visa is one of the major hurdles seem to be actually 
surprising, as compared to those in low-skilled jobs those working in professional jobs should 
have been valued more as they considered high-skilled. But as what has been mentioned, many 
of those who continually engage in low-skilled jobs are already holders of permanent visas and 
hence they are less concerned about their visa status. Further, because in Japan the visa is 
dependent on the activity, if a foreign resident who has an Engineer visa then he or she cannot 
decide to just change jobs and start working as a teacher because this would require him or her 
to change his or her visa status. Immobility seems to arise from this interplay between policies 
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and the specific context of the Filipino residents in terms of structural integration. This 
devaluation of their qualifications contributes to their immobility.  
 
In short, while jobs, housing and social protection are easily accessed, the more nuanced 
situation is seen in the discussion of access to employment. It was argued that housing and 
social protection is accessed by almost all as those two are often associated with documents 
required for respondents to be allowed to legally stay in Japan. On the other hand, access to job 
would seem to rely on a more diverse group of factors, both institutional and agential. It would 
seem then that among the variables looked at in terms of structural integration, the variable that 
seems to give us the most information regarding extent of structural integration is access to job 
as was also confirmed in the literature (Fokkema and Haas 2015). 
 
 
B. Cultural integration 
Cultural integration, according to Berry (2011) represents changes in mindset and behavior 
towards the host society. However cultural integration also has an economic function. Following 
the definition of integration that is followed in this project, that individuals, deciding to migrate to 
improve their outcomes can choose to invest or not to invest in integration based on whether 
they view integration as going to help improve their outcomes. Algan et al (2012) also note this in 
terms of cultural integration in that, c  in that 
the incentives for an individual belonging to the minority cultural group to assimilate and adopt 
the culture of the majority are then directly related to the expected gains from trade that such a 
. Following this we can expect three implications: in that the smaller the 
minority group and the more dispersed they are the higher the degree of cultural assimilation is 
to be expected; the more incentives and benefits to be gained in being integrated, the more an 
individual is likely to integrate; and third, the more important it is to share a common culture to 
enjoy social interactions  (Algan et al 2012) then the higher degree of integration can be 
expected.  
 
In the literature, cultural integration is generally agreed to be measured by migrant  language 
proficiency (Ersanilli and Koopmans 2010, Gijsberts and Dagevos 2007). Gijsberts and Dagevos 
(2007) note that cultural integration measures the cultural distance between the ethnic minority 
and the indigenous majority  (p.806). This is also affirmed in Esser (2004) and Berry (2011). This 
distance pertains to the distinction between the local and the foreign residents and is often 
operationalized using language proficiency. Therefore, following what has been said above, this 
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distance that is operationalized through language proficiency can be said to be shorter if there 
are more incentives to learn the language. Language learning is in itself an investment. Time, 
energy and money, in cases where language learning is free, are often invested to be able to 
reach a certain level of proficiency. What is being argued here is that if the individual feels that 
learning the language will better his or her outcomes in the host society then he or she will most 
likely invest time, energy and most likely money in learning the language. 
 
In the survey, we asked respondents to rate their own perceived proficiency in the Japanese 
language. The respondents were asked to rate their perceived proficiency in a scale of one to 
five, with five corresponding to the highest level of the Japanese Language Proficiency Test 
(2012), the most common proficiency test among foreigners. Levels one and two correspond to 
N5 and N4 levels in the JLPT, while three and four correspond to N3 and N2 and level five 
corresponds to N1. The JLPT website offers explanation of linguistic competence necessary to 
be in every level. According to the JLPT, N1 corresponds to the ability to understand Japanese 
 N2 on the other hand pertains to the nderstand 
. N3 
refers to . N4 is 
the  and N5 refers to the 
. 
 
Chart 7.15 below shows the self-rated proficiency levels of the respondents. It shows that 
majority of the respondents rated themselves as either Level 2 or Level 3 or in JLPT terms N4 
and N3. What this means is that majority of the respondents have below average to average 
proficiency in their language. In a country such as Japan where not everyone can speak English, 
language becomes a really big hurdle. What this implies following earlier definitions is that while 
respondents realize the advantage of learning the language, they do not seek to learn it much 
more to have better proficiency. What is pushed forward here is that the language is important 
only in as much as it can help an individual be structurally or economically integrated and is 
abandoned once these goals have been met.  
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Chart 7.15. Self-rated language proficiency levels 
 
Language proficiency Magnitude Proportion Female (%) Male (%) 
Level 1 33 7.19 6.92 7.80 
Level 2 184 40.09 45.60 27.66 
Level 3 176 38.34 33.96 48.23 
Level 4 59 12.85 12.58 13.48 
Level 5 7 1.53 0.94 2.84 
 
In terms of group differences, there is not much variation seen in terms of age groups, though it 
is worthy to note that as age increases the tendency is to have Level 3 proficiency than Level 2. 
And that the proportion of respondents who have higher levels than Level 4 increases as age 
increases. In terms of sex, more females rate themselves as Level 2 as compared to men who 
rate themselves more as Level 3. Further, more married, divorced and widowed respondents 
rated themselves as Level 3 than Level 2 which is often the self-rated proficiency among singles 
and cohabiting individuals. While the differences in terms of these variables are not so 
pronounced it is still interesting to note of these. On the other hand, in terms of individual 
trajectories, we see that surprisingly, there is no discernible pattern when it comes to educational 
attainment (Chart 7.20). Language levels vary among the different educational levels. Higher 
educational level does not translate to higher language proficiency in this case. There is as much 
respondents who are high school graduates (37.24%) who have Level 3 proficiency as College 
graduates (36.59%). On the other hand, language proficiency seems to correspond with length 
of stay. As the length of stay increases language proficiency levels also increase (Chart 7.19). 
Compare for instance the six percent of respondents who have stayed in Japan for less than 
three years who rated themselves as Level 4 with the 26 percent of those who stayed for more 
than 10 years who rated themselves as Level 4. The same is reflected when we look at 
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proportion of life in Japan (Chart 7.21). The higher the proportion of one s life one spent in Japan, 
the better the language proficiency it would seem.  
 
What is striking I think is the difference in language proficiency by reasons for migration (see 
Chart 7.23). We see that interestingly, those who migrated to be with relatives seem to have 
better handle on the language than those who migrated for more economic reasons. About 32 
percent of those who migrated for family reunification purposes reported having Level 4 
proficiency while only about 10 percent of those who migrated for work reported having the same 
level. This also corresponds to the finding in terms of having work experience in the home 
country. If, based on the earlier discussion, language is very important in economic mobility, then 
from the findings we can say that the assertion that their current human capital and skills are 
being devalued holds especially among low-skilled workers. 
 
Interestingly, in terms of transnational practices the results are more mixed (see Charts 
7.24-7.26). More respondents who regularly send remittances home seem to have better 
language proficiency than those who do not send remittances regularly as well as than those 
who do not send remittances at all. On the other hand, there seems to be no variation in terms of 
those who regularly travel to the home country as compared to those who do not. The most 
distinct variation however is when language proficiency is compared among those who save in 
the home country and among those who do not. It would seem that those who save money in 
Japan or those who save in both Japan and the Philippines have better self-rated language 
proficiency than those who save only in the home country and as compared to those who do not 
save at all. On the other hand, there is no particular trend in terms of ethnic social ties.  
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Regardless of the very small proportion of the respondents who reported having high levels of 
language proficiency, only a very small proportion of the respondents are currently studying the 
language. Learning it is not mandatory and there is no comprehensive government program for 
learning the language which is in contrast to other migrant-receiving countries which implement 
government-run language programs whose credits can be used towards gaining permanent 
residency and citizenship (see for instance Language Instruction for Newcomers to Canada 
(LINC), or the integration courses provided by the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees in 
Germany). In Japan, while there is no comprehensive national strategy for integration, classes 
provided by the local government are free. However, regardless, it is surprising to find that most 
of those studying the language are taking them from migrant organization. Majority reported 
ing the language from formal 
institutions. Which is expected given that majority of the respondents are working and are with 
children.  
 
Table 7.8. Selected language education variables, N=27 
Japanese language education Magnitude Proportion 
Currently studying language 27 5.88 
Where 
Classes provided by local government 8 29.63 
Classes provided by migrant organizations 10 37.04 
Private institution/University 3 11.11 
Self-study 6 22.22 
Problem encountered with studying 
None 5 18.52 
Lack of information 2 7.41 
Motivation 4 14.81 
Time 20 74.07 
 
Language is important for adult learners. As we have seen from the discussion in the earlier 
section, language along with qualifications are important to be able to be more economically 
mobile. Having better proficiency of the language can help curb the effects of the devaluation of 
qualifications experienced by those in higher-skilled jobs and can facilitate better mobility of 
Filipino residents who are trapped in lower-skilled jobs. One of my informants who came on a 
spouse visa said she initially attended for a half a year straight the language classes offered by 
the City but after half a year of intensive Japanese she just could not attend classes anymore 
because she had other stuff to do and the language have become progressively harder.  
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Aside from adult learners, there is a much bigger issue that the City aims to address when it 
comes to language competency. The so-called 1.5 generation who arrive as children and 
adolescents in Japan was the proposed focus of the multicultural plan for 2018 discussed during 
the Nagoya Regional Seminar. According to Asuncion Fresnoza-Flot (2015) in her study on 1.5 
who 
eighteen and have therefore experienced schooling successively in both their country of origin 
. Not uncommon are stories of Filipino women who worked as entertainers 
in Japan and upon coming back to the Philippines learned that they are pregnant. Recognition of 
the children by their Japanese fathers often takes time and are usually traumatizing. Upon 
recognition, children are moved to Japan after having spent some part of their childhood in the 
Philippines. They constitute a big portion of the 1.5 generation children in Japan. According to 
Takahata (2011), the number of 1.5 generation Filipino children in Japan is increasing though 
there are no specific numbers, as many of them are often categorized into long-term residents.  
 
chapter, most of the complaints of Filipino residents 
understand the school roles. Many of the Filipino mothers congregate among themselves to 
create some sort of a self-help group to educate themselves about the school rules. One mother 
actually raised an issue regarding one teacher hitting her child on the head which is a big no-no 
in the Philippines. It created a traumatic experience for the child who wanted to either go to 
another school or go back to the Philippines to study. But transferring is impossible as the next 
available school is the next school district and is too far from where they live. There was another 
issue where a teacher wanted to cut the hair of a child and the mother said that she will have this 
done when she gets her salary but the teacher could not wait and so cut t
Another big issue was the issue of packed lunch or obentou
her child and she got a scolding from the teacher saying that this is not allowed. However, if she 
was to remove the food from the packaging and put it in a proper obentou then it would be fine. 
That was something that mother could not understand.  
 
Another issue is that many Filipino parents cannot send their children to the daycare because the 
children cannot understand Japanese yet and would not be taken cared of properly. This 
problem with not being able to catch up in school was much harder for older kids. One mother 
asked where she can go for consultation because some of the children who could not cope up 
with their lesson end up joining bousouzoku or bike gangs.  
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One of the biggest problems with regard to the education of children is the difference in the 
Philippine and Japan education systems. Though the Philippines has recently implemented the 
K-12 system which adds two more years of education to be at par with other educational 
systems in the world, there are still differences in culture and rules. The language difference that 
children have to overcome to be able to integrate stands out. Takahata (2011) notes that children 
aged five years old or more will have a difficult time catching up with lessons, as Japanese and 
Filipino language differ greatly.  Further, since school year levels are determined by age in 
Japan, this creates problems for teenagers who are suddenly thrown into junior and senior high 
schools whose Japanese ability is elementary at best.  This can set off a series of complicated 
problems: not properly learning the Japanese language will hinder these children from going to 
higher education, and ultimately into the labor market.  
 
What we see here is that in terms of cultural integration, many respondents do have some 
knowledge of the language but they are not proficient. There are two conclusions that can be 
made: first, what is stipulated here is that the average to below average levels of proficiency 
point to the fact that many Filipino residents only invest in learning the language up to a certain 
extent, and that is when certain goals have been met. We see from earlier discussions that there 
is very little difference in terms of language proficiency among men and women, or among 
younger and older respondents, or even among high-skilled and low-skilled individuals. What 
this implies is that incentives are not too high, at least in the perspective of many of the 
respondents. As mentioned in the previous section, jobs are easy to access, many jobs do not 
require knowing or speaking Japanese language at all, while some jobs require only a basic 
knowledge of Japanese. What this leads to is disincentivizing learning the language especially 
for foreign residents who do not think of staying permanently in the country. And second, the 
increase in the number of Filipino coming to Japan suggests the possibility of the Filipino 
community becoming thicker and tighter as mentioned in Chapter 7 in which we see that many of 
the Filipinos tend to live together. As mentioned in the opening of this section, Algan et al (2012) 
notes the extent to which cultural integration can happen is going to be wider and deeper if the 
minority culture is more dispersed. What is implied therefore is that language learning is 
disincentivized not just because jobs are available for people who know nothing of the language, 
but that emotional, psychological and social support can also be accessed through the ethnic 
community further disincentivizing the need to go out of the community to interact with 
native-born Japanese.  
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C. Interactive integration 
Interactive integration refers to the inclusion or acceptance of foreign residents into the primary 
relations and various social networks in the society (Bosswick and Heckmann 2006). Bosswick 
and Heckmann (2006) note that these relations include friendships, partnerships and 
memberships in different organizations. Following this then, how I measured interactive 
integration is by looking at three levels of interactions: personal, meso-level and civic-political. By 
looking at these three levels we can see the ways in which majority and minority groups 
negotiate the terms of membership and belonging in nationally defined polities  (Nagel and 
Staeheli 2008, p.416). What is underscored is the importance of interactions in establishing 
representation. Interactions can help revise and shape prejudices and stereotypes and slowly 
allow the creation of a collective that can represent the minority group in the host society to be 
able to negotiate better the terms of their membership. 
 
Such interactions at different levels become important especially in cases when a foreign 
resident is not employed, not studying or not involved in any activity where he or she can meet 
people from different ethnic backgrounds and understand more about the host culture.  
 
First what we see is that on the personal level, many of the respondents seem to go out of their 
ethnic community and establish friendships with native-born Japanese. Majority reported having 
a Japanese friend that they can rely on (82.79%). Results suggest that language plays an 
important role in establishing friendships with Japanese residents. About 67 percent of the 
respondents cited language as what stops them from having more Japanese friends, while 60 
percent noted time and 25 percent pertained to the differences in culture (Table 7). Further, 
Facchini et al (2014) found out that to natives 
than those  and that 
about xenophobic feelings, less concerned about their own economic situation and more 
interested in politics than their counterparts with no local c  (p.10). In the case of the 
Filipino residents, creating friendships can impact and slowly change the way they view the host 
country and the way they are being viewed by the host country. 
 
While this is interesting, results of the qualitative part of the study shows a contradictory 
response from the informants. Many of them said that they do not have really close Japanese 
friends, friends that come over to your house and go out with you to eat out or to shop. They 
have Japanese acquaintances that they say hello to every now and then, or that they meet and 
talk to in schools where their children study at. The main problem, one of my informants said, is 
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because a plastic is a processed material, and what it connotes is that when interacting with 
Japanese they find their interactions with them unnatural.  
 
Chart 7.29. Having Japanese friends, N=459  
 
Many Japanese friend Magnitude Proportion Female (%) Male (%) 
No 79 17.21 20.13 10.64 
Yes 380 82.79 79.87 89.36 
 
As previously mentioned, the route by which many Filipinos have come to Japan may have 
created stereotypes that see them as low-skilled, or at worst, Japayuki-san . We have earlier 
discussed the ramifications of this label and studies (see Chapter 5) have shown that regardless 
of the increase in the different types of Filipino migrants to Japan, the label Japayuki-san  still 
exists. At this point let me share an anecdote about the experience on this stereotype of one 
Filipino friend who is studying in Japan for her doctorate degree. During a big conference held 
this June 2017 where the works of many laboratories from different universities in Japan are 
exhibited, she found herself being asked again and again by older Japanese men about certain 
Filipino colloquial words that are part of Japayuki slang . While she was manning their 
laboratory s exhibit, she was approached on two occasions by some older Japanese men and 
asked her about the meaning of the word paru-paro . In Filipino, this word means butterfly. I 
actually did not know the colloquial meaning of the word until I started working on a project on 
Filipino entertainers where I was told that paru-paro  meant a cheating boyfriend or girlfriend 
and that the common phrase includes paru-paro dame yo  which means don t cheat on me , a 
phrase often heard in Philippine pubs. When I told my friend this she said that that was exactly 
the explanation of the Japanese men to her. And they kept on insisting that she should know the 
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term. She complained that they kept on badgering her until the next day and she finally told them 
that if they have no other questions on the exhibited experiments then they better go check out 
other experiments.  
 
One of my informants also said that while many Filipinos have a general image of being 
hardworking, for those working in the Sakae Entertainment District which she jokingly called 
ways 
after tips. Even back in the home country, there is immediately a stereotype ascribed to someone 
travelling to Japan. People going to Japan are often called Japayuki  albeit in joking terms if the 
person is not going to be engaged in entertainer work. Regardless what this means is that there 
is a negative connotation to the term Japayuki . This stereotype I believe is very slowly being 
erased as fares to Japan are becoming cheaper and more and more Filipino tourists are able to 
afford travelling and visiting Japan.  
 
It would seem that among the Filipino residents who reported having a Japanese friend, they met 
them at work most of the times, which suggests that where they work they are able to meet 
people from the host society, regardless if the job they are engaged in is considered low-skilled 
or not. What this can mean however is that if friends are meant in the same way as Japanese 
clients in the case of the entertainers, then there is still a possibility of this leading to more 
entrenched stereotypes rather than improving them. Further, regardless of earlier findings that 
many Filipinos live in areas where there are many Filipinos, there seems to be no evidence of 
housing segregation as majority of the respondents who reported having a Japanese friend met 
them in the same residential blocks where they live. Also, in response to what stops them from 
having Japanese friends, time  and language  seem to be the oft-cited reason.  
 
Table 7.9. Where met Japanese friends, N=380 
Where met Japanese friends Magnitude Proportion 
Same residential block/complex 143 37.63 
Work 357 93.95 
Organization 24 6.32 
Church 7 1.84 
Common friend 4 1.05 
School 7 1.84 
Internet 1 0.26 
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Table 7.10. What stops from having more Japanese friend, N=79 
Reason Magnitude Proportion 
Culture 20 25.32 
Time 47 59.49 
Language 53 67.09 
Nationality 9 11.39 
Visa 17 21.52 
Personality 1 1.27 
 
Looking at group differences (see Charts 7.30-7.32), we see that while differences are little they 
are still worth noting. A bigger proportion of males and older respondents reported having 
Japanese friends as compared to females and younger respondents. In terms of civil status, 
single never-married individuals and widowed respondents reported establishing friendships with 
native-born Japanese more than other statuses.  
 
In terms of individual trajectories, we see that as with age, respondents who have stayed longer 
in Japan and have spent a bigger proportion of their lives in Japan reported having friends than 
those who have spent less time in Japan (Chart 7.33). Findings for language proficiency earlier 
suggest that language and establishing networks among native-born population have a circular 
relationship. Having some skill in the language allows foreign residents to make contact and 
communicate with Japanese locals and continued interaction can help improve their language 
skills.  
 
Further while previous work experience from the home country does not really impact having 
Japanese friends or not, we see that higher-educated respondents reported having more 
Japanese friends (Chart 7.35). And that interestingly, those who came to Japan for family 
reunification reasons tend to have more Japanese friends when compared to those who came 
for more economic reasons (Chart 7.37). Surprisingly however, those who came to marry have 
the least proportion of respondents who reported having Japanese friends. The difference I 
argue is that those who came to be with relatives have a better settling in experience than those 
who came to marry. Essentially those who travelled to be with relatives do not really travel to a 
completely foreign land, their relatives are there who can help them connect to people and 
places. On the other hand, those who travelled to marry, more often than not, travel alone into a 
completely different environment with no single familiar face to help them settle in. One of my key 
informants told me that when she agreed to marry her now Japanese husband, she did not really 
anticipate the overhauling of her life that she would have to live somewhere far from her 
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parents, that she would have to live somewhere totally different with a language foreign to her 
ears, eat different food and see and meet different people. She said that in the beginning, even 
going to the convenience store or to the supermarket to buy something to eat was difficult, so 
difficult that her husband would have to accompany her and teach her what is what every time.  
 
On the other hand, those who are engaged with transnational practices equally between Japan 
and the Philippines report more personal relationships with Japanese people (Chart 7.38-8.40). 
A higher proportion of those who have savings in both Japan and the Philippines, those who 
remit regularly and those who travel back to the Philippines regularly but not too frequently report 
having Japanese friends. And finally, as expected those who have an intention to stay are more 
likely to have Japanese friends than those who do not intend to stay permanently (Chart 7.42).  
 
The second type of interactions I looked at involved engagement with meso-level organizations 
such as migrant organizations, voluntary organizations and religious or church-related 
associations among others. In the literature participation and membership in such organizations 
whether it be ethnic-based or more multiculturally-based can facilitate the growth of a community 
(Brettel 2005). As essential to communities, organizations, according to Brettel (2005) put 
forward the centrality of questions such as how people work toward effecting the continued 
existence of community (as a place-making process) in a deterritorialized world of movement 
and how community is relat  (p.854), in short, 
representation. Central to the idea of a community is interactions.  
 
In terms of civic participation, according to the survey, majority of the respondents reported being 
involved in some form of organization (40.31%, see Chart 7.29). Many Filipino residents 
acknowledge the benefits of joining and being active in organizations and the most oft-cited 
advantage is that it makes them feel part of a community, which follows Brettel s (2005) 
argument.  
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Chart 7.30. Membership in organizations 
 
Magnitude Proportion Female (%) Male (%) 
Non-member 274 59.69 66.04 45.39 
Member 185 40.31 33.96 54.61  
 
A substantial proportion also noted that organizations can give them better access to information, 
work and opportunities (see Table 7.11). However, even among those who are members of 
organizations, active participation is low. Time seems to hinder most of the respondents from 
joining and actively participating in organizations. 
 
Table 7.11. Selected variables, N=185 
Variables Magnitude Proportion 
Why join 
Feels part of a community 137 74.05 
Better access to information 109 58.92 
Better access to work and opportunities 58 31.35 
Help with homesickness 5 2.70 
Emotional support 3 1.62 
Frequency of participation in organization events 
Always 7 3.78 
Sometimes 44 23.78 
Neither sometimes neither seldom 81 43.78 
Seldom 51 27.57 
Often 2 1.08 
 170 
 
 
Table 7.12. What stops from joining organizations, N=274 
What stops from joining organization Magnitude Proportion 
Lack information 102 37.23 
Time 217 79.20 
Visa 11 4.01 
Language 30 10.95 
Personal reason 1 0.36 
 
In terms of type of organization, we see that majority are involved in church or religious 
organizations (Table 7.13). For many researchers looking at the role of church and religious 
spaces and organizations in the lives of the migrants, they see this as s and the outcome 
as well as the medium of social and  (Knott 2005, cited in Fresnoza-Flot 2010). 
What Fresnoza-Flot (2010) argues is that religious belonging help migrants adjust and confront 
to the new lives they are living in the host society. For many, the Church especially for Catholic 
migrants have been a place where they can meet other Filipinos. In the absence of emotional 
and psychological support that migrants get from their families, the Church becomes this place 
where they can rest and feel that someone is caring for them. This is summed up by 
Fresnoza-Flot (2010) by saying that the Church becomes  
. It comes with no surprise then that most Filipinos are engaged 
in some form of religious organization. On the other hand, membership in Filipino migrant 
organizations and voluntary organizations are also markedly high.  
 
Table 7.13. Membership in organizations, N=4185 
Organization Magnitude Proportion 
Church/Religious 67 36.22 
Filipino migrant organizations 40 21.62 
International associations 1 0.54 
Neighborhood organizations 14 7.57 
Organizations organized by the local government 1 0.54 
Voluntary organizations 62 33.51 
 
Membership in religious groups provide a contrasting image to that of the bad girl  image 
stemming from many of the Filipinos  involvement with entertainer work. I argue that apart from 
being able to get a sort of substitute source of emotional and physical support, the Filipino 
residents also actively join religious organizations to slowly curb and tame the negative image 
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being ascribed to them by their involvement in entertainer work. Churches, as mentioned by 
Knott (2005) act as markers in the process of place-making by the Filipino residents. Economic 
reasons drove them to migrate to Japan and work in such jobs and regardless whether they 
engaged in prostitution work or not, many of them find comfort and a confirmation and 
justification of their migration to Japan in religious places.  
 
Looking at group differences, we see that males and those in higher age groups tend to be 
engaged with organizations (Chart 7.30-8.31). While males are more engaged in voluntary 
associations (41.56%), females tend to join religious organizations (40.74%). While middle-aged 
groups tend to be more involved in religious groups, younger and older groups tend to join 
voluntary associations.  
 
In terms of individual trajectories, we see that people who have stayed longer and have spent 
about half of their lives in Japan tend to be more active in joining organizations (Chart 7.33). It 
would seem that as the length of stay in Japan increases the likelier it becomes for a Filipino 
resident to be a member of a religious organization than of a voluntary association. Further, we 
see that in terms of educational attainment (See Chart 7.35), higher-educated individuals tend to 
be more active as well as those with previous work experiences from the Philippines. There is 
however no difference in the choice of the organization which members of different educational 
levels join.  
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Interestingly, more respondents who migrated to Japan to train or to study are active in 
organizations (Chart 7.37). Those who came to work or to find work are less inclined to join 
organizations. It is quite intuitive since those people who came to work or to look for work would 
most probably have less time to be active in organizations. On the other hand, it would seem that 
respondents who engage in transnational practices more regularly but not too often are more 
likely to be active in organizations (Charts 7.38-7.40). Respondents who have access to only 
weak ties or to a combination of weak and strong ethnic ties tend to be more active in 
organizations (Chart 7.41). And as expected, more respondents who expressed intent to stay are 
more likely to be engaging in an association than those who do not intend to stay permanently 
(Chart 7.42).  
 
We see that in terms of policies on organizing, the City does not hinder foreign residents from 
organizing. Nagoya City hosts a number of foreign resident and migrant associations as was 
discussed in Chapter 6. It provides financial sponsorship as well as legitimacy to many of the 
groups that are active in the locality. And at the same time, the City also taps into these 
organizations for assistance on various foreign resident-related issues. 
 
The last interaction variable that I analyzed is the respondents  participation in events and 
activities that are organized by local governments. These activities range from the simplest and 
least politically-charged such as emergency drills, to the most politically-charged events such as 
seminars soliciting foreign resident views on what programs should be implemented to improve 
their outcomes. Given the limited political rights afforded to foreign residents in Japan, I aim to 
understand the degree to which foreign residents become involve and in which programs they 
become engaged in. I argue that participation in local government-led events and organizations 
is of conventional political participation that [s] place within a previously structured set of 
 (Martiniello 2005, p.3) which allows for individual participation and allows for 
individual participants an opportunity to connect with the collective.  
 
In terms of participation in events and programs conducted by the local government, there is a 
much lower participation rate (see Table 10). Time, lack of information and language are the 
most oft-cited reasons for non-participation. Among programs that have been implemented by 
the local government, take-up is high for language classes than among other programs. While 
many respondents note that participation in local government-led events and programs can help 
them feel more at home in the community, some still reported having no idea how such 
involvement can help them.  
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Chart 7.44. Frequency of participation in local government events, N=459 
 
Frequency of participation Magnitude Proportion Female (%) Male (%) 
Never 196 42.70 46.86 33.33 
Seldom 194 42.27 39.62 48.23 
Neither seldom nor often 60 13.07 11.64 16.31 
Often 8 1.74 1.89 1.42 
Always 1 0.22 0.00 0.71 
 
Table 7.14. What stops from joining events, N=459 
What stops from joining Magnitude Proportion 
Lack information 169 36.82 
Time 360 78.43 
Visa 23 5.01 
Language 61 13.29 
No interest 1 0.22 
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Table 7.15. Local government programs participated in, N=459 
Local government program Magnitude Proportion 
Language classes 111 24.18 
Translation services 44 9.59 
Visa assistance 40 8.71 
Multicultural programs 57 12.42 
Job fairs 42 9.15 
Housing 54 11.76 
Earthquake and emergency drills 78 16.99 
Windows for foreign resident opinion 33 7.19 
 
 
In terms of group differences, we see that males and older respondents tend to participate more 
in local government-led activities (Chart 7.30). While participation is all around low in terms of 
civil status, we see that married and widowed respondents generally participate more often than 
other groups. In terms of individual trajectories on the other hand, we see that respondents who 
have stayed more in Japan and have spent a bigger proportion of their lives in Japan participate 
more. Further, while there is no significant difference in terms of work experience, we see that 
those who have better educational levels tend to be more active in participating (Chart 7.35). 
Interestingly, looking at the reasons for migration, we see that respondents who migrated to train 
or study tend to be more active (Chart 7.37). One possible reason is that most of those who 
came to train or to study came under government-hosted programs such as the Trainee System 
or the Monbukagakusho Scholarship or Japanese Government Scholarship. Thus, we can 
surmise that they are more connected and are able to access more information about certain 
activities and programs.  
 
In terms of transnational practices, there is no discernible pattern (Charts 8.38-8.40). While those 
who have savings only in the Philippines tend to participate less, those who do not remit 
participate more. We see the most distinct difference in terms of ethnic social ties. Those who 
have access to only weak ties tend to participate more than those who have only strong ties 
(Chart 7.41). And lastly in terms of intent to stay, the difference in the frequency of participation 
of those who intend to stay and those who do not are markedly different. It would seem that 
those who intend to stay permanently tend to be more active in participating in government-led 
events.  
 
Participation overall is low and this is not without surprise; many programs can be categorized as 
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3Fs multiculturalism and hark back to kokusaika. If following earlier described importance of 
participation in local government-led events as a way to interact with other people of both 
Japanese and other ethnicities and as a way to represent themselves, we see that services and 
events which call for participation among foreign residents are limited (see Chapter 6). The City 
government, along with neighborhood associations, has supported parades and festivals 
showcasing the various cultures of the foreign residents such as the Philippine Festival and the 
Brazilian Day. While this is not entirely bad, Carruthers (2004) and Flowers (2012) warn us of the 
peril of the so-
culture thereby failing to recognize the subjectivity of the migrant.  
 
It would seem that while programs are acceptable, the approach is not appropriate. Following the 
rhetoric at the national level, foreign residents are treated more as a problem rather than as a 
possible asset. By approaching foreign residents as problems needing to be solved, there is a 
tendency to lump all foreign residents into one outsider group, disregarding their differences and 
the issues particular to their historical relations with Japan.  
 
This was noticeable during the Nagoya Regional Seminar held in February 5-6, 2016. The 
seminar was held to discuss how to revise the current multicultural plan as it is expiring in 2017. 
Japanese experts from various universities discussed the 1.5 generation issue, which was the 
decided theme of the new plan, and while this is indeed an urgent issue as I mentioned, the 
format l
non-
raised by foreign residents during the panel discussion at the end of the program, such as the 
loneliness of foreign wives raised by a Chinese foreign resident, business opportunities raised by 
an American foreign resident or lack of funds for migrant-run schools as raised by a Filipino 
resident, were seemingly put to the side because of the issues that were already highlighted by 
the City since the beginning of the event.  
 
Among the most important programs held by Nagoya City to improve the representation of 
foreign residents and to address the diversity in the City is the Foreign Resident Discussion 
Meetings as was previously discussed. The potential of such a program in improving the 
integration process of the foreign residents is substantial, as including them in discussions that 
are needed to address their specific concerns can greatly improve their sense of belongingness. 
However, participation in the meeting is made difficult by a number of factors. First, the 
discussion meetings are conducted in Japanese. Residents who cannot speak Japanese and 
who would want to attend are required to bring their own interpreters. Second, the format 
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suggests that themes are already decided by the local government beforehand. Meetings are 
held thrice a year, which is sparse considering the purpose of the discussion meeting. 
 
However, one noticeable contradiction is that while from the qualitative aspect of the data I get 
the impression that Filipinos want to negotiate better terms for themselves and want to actually 
be more active in the society. While from the quantitative part of the study we see that they do 
not really try to engage beyond personal relationships.  
 
In the literature, foreign resident non-engagement with the host society has been a chicken and 
egg kind of question (Penninx 2005). Whether it is caused by foreign residents not wanting to 
engage or whether it is the lack of government responses, the literature could not really seem to 
say definitively. What we see in this case however is a largely inactive group of foreign residents 
whose inactivity is being addressed by inappropriate approaches. 
 
In short, interactions measured in terms of personal relationships are high while the proportion of 
respondents engaging in organizations and with the local government are low. On the one hand, 
at the individual level the respondents seem to interact and establish personal ties with other 
Japanese individuals, and they seem to acknowledge the importance of being involved in 
meso-level organizations, though reasons for participating are more for personal benefits than 
for pushing for acceptance in their locality. At the organizational level on the other hand, many 
still do not see the need to push for representation. And further, we see a local government 
whose approach on diversity has the tendency to consume other cultures where the center of 
this multicultural exchange is the host society and migrant subjectivities ignored.  
 
 
D. Identificational integration 
Central to the concept of identificational integration is belongingness. It refers to identification 
with a certain social structure, whether it be with the host society, or the ethnic community or 
other ethnic communities. In terms of immigrant integration however, the focus is on the 
perception of belongingness or the degree to which the migrant identifies with the dominant 
culture. Hence identificational integration is crucial in identity formation, and its role in interacting 
with gains and losses in associated with integrating into the host society (Akerlof and Kranton 
2000). Developing identificational integration then is seen as an investment, an investment 
resulting from the weighing of gains and losses of the individual when he or she makes the 
choice to either integrate or not. The concept of identificational integration becomes doubly 
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important when it comes to oppositional cultures. Talking about cultural identity, Akerlof and 
Kranton (2000) note that there are two concepts lying at the heart of oppositional cultures: social 
exclusion and lack of economic opportunities. Beginning from the well-argued sociological fact 
that majority cultures define themselves by differentiating and excluding others, Akerlof and 
Kranton (2000) note that it is within this that minority cultures try to make their way in without 
betraying their own culture and belief systems. However complete opposition to the majority 
culture may result in lack and loss of economic opportunities. This is what Parreñas (2001) calls 
the , mentioned previously. How this devaluation of migrants  skills 
due to their position in the host society as a minority impact their identificational integration and 
identity formation is discussed by a number of ethnographic studies (Wilson 1996, Liebow 1967, 
cited in Algan et al 2012). According to many of these studies, the inability of many migrants to 
get a decent-paying job lead them towards the adoption of identities which severely inhibit the 
value of any labor market skill they may possess, in an attempt to avoid suffering the guilt of 
 (Algan et al 2012). 
 
What we see in the data seems to hint at this. The data show that majority of the respondents 
have high educational attainment but are mostly employed in low-skilled jobs, mostly because 
these are the jobs that they can find and because these jobs still pay much better when 
compared to the money that they will probably earn in the Philippines. Further, in many cases 
migrating abroad is an investment for the family as well. Often, to be able to afford sending a 
household member abroad, families have to loan assets and sell properties. These investments 
pressure migrants into adopting various identities that may contradict their own culture, and that 
may devalue skills and human capital they may have. This is seen most saliently in the case of 
the entertainers, as dutiful daughters  they are bestowed on their departure from the home 
country an identity that clashes with the identity they are soon to assume upon landing on the 
host country, that of the bad girl  entertainer. This is not to say however that they are victims, as 
was mentioned previously, migration is a choice made by individuals, forcefully or not, to be able 
to better their outcomes. This also does not mean that they are helpless studies such as Suzuki 
(2011) have shown that many former entertainers engage in transgressive acts. By being active 
in the community and in the Church, they try to subvert negative images brought about by their 
previous engagement with entertainer work.  
 
We look at identificational integration in terms of three factors: fit, involvement and contentment 
(Berry 2011). From Table 11, we see in terms of perceptions of belongingness more 
respondents have responded positively in terms of being contented, feeling welcomed and able 
to succeed though more moderately than expected. A minimum-wage earner in Japan still earns 
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considerably more than a minimum-wage earner in the Philippines and following the discussions 
in the previous sections showing that majority of the migrants travelled to Japan for economic 
reasons, it would be instinctive to expect responses showing higher levels of contentment. 
Levels of contentment and perceptions of being welcomed seemed to be more moderate as 
compared to perceptions of being able to succeed. Responses for contentment and being 
welcome
perceptions of being able to succeed which cluster  
 
Chart 7.45. Levels of contentment in life in Japan, N=459 
 
Contentment in life in Japan Magnitude Proportion Female (%) Male (%) 
Very content 105 23.09 24.53 19.86  
Content 209 45.53 41.51 54.61 
Discontent 135 29.41 32.08 23.40  
Very discontented 9 1.96 1.89 2.13 
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Chart 7.46. Perception of being welcomed in Japan, N=459 
 
Feelings of being welcomed Magnitude Proportion Female (%) Male (%) 
Very welcomed 100 21.79 22.33 20.57 
Welcomed 228 49.67 49.06 51.06 
Unwelcomed 127 27.67 27.67 27.66 
Very unwelcomed 4 0.87 0.94 0.71 
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Chart 7.47. Perception of being able to succeed, N=459 
 
Feelings of being able to succeed Magnitude Proportion Female (%) Male (%) 
Very able 190 41.39 39.94 44.68  
Able 212 46.19 48.74 40.43  
Unable 56 12.2 11.01 14.89  
Very unable 1 0.22 0.31 0.00 
 
While fit and content are relational variables, meaning they try to assess the perceived position 
of the Filipino resident in comparison to others around him or her, involvement is more 
inward-looking as it assesses how given his or her skills and position, he or she thinks he or she 
can succeed in the host society. That I argue is the main reason why we see for the two 
relational variables lower scores as when compared to the involvement variable. While 
respondents seem to be uncertain about their relational positions in the host society, they are 
fairly certain of what they can do.  
 
In terms of group differences, we first look at demographic differences (Chart 7.47-7.49). We see 
that in terms of fit and contentment, males seem to be having better outcomes while in terms of 
perceived ability to succeed, women have higher scores. This goes back to what has been said 
regarding the position of entertainers and those who came as wives. We have said again and 
again that majority of the women in the dataset are either working currently as entertainers or 
have worked as entertainers at least once in their lives. This has somewhat created for them a 
precarious position in the host society in that while engagement with entertainer work does 
indeed improve economic resources, it inhibits other skills and human capital that they may have 
that could have helped them get in positions associated with being highly-skilled.  
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In terms of age on the other hand, we see that outcomes are better for older respondents than 
for younger ones. Looking at civil status, we see that respondents with partners (married and 
cohabiting) tend to have better perceptions overall than those who are single or widowed or 
divorced. Single/never married respondents performed the least overall, perhaps because of the 
lack of emotional and psychological support felt among those who are living alone which in most 
cases include mostly single/never married individuals.  
 
Looking at individual trajectories, we see that length of stay and proportion of life spent in Japan 
mimics the impact of age on belongingness variables (Charts 7.50 and 7.51). Longer length of 
stay is associated with better identiificational integration outcomes. We further see that among 
those who spent less than a year in Japan, they have the lowest scores for fit and welcome. I 
argue that this is related to language skills as we have seen from previous discussions in 
Chapter 7.  
 
We see the opposite when we look at educational attainment and work experience (Charts 7.52 
and 7.53). Those with higher education and work experience from the home country reported 
lower perceptions of being welcomed, able to succeed and contentment. This is interesting in 
that it hints at what has been previously mentioned regarding oppositional cultures. We see this 
affirmed here in that qualifications and skills that were brought from the home country are being 
devalued and we can see this frustration in the low identificational integration scores of those 
that can be considered higher-skilled. In terms of reasons for migration, we see that while those 
who came for more economic reasons tend to have lower scores than those who came for more 
familial reasons. Specifically, those who came to study or to train actually almost feel 
discontented and unwelcomed (Chart 7.53).  
 
In terms of transnational practices on the other hand, we see that those whose transnational 
practices are more moderate tend to have better identificational integration scores, in that those 
who keep savings in both Japan and the Philippines, those who remit but do so irregularly, and 
those who do travel to the home country but in relatively less frequency perform better overall 
than those who regularly do any of these practices and those who do not (Charts 7.55-7.57). 
Looking at ethnic social ties, we can say that those who generally feel more welcomed, feel that 
they can succeed and feel content are those that have access to weak ties (Chart 7.58). As we 
economic opportunities. And finally, in terms of intent to stay permanently, those who have 
intention to stay generally have better scores in terms of fit, involvement, and contentment (Chart 
7.59). 
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Overall, interestingly, based on the data, identificational integration in terms of contentment and 
fit are moderate while involvement is moderate to high. It would seem that while involvement or 
contentment and perception of being welcomed are assessed more on in terms of their position 
as a Filipino in Japan. The relatively lower levels of perception of fit and contentment are 
possibly affected by the conflation of the approach of the local government which values 
language competency and high-skilled participants in the labor market (see Chapter 6), as well 
as the stereotype of the Filipino in Japan resulting from their taking up positions in the society 
that can benefit them economically which is the main purpose of their migration activity but has 
severely impacted their mobility. There are two things that we can glean from this. One the one 
hand, the policies and preferences of the government, while aiming to reward those with 
high-skills, also have a tendency to limit their mobility and impact their positions in the host 
society by having no encompassing integration strategy. On the other hand, it remains indifferent 
to the concerns of those in low-skilled jobs and this indifference actually punishes them by 
devaluing any skills they bring with them and any skills they eventually develop as they become 
involved in the labor market. This leads them to continuously assume positions that maybe 
oppositional to their culture and maybe detrimental to their position in Japan in order to 
continuously earn money to be able to stay in the host country and to be able to continue 
sending remittances to the home country.   
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As an externality, what it does is entrench the already prevalent image of the Filipino woman 
 migrant 
organization called CPFA (introduced in Chapter 5) argues that this image still exists in Nagoya 
more upscale places such as the Hilton Nagoya and opening these cultural events to both 
Japanese and foreign expats.  
 
Even at the individual level, one of my key informants was quick to differentiate herself from 
other Filipino women who, even if they were married to Japanese men, still engage in entertainer 
work. She pointed to their brightly colored hair and very fair skin and said that even if she does 
not look as good as them, she can proudly say that she did not work as an entertainer. Another 
when they were working as entertainers. One informants, who explains that she does not count 
her years as entertainer and that she only considers her stay in Japan to have started when she 
married her husband, said that the reason why was because she did not use her name when she 
was working as an entertainer. She then switched to her real name she got married and she got 
away with it because at that time, biometrics were still not yet collected when applying for the 
passport. She said that there were other Filipinos who did the same but got caught when the 
biometric system was introduced and many are still here unable to go back to the Philippines.  
 
Involvement in unskilled labor can put one at a disadvantage in the Japanese society especially 
when it comes to economic equality and demand for fair treatment. And the local government 
approach to multicultural co-existence runs the risk of entrenching such negative images. Even 
among women working as entertainers there is a separation. It was already mentioned that in 
Nagoya the Sakae entertainment district is where most of the Philippine pubs and other pubs 
where many Filipino entertainers work. On the other side of Sakae district is Nishiki district, 
another entertainment district which according to Mr. Puno of FMC is a higher-end entertainment 
district. Pubs in Nishiki district only employ Japanese and some Korean entertainers and rates 
are much higher. This clearly separates Filipinos working as entertainers from the majority 
culture as those in oppositional culture. 
 
Even among migrant organizations, there is a general separation of those organizations that 
oppose  and demand for better representation and attention to illegal migrants who are in 
dangerous situations, and those organizations whose goal is to promote multicultural 
coexistence and agree  with the local government policies as was discussed in Chapter 5.  We 
actually see that in a way agreeing  can be advantageous in that those organizations that are 
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supporting and agreeing with the local government get better funding and access to government 
facilities than those that oppose . I am not saying that it is better to agree than to oppose, both 
strategies can have merits. Simply agreeing will not allow the minority culture ability to negotiate 
better the terms of their membership and position in the home country. But opposing  too much 
can be seen as asking for too much and might have the unintended consequence of being shut 
off and discriminated against. Based on my interviews there is a bit of a rift among the leaders 
and members of the two groups of organizations, as the more conformist groups claim that the 
other group has the tendency to be envious of the resources they are able access, often labelling 
them as detached from the actual experiences of the Filipino residents in the community. While 
the more activist groups claim that the other groups are hoarding all resources and have the 
tendency to limit and block their participation in some of the local government events. Their 
strategies in addressing the negative stereotype of Filipinos in Nagoya are also different. While 
the more affluent group, as mentioned earlier, holds events in more posh places to show a 
different side of Filipinos, the other group aim to bring into light the harsh realities of many of the 
illegal Filipinos in Japan who are often trapped in debts and are forced to work for Japanese 
gangs to show that while they do become illegal it is the system that exploit their illegality and 
force them further down.  
 
What actually this does is making organizing and mobilizing too political  in the negative sense 
of the word. And for many Filipinos whose concerns are more basic (finding employment, money, 
food and shelter and being able to send some money back to the Philippines) this can put them 
off joining and being active in organizations to be able to slowly fashion and image and an 
identity that will help them negotiate their positions in being members of the society. What we 
saw is that a number of factors impact belongingness: one, the individual characteristics of the 
migrants play an important role in determining their levels of fit, involvement and contentment. It 
would seem that better educated and higher-skilled individuals feel the frustration of economic 
immobility and this translates to low levels of contentment and fit. Second, the division among 
the migrant groups who somehow become representatives of Filipino residents in the local 
government and in the Japanese society can also impact discontent and fit, as not properly 
addressing stereotypes and addressing stereotypes in different ways can work against them, 
entrenching the very stereotype they try to erase. And finally, the local government who rewards 
both high-skilled individuals and low-skilled individuals with better economic resources but does 
not give them economic mobility and the chance to negotiate better their membership in the host 
society because of a lack of a comprehensive integration strategy also impact identificational 
integration in certain ways. 
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Chapter conclusion 
In this chapter, we discussed the integration outcomes of the Filipino residents from the data in 
terms of the dimensions of integration. We have assessed different these integration outcomes 
vis-à-vis different individual factors such as demographic characteristics, individual trajectories, 
transnational practice, ethnic social ties and intents for the future. What we found in this chapter 
is that understanding integration requires a nuanced understanding of the underlying factors that 
may impact integration. In general, we see an uneven integration in that while integration 
outcomes in terms of structural integration are high, we see rather low outcomes for the other 
three dimensions. I argued in this chapter that this is a result of the confluence of both contextual 
factors such as policies and programs, histories, and individual factors such as reasons for 
migration and engagements with ethnic community and the home country through transnational 
practices.  
 
In terms of structural integration, we see that while the respondents are able to access jobs and 
other public services, they are experiencing entrapment in that they are unable to access jobs 
that go outside the 3D categories. Language and qualifications seem to be the biggest hurdle, 
entrenching them into jobs that are considered 3D and are often short-term. Immobility seems to 
arise from this interplay between policies and the specific context of the Filipino residents in 
terms of structural integration. We have previously seen that there are policies being 
implemented relating to public service delivery and access to jobs as compared to other types of 
policies. The thrust towards municipality revitalization through tabunka kyousei creates a space 
where foreign residents are welcome to contribute to their society economically. But only in 
certain areas. Areas that are outside the 3D areas are hard to access and regardless of high 
educational attainment and work experience from the Philippines, many still feel trapped. The 
need to send remittances keep many of them accepting jobs that further trap them in such 
industries.  
 
On the other hand, in terms of cultural integration many respondents do have some knowledge 
of the language but they are not proficient. There are two conclusions that can be made: first, 
what is stipulated here is that the average to below average levels of proficiency point to the fact 
that many Filipino residents only invest in learning the language up to a certain extent, and that is 
when certain goals have been met. We see from earlier discussions that there is very little 
difference in terms of language proficiency among men and women, or among younger and 
older respondents, or even among high-skilled and low-skilled individuals. What this implies is 
that incentives are not too high, at least in the perspective of many of the respondents. As 
mentioned, jobs are easy to access, many jobs do not require knowing or speaking Japanese 
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language at all, while some jobs require only a basic knowledge of Japanese. What this leads to 
is disincentivizing learning the language especially for foreign residents who do not think of 
staying permanently in the country. And second, the increase in the number of Filipino coming to 
Japan suggests the possibility of the Filipino community becoming thicker and tighter as 
mentioned in Chapter 7 in which we see that many of the Filipinos tend to live together. As 
mentioned in the opening of this section, Yalgan et al (2012) notes the extent to which cultural 
integration can happen is going to be wider and deeper if the minority culture is more dispersed. 
What is implied therefore is language learning is disincentivized not just because jobs are 
available for people who know nothing of the language, but that emotional, psychological and 
social support can also be accessed through the ethnic community further disincentivizing the 
need to go out of the community to interact with native-born Japanese. 
 
In terms of interactive integration, outcomes are much lower. Interactions measured in terms of 
personal relationships are high while the proportion of respondents engaging in organizations 
and with the local government are low. On the one hand, at the individual level the respondents 
seem to interact and establish personal ties with other Japanese individuals, and they seem to 
acknowledge the importance of being involved in meso-level organizations, though reasons for 
participating are more for personal benefits than for pushing for acceptance in their locality. At 
the organizational level on the other hand, many still do not see the need to push for 
representation. And further, we see a local government whose approach on diversity has the 
tendency to consume other cultures where the center of this multicultural exchange is the host 
society and migrant subjectivities ignored. We see that these individual factors compound the 
effects at the organizational level and result to a group of people that are more inward-looking 
than expected.  
 
Finally, what we saw is that a number of factors impact belongingness: one, the individual 
characteristics of the migrants play an important role in determining their levels of fit, involvement 
and contentment. It would seem that better educated and higher-skilled individuals feel the 
frustration of economic immobility and this translates to low levels of contentment and fit. Second, 
at the structural level, the division among the migrant groups who somehow become 
representatives of Filipino residents in the local government and in the Japanese society can 
also impact discontent and fit, as not properly addressing stereotypes and addressing 
stereotypes in different ways can work against them, entrenching the very stereotype they try to 
erase. And finally, the local government who rewards both high-skilled individuals and low-skilled 
individuals with better economic resources but does not give them economic mobility and the 
chance to negotiate better their membership in the host society because of a lack of a 
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comprehensive integration strategy also impact identificational integration in certain ways. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 196 
 
Chapter 8: Dimensions and Patterns of Integration 
 
In this section, I will discuss the dimensions and patterns of integration that I found using the data. 
In the first section, using the integration outcome indicators discussed in Chapter 7 I aimed to 
construct composite indicators for the dimensions of integration discussed in the literature review 
(see Chapter 1) and discussed in-depth in Chapters 6 and 7. In the next section, I assess how 
every individual respondent scored in terms of the four dimensions and discuss the combinations 
and extent of their integration as a whole. Finally, I discuss and characterize the patterns found 
and perform multiple logistic regression analyses to understand how the foreign residents  
individual characteristics impact their overall integration.  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate how integration can be measured to be able to 
objectively assess extent and outcomes and shed light onto how, the foreign residents, given 
their individual circumstances, integrate into the host society. This section, given the nature of its 
focus, will mostly present data from the quantitative part of the study.  
 
 
A. Constructing the composite indicators for the four dimensions of integration 
Based on the review of the literature and the current policies being implemented and directions 
being undertaken by the local government, I conducted a survey that aims to collect data on 
integration using quantifiable measures. The purpose of the survey was to collect information on 
various aspects of the integration experiences of the Filipino residents and be able to construct 
synthetic composite indicators that can measure integration extent.  
 
There are four steps necessary to this approach. First, concepts were defined. To be able to do 
this I reviewed the literature (see Chapter 1) and concluded based on the literature that 
integration has four dimensions. These dimensions are then discussed in detail, information 
coming from both the global literature and the local experiences in the Japanese context. 
Possible indicators measuring and capturing information on these four indicators were then 
looked at and assessed and the explanatory power of these indicators were discussed vis-à-vis 
the specific context of Japan and more importantly Nagoya City (see Chapter 8). This was done 
because according to the literature, while some generally accepted measures had already been 
defined, these measures should always be localized to capture the actual integration process at 
the local level, taking into account both contextual and individual factors.  
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Second, the dimensions were then generally defined (see Chapter 8) and each indicator was 
assessed.  Those discussions provided the background for selecting which indicators to include 
for every dimension in the context of the Filipino residents in Japan. From the literature, we have 
defined integration as composed of four dimensions: structural, cultural, interactive and 
identificational. These four dimensions address the inclusion or exclusion from social 
subsystems of the migrants as was previously defined. Understanding the social inclusion and 
exclusion of foreign residents into social subsystems can inform us of social inequality, a central 
dimension of social structure along with social differentiation.  
 
Locating these concepts into the local context of the Filipino residents in Nagoya City, we found 
that structural integration is mostly defined by being involved in the labor market. As discussed in 
the previous sections, the initial drive that brought Filipinos to Japan has been to fill in positions 
in the labor market that were created because of the boom in the economy. Their foreign 
er, as trainee or as 
laborers among others. What this gives participation in the labor market is a heavier weight in 
understanding structural integration when compared to other indicators. Access to health 
insurance and housing structures were considered not powerful enough to explain the variations 
within the respondent population as in the case of Japan, access to health and housing are 
reliant on residency permits. As mentioned before, health insurance is mandated by law and are 
accessible to both local and foreign residents residing in Japan for more than three months. And 
considering this is the filter I utilized in my sampling, access then to health insurance loses its 
explanatory power.  
 
Third, given that there is already a definition of integration and its dimensions that was based on 
the literature, I conducted a multivariate analysis to check the underlying structure of the 
individual indicators. Conducting this for instance statistically proved the unsuitability of including 
access to health and housing in the composite indicator as previously hypothesized. Conducting 
this informed me of what indicators to include and the structure of the individual indicators. 
However following argument that the position in Japan is a function of their activity in Japan, I 
also considered inclusion into the educational structure.  
 
Did you have an income-generating activity in 
the past two weeks? was asked to measure whether respondent has a job that provides 
them a source of income or not in the past two weeks. Answerable by yes or no, Yes answers 
were coded as 1 and No answers were coded as 0. 
again coded as Yes = 1 and No = 0 was used to distinguish the currently unemployed. Among 
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choosing from a list of pre-determined answers: 1 = Waiting for rehire, 2 = Too old/too young, 3 = 
Studying, 4 = Stay at home. While traditional measures determining the labor force do not 
include those that answer too old or too young, studying and stay at home, the only group that I 
excluded are those that are studying, as following what has been discussed earlier that the 
position in the society is a function of their position in the society. Therefore, those that have not 
look for job because of the following reasons: too old/too young, and stay at home have been 
included as not currently engaged in any economic activity.  
 
On the other hand, the composite indicator for cultural integration is measured using language 
proficiency as proxy. Language proficiency is a self-rated level of proficiency, ranging from 1 to 5. 
This reflects the levels in JLPT which has levels from N1 as the highest to N5 as the lowest. 
Answers were later recoded as 0-4. Not all respondents have taken the JLPT and so were asked 
to rate their own language proficiency (see results from Chapter 7) 
 
On the other hand, the composite indicator for interactive integration is a summation of 
responses to three questions. Interactive integration refers to memberships in various groups, 
both formal and informal, in the host society. Therefore, I looked at three possible memberships: 
friendships with native-born Japanese, membership in formal and voluntary organizations and 
participation in local government-organized activities and events. Having a Japanese friend is 
measured using a subjective question, Do you think you have friends that are Japanese that you 
can consider close friends?  Yes answers were coded as 1 and No answers were coded as 0.  
 
Membership in an organization measures involvement in any organization both formal and 
informal, registered and unregistered organizations. It was asked as: Are you currently a 
member of any organization?  This question does not distinguish between active and non-active 
members, as both active and non-active members can receive information from organizations, 
based on my interviews with leaders of some organizations in Nagoya City. This question is 
answerable by Yes or No, codes as 1 and 0, respectively.  
 
Frequency of participation in local government events was asked as In a scale of 1-5, with 1 
being Never and 4 being Always, how often do you participate in local government events?  This 
question pertains to Answers were later recoded as 0-3. This is a self-reported subjective 
question measuring how much respondents think they participate in the formal society.  
 
Finally, the composite of indicator of identificational integration is a summation of three indicators 
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that measure fit, involvement and contentment as was discussed in the previous chapter. 
Perception of being welcomed is a subjective question asked as, In a scale of 1 to 4, with 1 
being Very Unwelcomed to 4 being Very Welcomed, how welcomed do you feel in Japan?  This 
question is later recoded as 0-3.  
 
The other aspect of belongingness, that is perceived valued involvement, is measured using 
perception of being able to succeed in Japan asked as, In a scale of 1 to 4, with 1 being Very 
Unable to 4 being Very Able, how able are Filipinos to succeed in Japan?  The question is later 
recoded as 0-3.  
 
Finally, to measure the level of contentment of the respondents in their lives in Japan, the 
question: In a scale of 1 to 4, how content are you in your life in Japan?   
 
Table below shows distribution of respondents in every indicator. 
 
Table 8.1. Index variables, N=459  
Variable Magnitude Proportion 
Has no job 38 8.28 
Has job 421 91.72 
Language proficiency 
Level 1 33 7.19 
Level 2 184 40.09 
Level 3 176 38.34 
Level 4 59 12.85 
Level 5 7 1.53 
Has no Japanese friend 79 17.21 
Has at least one Japanese friend 380 82.79 
Is not a member in any organization 274 59.69 
Is a member of at least one organization 185 40.31 
Frequency of participation in local government events 
Never 196 42.7 
Seldom 194 42.27 
Neither seldom nor often 60 13.07 
Often 8 1.74 
Always 1 0.22 
Perception of being welcomed 
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Very Unwelcomed 4 0.87 
Unwelcomed 127 27.67 
Welcomed 228 49.67 
Very welcomed 100 21.79 
Perception of being able to succeed 
Very Unable 1 0.22 
Unable 56 12.2 
Able 212 46.19 
Very Able 190 41.39 
Levels of contentment 
Very discontented 9 1.96 
Discontented 135 29.41 
Content 209 45.53 
Contented 106 23.09 
 
The fourth step to making composite indicators for the four dimensions include a simple 
normalization all dimensions to be able to be comparable. Every dimension composite indicator 
has a range of zero to one. From the discussion above, we can now look at the mean scores for 
every dimension for all the respondents. Mean scores for every dimension is shown in the table 
below. 
 
Table 8.2. Mean scores for dimension indicators 
Dimension Observations Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Structural 459 0.92 0.27 0.00 0.25 
Cultural 459 0.40 0.21 0.00 0.25 
Interactive 459 0.60 0.33 0.00 0.25 
Identification 459 0.59 0.27 0.06 0.25 
 
We can plot the mean scores as follows: 
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Chart 8.1. Radial chart showing mean scores for dimensions of integration 
 
 
We can see from the shape of the graph that mean scores for cultural and interactive integration 
are almost flat and straight. While mean scores for structural and identificational integration are 
relatively pointed. This can be expected given the findings from Table 8.1 above, which shows 
distribution of respondents for every indicator that make up the dimension scores.  
 
What this finding suggests is that while many of the respondents are economically integrated 
and have moderate levels of being able to succeed, being welcomed and being content in their 
lives in Japan, interaction with the society through having Japanese friends, being active in 
organizations and in local government events are lacking, while cultural integration in terms of 
language proficiency remains low. This is reflected in previous discussions in Chapter 7 where 
descriptive statistics as well as anecdotes from key informants showed that there is an uneven 
Japan, we see that the levels of their structural integration is high. However, performance in 
terms of other dimensions is relatively low.  
 
These findings complement what has been previously discussed in earlier chapters. To reiterate, 
the fairly expansive policies of the local government in terms of involving foreign residents into 
the economic sphere has resulted in high structural integration. While occupational diversity is 
relatively low as most of the respondents are still employed in very specific areas such as 
entertainer work and factory work, the relative ease with which respondents find jobs and get 
them contribute to high levels of structural integration.  
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However, the rather incomplete and ad hoc policies pertaining to the other dimensions are also 
reflected in the chart above. On average, mean score for cultural integration is at 0.40, 
suggesting that most of the respondents have lower than average handle of the Japanese 
language. Language, as we have seen from previous discussions, is a key element in better 
economic mobility, better acculturation and an important factor in creating bonds and n investing 
in relationships in the host society. We see the impact of language in the lack of occupation 
diversity, in the entrapment of Filipino residents in specific areas of work and in the hard-to-erase 
hanayome who is only after the yen.  
 
This is further reflected in the lack of interactions among foreign residents and local residents. 
We see that issues such as 1.5 generation, and the continued involvement of many Filipino 
women and men in the entertainment industry can entrench existing images about the Filipino 
migrant in Japan. The data shows that average mean score for interactive integration is 0.60, 
suggesting that on the average respondents are above average when it comes to having 
interactions with Japanese people, in organizations and in local government events. These three 
categories represent three levels of organizations, one at the intimate level, next one at the 
meso-level and the third one represents a more formal engagement with the governing body in 
the host society. While the integration scores are relatively high it is worth noting that the 
indicator for having a Japanese friend influenced it much more than the other two indicators, 
suggesting that at the individual level Filipino residents interact with other Japanese individuals 
and even form friendships. However, at the more organizational level, at the level where 
stereotypes could be better approached and possibly rectified, interaction seems lacking. What 
able to send children to school, being able to find jobs, among others.  
 
This again is reflected in the relatively low mean score for identificational integration. 
Respondents on average have a score of 0.59, suggesting that in terms of fit, involvement and 
contentment, in average respondents are in the middle. They are relatively content, relatively feel 
welcome and relatively feel that they can succeed in the host country.  
 
Looking at the scores in terms of various groupings, we see that in terms of demographic 
characteristics there is not much variation in the scores. However, we see that overall males 
have higher scores than females in all the dimensions. There is also a certain trend when it 
comes to age. As age increases, economic activity decreases but scores in other dimensions 
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increase. This is in contrast to younger age groups where scores for structural integration are 
really high but scores in particular for cultural and interactive dimensions are extremely low. This 
complements perfectly findings discussed in Chapter 8. In terms of civil status, the differences 
are less salient though it can be said that respondents who are single or never married and those 
that are cohabiting tend to have lower cultural and interactive integration scores while those that 
are married, divorced or widowed have better outcomes in those dimensions but lower scores for 
structural integration.  
 
We see from the dataset, and as was previously discussed that majority of the single and never 
married respondents have been in Japan for a fairly shorter length of time as compared to those 
who are married, or widowed or divorced. Further, many of the single and never married 
respondents are engaged in entertainment and factory work and following our earlier discussions, 
it becomes intuitive why they would have better structural integration outcomes and lower scores 
for cultural and interactive integration.  
 
In terms of individual migrant trajectories and human capital, we see higher variance. Overall, 
scores of those with college-level education are higher in all dimensions than those who are high 
school graduates or technical vocational diploma holders. On the other hand, there are more 
interesting findings when we look at reason for migration. Those who migrated to Japan because 
of economic reasons such as working (to look for work) or to study or to undergo training have 
better structural integration outcomes, which is understandable and expected considering that 
the reason behind their migration is actually to work. This reason is the reason majority of the 
respondents expressed as the main driving force behind their migration to Japan. This 
complements the discussion on the Philippine migration to Japan which started as an economic 
endeavor on the one hand there is a demand created in Japan because of the economic boom, 
and on the other, there is a supply of able-bodied individuals whose want nothing else but to help 
and impro  
 
However, comparing those who came to Japan to work with those who came to undergo training 
or to study, those in the latter groups have better outcomes in all four dimensions. One possible 
reason is that during their training or education period, many of the respondents had a chance 
and had ample time to adjust and learn the language which could help them find jobs easier, and 
find jobs that would fit their qualifications, especially since they have qualifications that they have 
earned in Japan during their training and education period.  
 
While those who came for family reunification purposes have relatively similar outcomes except 
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for scores in terms of cultural integration. We see that those who came to be with relatives have 
better cultural integration outcomes than those who came to marry or be with their spouses. One 
of my key informants came as a spouse and she recalled not having any idea as to what the 
Japanese language is. She said that the way she learned is very informal and that even now she 
cannot claim knowing the language entirely even after she had stayed for many years.  
 
One really interesting finding is the integration outcomes for those who came as tourists. Their 
structural integration scores are really high, reflecting still the economic nature of their migration. 
Their scores for interactive integration is also high, while their scores for cultural and 
identificational remain low. This mix of scores is very interesting in that supposedly cultural and 
interactive integration usually come after the other. What is noted here is that this mix of scores 
is a product of their particular condition in Japan. Coming in as tourists, they were not given the 
right to work, though their actual purpose was to find a job to earn money. Further their lack of 
rights in many areas such as access to housing or access to insurance have made it necessary 
to access certain services offered by different groups and organizations. For instance, 
participation in local government-led events among those who came as tourists are really high, 
since local governments offer free services such as language schools, free check-ups and drills 
that can be accessed some of the times without showing any resident card or any other 
documents. Further, many of those who came to Japan as tourists, without proper access to 
many social subsystems would have to rely on their social capital which includes Japanese 
friends and migrant organizations. It also becomes intuitive why those who do not have proper 
identification papers would be active especially in organizations that are more activist and are 
working towards recognition of illegal migrants.  
 
In terms of length of stay and proportion of life spent in Japan we see the same pattern as what 
we saw in terms of age. As the individual spends more time in Japan their structural integration 
scores decrease while scores in other dimensions of integration increase. This is true except for 
those individuals who have stayed more than ten years but less than ten years who consistently 
engage in economic activities.  
 
There are also significant differences in terms of their current visas. Permanent and long-term 
residents consistently have good and somehow even integration outcomes in all four dimensions 
while trainees and entertainers have high structural integration scores and low scores in the 
other three dimensions. Spouse visa holder on the other hand have relatively low outcomes for 
most of the integration dimensions except for interactive and identificational outcomes. Students 
on the other hand have high scores on structural, cultural and interactive but low on 
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identificational. Since their visa status reflects their activities in the host country, this somehow 
reflects what Luthra et al (2014) noted that for instance while students may be engaged culturally, 
they do not really feel that they belong to their host society since their main purpose is to study, 
and studies suggest that while many students are preferring to stay in the host society after 
graduation, many still think of their time in the host society as temporary, a temporary stay that 
will only last until they finish their education.  
 
In terms of ethnic social ties, we see that those who have a combination of strong and weak ties 
fare better than those who have exclusively just one type of social tie. But that those who only 
have weak ties did better than those who only have strong ties, especially in terms of structural 
integration. What this affirms is what has been discussed in the literature. We have extensively 
discussed this in Chapter 1 and Chapter 7. Interestingly however, while those who have a 
combination of strong and weak ties and those who have only weak ties have moderate 
perceptions on their identificational integration, those who have only strong ethnic social ties 
have a really high mean score on identificational integration. What this implied is that, while 
performing less better than the other groups in structural, cultural and interactive integration 
dimensions, they are able to feel like they belong in Japan most likely because of the existence 
of their strong ties. Remember that strong ties are differentiated from the weak ties by the 
capability of strong ties to provide emotional support (see Chapter 1).  
 
Interestingly, outcomes for those who engage regularly in transnational practices seem to be 
better except for those who regularly travel back to the home country. The data shows that 
respondents who send remittances regularly are more likely to have better structural, cultural, 
interactive and identificational outcomes than those who send remittances irregularly and 
especially than those who do not send any remittances at all. Further, those who send 
remittances even if at irregular frequencies still fare better than those who do not send. We see 
the same patterns for those who have savings in the Philippines. However, we see the best 
integration outcomes overall for those who save in both Japan and the Philippines. Contrastingly 
however, in terms of travelling to the home country, while respondents who travel to the home 
country tend to have better integration scores overall, those who travel more frequently than 
once a year tend to have lower scores in cultural, interactive and identificational integration. This 
is quite intuitive as regularly and more frequently travelling back to the home country involves 
some uprooting both from the home country and from the host country. The foreign resident does 
not stay long enough to be rooted, or to start the acculturation process. These decline in scores 
is evident among those who travel to the home country every six months. Looking at the 
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This is because that most entertainers, especially those that come to Japan on entertainer visas 
to differentiate them from permanent and long-term residents who work as entertainers, usually 
get six-month contracts that they have to renew every time. This requires them to go back to the 
home country and be deployed again to Japan and stay there for six months. Parrenas (2010) 
call them circular migrants and as Luthra et al (2014) noted circular migrants have specific 
consequences that can affect their integration levels. Since their circularity stems from the 
economic drive behind their migration coupled with the relatively low-skills that they have that 
forces them to be on short-term contracts, Luthra et al (2014) suggest that structural integration 
can be expected to be high while other forms, those that require time to be developed would be 
rather low.   
 
Having looked at the differences in terms of integration scores among different groups, in the 
next section we determine the combinations and extent of integration in every dimension of 
every individual foreign residents to have a better understanding of the extent of their integration. 
Next, upon classifying the foreign residents based on their scores in the four dimensions of 
integration, I will discuss what determines this classification, and what specific characteristics 
and trajectories migrants have that can impact the classification. 
 
 
B. Determining the patterns of integration and what impacts pattern membership 
 
Understanding underlying patterns/clusters 
In the previous section we assessed the integration scores in every dimension to be able to 
understand social inclusion or exclusion into social subsystems, understanding of which can 
further our understanding of social inequality. We have previously discussed how understanding 
on their scores on the four dimensions can inform us of social differentiation and provide us a 
better understanding of how and to what extent they integrate. In this section, I first classify the 
respondents into groups based on their dimension scores to be able to understand the various 
patterns of integration. In the next section, I will aim to understand what can determine and 
impact membership into these patterns of integration.  
 
The data was tested and four underlying clusters or groups corresponding to patterns of 
integration using cluster analysis were found. Cluster analysis, along with factor analysis, 
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discriminant analysis and others, is a multivariate method which aims to classify or group 
observations. Factor analysis, principal component analysis and exploratory and confirmatory 
factor analyses are often used to understand the underlying structure of the variables, to 
understand which variables explain similar concepts and are very useful in cutting down 
variables for analysis. On the other hand, discriminant analysis, also focused on variables, 
predetermined groups (Gore Jr 2009). However, cluster analysis on the other hand aims to 
understand the homogeneity among individual subjects or observations and not variables while 
maximizing heterogeneity among groups. Simply, what it means is that the cluster analysis 
groups observations in such a way that observations inside a cluster would share more similar 
characteristics with each other rather than with observations in other clusters (Gore Jr 2009). 
This is in particular useful for this project as one aim of the project is make sense of how 
individuals are groups in relation to the integration outcomes they have in the four dimensions. 
What this provides us is a clearer image of where and how every indiv
processes and extents are.  
 
Cluster analysis has been utilized in the social science. Largely absent in cluster analysis is 
-
exploratory and thus is very useful for studies in the social sciences where the environment 
cannot be largely controlled and are variable to many change in factors. Though this lack of 
-  analysis remains useful 
in the social sciences. Gore Jr (2009) notes that cluster analysis has a wide range of uses from 
data exploration to hypothesis testing and confirmation. For instance, in the social sciences, 
cluster analysis has been used in many studies in psychology, political science. 
 
The first stage for classification is theory formulation (Gore Jr 2009). We have laid out the 
theoretical foundations for this project in Chapter 1. This is an important stage as it means that 
cluster analysis is grounded in theory. We have defined based on the theoretical underpinnings 
of this research the important variables with which we will classify the observations or the 
respondents. We have generated, as seen in the earlier section, scores for all four dimensions.  
 
Statistical tests using hierarchical cluster analysis suggests testing for clusters using single 
linkage, average linkage and complete linkage. Dendrograms generated using average land 
complete linkages suggest distinct clustering for four to five clusters. Hart-Duda tests suggest 
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keeping four clusters. From there we can choose to classify our groups on different dis/similarity 
a measure of corres
According to Figueiredo Filho et al (2014) the three methods most usual in cluster analysis 
include correlational measures, distance measures and association measures. While 
correlational measures, referring to the correlation of profiles of the objects, is not the most used 
in cluster analysis, association measures are often used with non-quantitative variable, often 
matching observation whether they have or do not have an attribute. That leaves us with 
distance measures which measure the distance or proximity of the observations based on given 
variables of interest. Clustering based on distance measures can be done three ways: 
hierarchical, non-hierarchical or a combination of both. According to Hesketh and Everitt (2004) 
series of nested or hierarchical classifications of the observations, beginning at the stage where 
each observation is regarded as forming a single-
 
 
The usefulness of the hierarchical clustering comes when there is no prior knowledge of how 
many clusters should be formed. It is generally up to the researcher to determine how many 
clusters to be formed, with the help of stopping rules, usefulness for explanation and the 
literature and framework. The three most common hierarchical clustering techniques include 
single linkage, average linkage and complete linkage clustering techniques. As their name 
implies, single linkage measures the distance between the closest pair and treats the first pair as 
members of their own individual clusters, average linkage averages the distance between all 
pairs where one member of the pair is in one cluster and the other in the second cluster, and 
complete linkage measures the distance between the farthest pair, with one member of the pair 
in one cluster and the other in another cluster.  
 
After testing for different hierarchical clustering techniques, I decided to cluster the dataset using 
average linkage as the two other methods show problems of chaining, or that which incorporates 
observations already classified into a cluster into another cluster instead of creating new ones. 
Using Stata computing package, I utilized the cluster analysis package. To determine the 
number of clusters I analyzed the dendrogram shown below and the two stopping rules provided 
by Stata.  
 
 
 
 209 
 
Chart 8.2. Dendrogram for average linkage cluster analysis using the four dimensions of 
integration 
 
 
As mentioned knowing what number of clusters should be defined cannot simply be known. 
Hence table below shows the results of the stopping rules. The two stopping rules provided by 
Stata are the Calinski-Harabasz pseudo F-statistic and the Duda and Hart index.  
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Table 8.3. Duda and Hart index 
Number of clusters Je (2)/ Je (1) Pseudo T-squared 
1 0.7586 145.5 
2 0.5318 29.1 
3 0.6183 260.5 
4 0.5957 11.5 
5 0.7351 79.6 
6 0.9007 21.2 
7 0.5899 138.4 
8 0.9656 6.6 
9 0.7268 5.3 
10 0.6963 4.8 
11 0.5618 3.9 
12 0.8383 35.3 
13 0.5233 51.9 
14 0.2783 10.4 
15 0.5693 9.8 
 
Table 8.4. Calinski-Harabasz pseudo-F  
Number of clusters Calinski/Harabasz pseudo-F 
2 145.5 
3 86.0 
4 175.9 
5 136.3 
6 138.2 
7 122.1 
8 152.5 
9 135.9 
10 123.0 
11 112.2 
12 102.7 
13 103.8 
14 105.4 
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15 98.6 
 
While there are no clear rules of choosing cluster analysis, the Calinski and Harabasz pseudo 
F-statistic and the Duda and Hart index stopping rules can inform up to where distinct clustering 
happens. For both these rules, larger values show distinct clustering. Interpreting Calinski and 
Harabasz pseudo F-statistic is fairly straightforward. We look for the largest value and see that it 
suggests that the data based on the four dimensions of integration scores have four distinct 
clusters. The Duda and Hart index on the other hand does not simply look at the largest values. 
In general, high Je(1)/Je(2) should also correspond to low Pseudo T-squared values. And not 
just any low value, this low value should be in between two extremely big values. Following this, 
we see that like Calinski and Harabasz pseudo F-statistic, Duda and Hart index also suggests 
there are four distinct clusters in the data.  
 
Thus, we generate the cluster based on this. The four clusters or groups are shown below 
vis-à-vis their mean average scores for the four dimensions of integration. Chart 8.3 below plots 
the average scores shown in Table 8.4 in a radial chart. 
 
Chart 8.3. Radial chart for mean scores for the four dimensions of integration, by group 
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Table 8.4. Typology by mean scores in four dimensions 
 Structural Cultural Interactive Identificational Number of 
observations 
Group1 0.0 0.30 0.19 0.56 19 
Group 2 0.0 0.64 0.79 0.76 16 
Group 3 1.0 0.32 0.38 0.46 223 
Group 4 1.0 0.49 0.87 0.72 201 
 
The first group makes up about four percent of the total number of respondents. This group is 
identified by low scores for all four dimensions overall. We see that it actually has zero for 
structural integration suggesting that members of this group are not economically integrated. 
Further, we see that cultural integration scores are low suggesting that the self-rated language 
proficiency of members of this group are below average. Interactive scores are extremely low 
implying very low rates of interaction with the host society and slightly low score for 
identificational integration suggesting that the respondents in this group relatively do not feel 
welcomed, able to succeed or contented in their lives in Japan (see Table 8.5). 
 
On the other hand, the second group makes up about three percent of the members of the 
population. Compared to the first group, members of this group scored high in almost all 
integration dimensions except for structural integration. Structural integration scores are zero, 
suggesting economic non-integration while scores for cultural, interactive and identificational 
integration dimensions are high. What this implies is that while members are not employed nor 
studying, members here have intermediate proficiency of the Japanese language, interacts with 
the host society in all three levels of interactions that we have measured and has high 
perceptions of belonging to the host society (Table 8.5).  
 
The third cluster makes up the most of the respondents. About 49 percent of the respondents are 
in this cluster. Compared to the two groups already mentioned, members falling in this category 
have high structural integration. Everyone in this group is either employed or studying. However, 
while structurally integrated we see that scores for the three other dimensions of integrated are 
fairly average. Though members of this group seem to be more active in terms interacting with 
the host society in the three levels of interactions, their scores overall in the remaining three 
dimensions are generally average to below average (see Table 8.5).  
 
Lastly, the fourth cluster makes up about 44 percent of the respondents. This group is 
characterized by high scores overall. Members of this group are structurally integrated, has high 
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self-rated language proficiency, is actively interacting with the host society and has high levels of 
perceived belongingness to the host society (see Table 8.5).  
 
In the next section, we discuss what impacts membership in the groups, in that what makes 
respondents, given their integration scores, be classified into where they are.  
 
Table 8.5. Distribution of respondents by groups by variable, N=459 
Variable Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 
Has no job 100.0 100.0 0.5 1.0 
Has job 0.0 0.0 99.5 99.0 
Language proficiency   
Level 1 15.8 0.0 13.0 0.5 
Level 2 52.6 6.3 52.0 28.4 
Level 3 26.3 43.8 29.6 48.8 
Level 4 5.3 37.5 4.5 20.9 
Level 5 0.0 12.5 0.9 1.5 
Has no Japanese friend 63.2 0.0 25.6 5.0 
Has at least one Japanese friend 36.8 100.0 74.4 95.0 
Is not a member in any organization 100.0 56.3 88.8 23.9 
Is a member of at least one organization 0.0 43.8 11.2 76.1 
Frequency of participation in local government events   
Never 79.0 6.3 72.7 9.0 
Seldom 21.1 75.0 23.8 62.2 
Neither seldom nor often 0.0 12.5 2.7 25.9 
Often 0.0 6.3 0.9 2.5 
Always 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 
Perception of being welcomed   
Very Unwelcomed 0.0 0.0 1.4 0.5 
Unwelcomed 31.6 12.5 38.1 16.9 
Welcomed 47.4 37.5 53.8 46.3 
Very welcomed 21.1 50.0 6.7 36.3 
Perception of being able to succeed   
Very Unable 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 
Unable 26.3 0.0 18.4 5.0 
Able 42.1 37.5 58.3 33.8 
Very Able 31.6 62.5 22.9 61.2 
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Levels of contentment   
Very discontented 0.0 0.0 4.0 0.0 
Discontented 31.6 12.5 46.2 11.9 
Content 42.1 43.8 44.4 47.3 
Contented 26.3 43.8 5.4 40.8 
 
To summarize we can rank the groups as such: Groups 1 and 3 are considered low integration 
outcome groups and Groups 2 and 4 are high integration outcome groups. Structural integration 
scores create the distinction between the bigger groupings, as Groups 1 and 2 are economically 
inactive and Groups 3 and 4 are economically integrated. 
 
 
What impacts pattern membership 
To test for what demographic variables can predict which respondent is more likely to fall into 
which category, I utilize multinomial logistic regression. This technique compares likelihood of 
being in one cluster as compared to another. In this regression equation, I utilized four groups of 
variables. The first group refers to demographic variables such as age, sex, civil status, 
educational attainment, number of years of stay in Japan and proportion of life spent in Japan. 
The second group of variables tests hypothesis on how migrant agency can impact the 
integration and as such includes variables pertaining to migrant agencies such as reason for 
migration and intents for the future. The third and fourth group of variables tests our initial 
hypothesis that engaging with other cores  such as ethnic community in the host country and 
home country can impact the integration outcomes of the respondents. The third group of 
variables includes ethnic social ties measures and the fourth group of variables includes 
variables such as sending remittances, regularly travelling to the home country and sending 
savings.  
 
I tested these variables in five multinomial regression models: one model that only regresses 
demographic variables, a second model adding individual trajectory variables, a third model 
adding ethnic social ties variables, a fourth model adding transnational practices variables into 
the mix and a fifth model adding variable for intent for the future. All five regression models give a 
prob>chi2 of 0.000 suggesting that the models have a better fit than an empty model. The 
descriptive statistics for all four groups of variables are discussed in depth in Chapter 8. They are 
also presented Table 8.5.  
 
Let us look at the five models one by one. Multinomial logistics compare the relative risk of being 
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in one group than in another in terms of a given variable. Since we have four groups or patterns 
in the context of the integration process, we use the last group or that group which has high 
scores overall as a base group. What this means is that relative risk ratios will refer to the risk of 
being in one group as compared to being in Group 4 in terms of a given variable. The relative risk 
ratios for all models are given in Table 8.6.  
 
As was mentioned, there are five models tested in this chapter. Let us look at the first model. The 
first model only regresses demographic variables which include sex, age, civil status and current 
current visa status may be significant in determining group or pattern membership, but only in 
specific groups. Specifically, being males reduces the relative risk of being in Group 1 than being 
in Group 4. What it means is that if we compare pattern membership between Group 1 and 
Group 4, then males are almost 100 percent more likely to be in Group 4 than in Group 1.  
 
On the other hand, current visa status seems significant in predicting membership in groups 
considered to have lower integration scores overall. We see for instance that respondents with 
entertainer (RRR=33.37), trainee (RRR=4.78), working (RRR=3.39) and overstay (RRR=22.32) 
visas are more likely than permanent residents (base category) to be in Group 3, the group 
which is economically active but have lower scores for more socio-cultural dimensions of 
integration, than in Group 4 when all other variables are held constant. Entertainers and trainees 
are more likely to be in Group 3 than Group 1 than permanent residents at p<0.001. Further, we 
see that entertainers are more likely to be in Group 1 than Group 4 though this particular 
observation is not statistically significant.  
 
While not statistically significant, we see that married respondents have a tendency to be in 
groups with lower integration scores, while divorced (RRR=4.43) and widowed (RRR=2.01) are 
more likely to be in Group 2 than Group 4 compared to single or never married individuals (base 
category). Group 2 while having high integration scores overall have very low scores in 
economic participation. What this means is that this is probably correlated with age and length of 
stay, as divorced and widowed respondents have better language proficiency, interaction and 
belongingness scores but they may be economically inactive because of their more advanced 
age.  
 
The next model adds into the mix variables pertaining to individual trajectories. As mentioned 
individual trajectories include variables such as reasons for migration, educational attainment, 
work experience from the home country, length of stay in Japan and proportion of life spent in the 
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host country. These group of variables pertain more to the human capital of the respondent. 
Looking at results from Table 8.6, we see that all variables are significant in varying significance 
level when we try to predict membership in groups as compared to membership in Group 4. 
Length of stay (RRR=2.26) is significant at p<0.01 when predicting membership in Group 2 as 
opposed to Group 4. As mentioned before, both Groups 2 and 4 are groups considered as 
groups with high integration outcomes, the difference lie in the economic inactivity of those in 
Group 2. Given that distinction, it becomes intuitive why a one-unit increase in length of stay in 
Japan means respondents are 2.26 times as likely to be in Group 2 than Group 4. What this 
means is that as the respondents spend more time in Japan and grow older, their economic 
participation decreases though their scores for other integration increases hence their movement 
from Group 4 to Group 2. On the other hand, proportion of life spent in Japan which is calculated 
as the respondents  length of stay divided by his or her age seems to be a protective factor, in 
that a unit increase in proportion of life spent in Japan means that the respondent is 19 times as 
likely to be in Group 2 than Group 4.  
 
Looking now at educational attainment, it would seem that education is a protective factor. What 
the results suggest is that higher educational attainment can predict membership in groups or 
integration patterns considered high outcome groups. In comparison to those having high school 
level education (base category), having a college level education makes a respondent 0.24 times 
the risk to be in Group 1 than Group 4 at p<0.05, and 0.39 times the risk to be in Group 1 than 
Group 3 at p<0.01. What this means is that with all factors remaining constant, respondents 
having college education as compared to high school education have 75 percent to 60 percent 
less risk of being in higher integration groups than in lower integration groups. Further we see 
that having technical vocational level of education makes a respondent 0.88 times the risk to be 
in Group 1 than Group 4 and Group 3 than Group 4 compared to those with high school 
education though p values suggest that this is not statistically significant.  
 
In terms of reasons for migration, we see that more family-related reasons tend to be protective 
factors. Comparing Group 4 and Group 2, respondents migrating to be with spouse is 3.81 times 
as likely to be in Group 2 and 2.92 times as likely to be in Group 1 than in Group 4 compared to 
those who migrate for work (base category). It is intuitive why those migrating to be with spouses 
will be more likely to be in Group 2 than Group 4 because of their economic inactivity, and further, 
as discussed in previous chapters many of those who migrate to be with spouses have lower 
language levels and lower interaction rates than those who travel for other reasons so we can 
expect that when we compare probabilities of membership between Group 4 and Group 1, they 
are more likely to be in Group 1. We see the same pattern for those migrating to be with relatives. 
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They are 5.29 times as likely to be in Group 2, a group characterized by high integration 
outcomes but low economic activity than Group 4, the group with high scores overall.  
 
On the other hand, we see that work experience is significant in predicting membership between 
Groups 4 and 2. As expected, having previous work experience from the home country makes a 
respondent 0.11 times the risk to be in Group 2 than Group 4 at p<0.01 as compared to those 
without prior experience. This means that those having work experience as compared to having 
no experience (base category) have 88 percent less risk to be in Group 2 than Group 4.  
 
Interestingly also, we see that previously non-significant variables became significant when we 
added individual trajectory variables in the regression equation. While being males (RRR=0.11) 
compared to females (base category) remains significant at p<0.05 in predicting membership in 
Group 4 over Group 1, age and civil status became significant. We see now, as predicted earlier, 
that older respondents tend to be in Group 2 than 4, owing to the relative economic inactivity as 
the age advances. And interestingly, divorced respondents are 6.56 times as likely to be in 
Group 3 than Group 4 when compared to single or never married respondents (base category) at 
p<0.05. 
 
Again, current visa status remains significant in predicting membership in high integration 
outcome Group 4. We see that being an entertainer makes a respondent 11.88 times as likely to 
be in Group 3 than Group 4 at p<0.001 than permanent residents. What this means is that 
entertainers are more likely to have high economic and structural integration while having low 
cultural, interactive and identificational integration outcomes. On the other hand, we see that 
long-term residents are 9.07 times as likely to be in Group 2 than Group 4 at p<0.05 when all 
other variables are held constant. I see this again as connected to length of stay hence why 
being long-term residents suddenly became statistically significant when we added individual 
trajectory variables.  
 
Model 3 regresses the two groups of variables included in Model 2 and add another variable 
measuring combination of access to two types of social capital. As we discussed in previous 
chapters, we see that majority of the respondents have access to ethnic social ties. Most of the 
respondents have a combination of strong and weak ties, while there are respondents who have 
access to only one of either of the types of ties. We see that access to both strong and weak ties 
predict membership in Group 4 when we compare Group 4 with other groups when all other 
variables are held constant. This means that having both types of ethnic social ties is beneficial 
for integration as respondents who reported having access to both types of ties have better 
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integration outcomes overall. Members with access to both types of ties have 0.05 times and 
0.28 times the risk of being in Group 1 than Group 4 or Group 2 than Group 4 compared to those 
with access to only one type of tie (base category) at p<0.001 and p<0.05. Interestingly also, we 
see that respondents with access to only weak ties are more likely to be in higher integration 
groups than in low integration groups when we compare them to members with only access to 
weak ties. These findings are interesting, as the literature has been in argument as to how ethnic 
ties impact integration. Theories such as ethnic entrapment have argued that keeping inside the 
ethnic community may be detrimental to integration (see Chapter 1). While others have argued 
the opposite, even suggesting that ethnic ties can help contribute to keeping afloat an ethnic 
economy. By taking another step further, which is to separate types of ethnic ties, we saw better 
how specific types impact integration outcomes.  
 
In this model, we also see that previously significant variables remain significant. Age remains 
significant in predicting membership in Group 4 over Group 2, widowed members are still more 
likely to be in Group 3 than Group 4 than single or never married members, entertainers are 
more likely to be in Group 3 and long-term residents in Group 2 than Group 4 when compared to 
permanent residents. Education, work experience and length of stay remain significant in 
predicting membership to higher integration groups than low integration groups.  
 
Model 4 includes in the regression equation variables relating to transnational practices. We 
included remittance practices, keeping savings in the home country, and travel to home country. 
The remittance variable has three levels: not sending remittance, sending remittances but 
irregularly, and sending remittances regularly. The savings variable also has three levels: not 
keeping any saving in the home country, having savings in both host and home countries and 
having savings only in the home country. Finally, travel to home country has five levels: does not 
travel to the home country, travels but irregularly, travels every two years, travels every year and 
travels every six months. We see that responses are mixed though in general engaging in any 
transnational practices can predict membership in better integration groups such as Group 2, 3 
or 4 when compared to Group 1, but that engagement in transnational practices can predict 
membership in lower integration groups Group 2 and 3 when compared to Group 4. The results 
are pronounced for sending remittances. Members who send remittances irregularly are about 4 
times as likely to be in Group 3 than Group 4 than those who do not send remittances at all (base 
category). But this becomes a protective variable when we look at membership in Group 4 over 
Group 2. As expected, a member sending remittances are more likely to be in economically 
active groups such as Groups 3 and 4 than economically inactive groups such as Groups 1 and 
2. We see however the greatest impact in terms of visits to home country. Members who visit 
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with high frequencies are more likely to be in Groups 1 and 2 than in Group 4.  
 
Finally, we regress in Model 5 intention to permanently stay in Japan. We see that interestingly, 
having an intention to stay permanently is a protective factor meaning that members who 
expressed intention to stay permanently in Japan are more likely to be in groups considered high 
integration outcome groups than in groups considered low integration outcome groups than 
those who expressed no intent to stay (base category). Variables such as current visa, length of 
stay, reasons for migrating, work experience from home country, ethnic social ties and 
remittance sending practices remain significant.  
 
In the next section based on the findings from the multinomial logistic regression done in this 
section, I will describe the four patterns of integration and stipulate how such patterns emerge 
given the characteristics of the Filipino residents in Japan.  
 
 
C. Patterns of integration 
Knowing how various characteristics determine group or pattern membership, in this section we 
summarize and describe each pattern of integration. I discuss four groups and given their 
characteristics label them. Because we have discussed integration as a process and as such we 
see groupings as temporary, as outcomes may change improve or disintegrate in the future. 
Therefore, we call these groups as patterns and are subject to changes. We call them patterns 
because they describe specific paths to integration. Groups 1 and 3 fall in the lower integration 
outcome groups and as such are labelled as follows: Group 1 as Non-integrated and Group 3 as 
Parallel. While Groups 2 and 4 are considered higher-integration groups and are labelled as 
follows: Group 2 as Economically inactive and Group 4 as Straight-line. Let us look at each of 
them in turn. 
 
Non-integrated 
Members falling in this pattern or group are characterized by low integration scores overall. 
Members of this group are economically inactive, have low self-rated language proficiency and 
do not have high interaction levels with the host society in personal, organizational and civic 
terms. Also, members of this group do not generally feel welcomed, unable to succeed and 
content in their lives in Japan. We call this group non-integrated as their scores in the four 
dimensions that have been measured are low.  
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Members of this group tend to be females who came as entertainers, are aged 35 years old and 
below, and have stayed on average less than 10 years in Japan. The most salient distinction 
between the Non-integrated pattern is that members of this group in general have at most high 
school level education. However, most of the members in this groups have work experience from 
the home country. Majority of the respondents in this group are stay-at-home household 
members who have children that are mostly in preschool and this deters them from being active 
in their community. We have previously discussed how being active in the community can help 
improve language proficiency and perceptions of belongingness as it increases contact and 
communication with the local society.  
 
Further we see that this group is characterized by high access to only strong ethnic ties. As was 
earlier discussed, strong ethnic ties may have both positive and negative impacts. While strong 
ethnic ties can act as source of emotional and psychological support, we see that in this case it 
can be detrimental to better integration outcomes. Members of this group live with their relatives 
and this informs us the possibility of being able to access most needs from their ethnic social ties. 
What is being seen here is that in the case of Filipino residents, high reliance on ethnic ties 
coupled with low interactions with the host society can result to non-integration.  
 
Further we see that members of this group travel to the home country quite frequently but 
sending remittances is not as common. We previously established that in the absence of the 
we see from the data that remittances provide drive to be economically active. Not sending 
remittances then and then being able to access most needs from their ethnic social ties, it 
becomes intuitive why this pattern is described by economic inactivity.  
 
 
Economically inactive 
This pattern is characterized by high levels of integration outcomes for cultural, interactive and 
identificational dimensions but we see that members of this group are economically inactive. We 
see in fact that members of this group have better integration outcomes in terms of the last three 
dimensions when compared to that of the overall integrated group.  
 
We see that members with this pattern of integration are long-term residents that are mostly 
females, married or widowed. Members from this group have arrived to Japan as dependents 
and understandably most of them explained that their reason for moving to Japan is to be with 
relatives. Further, we see that members from having this pattern of integration tend to be older 
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who have stayed longer in Japan and have spent on average half of their lives in Japan. Knowing 
this, we can understand why members of this group are inactive economically. Many of the 
respondents in this pattern, like the previous category, are with children and are full-time 
housekeepers. However, the distinction between the first pattern and this pattern is that majority 
have high educational attainment.  
 
On the other hand, we see that this pattern is characterized by high levels of interaction at the 
individual, organizational and civic levels, acknowledging that being active in organizations and 
local government events contributes to making them feel like they are part of a community, as 
well as by providing them information to access better opportunities.  
 
In terms of having ethnic social ties, compared to the Non-integrated pattern we see that 
members of this pattern tend to have access to a combination of strong and weak ties that 
provide them on the one hand, emotional and psychological support and on the other hand, 
economic and social support. The previously discussed pattern is described as more 
inward-looking while this pattern seems to be more established and rooted in their position in 
Japan. This is also reflected in their high belongingness scores.  
 
In terms of transnational practices, we see that this pattern tends to be not involved as much in 
transnational activities. While they do in some cases, their engagement is irregular at best. What 
this implies is that, at least in this group, less engagement with the home country can predict 
better integration outcomes, except for being economically and structurally active.  
 
 
Parallel 
This pattern is characterized by high structural integration scores coupled with average cultural, 
interactive and identificational scores. What this means is that while economically active, 
members of this pattern have relatively average language proficiency, relatively average 
engagement with the host society in personal, organizational and civic terms, and have relatively 
average perceptions of belongingness in terms of feeling being welcomed, being able to succeed 
and contentment in life in Japan. They make up majority of the respondents at about more than 
50 percent. 
 
We see that members of this pattern, as compared to the previously discussed patterns tend to 
be younger, in more temporary residency status such as various designated activities including 
entertainers and trainees. Further, we see that many of the members of this pattern have stayed 
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in Japan for quite a shorter time than other groups. Majority of the members of this pattern have 
stayed in Japan for less than three years and majority have spent about one-fifths of their lives in 
Japan. Also, members of this group are more economically driven than other groups if we look at 
the reasons for their migration.  
 
Interestingly we see that the respondents in this pattern have access to a combination of strong 
and weak ties and in cases where they access only one tie, they only access strong ties. This 
ties with the other characteristics of this group, in that they are younger, economically active and 
are economically drive. Weak ties, as compared to strong ties, are associated with economic 
opportunities.  
 
We see the result of their economic activity and economic-oriented migration in their 
transnational practices. Members of this group tend to be more transnationally active than other 
groups, as they remit more regularly, keep savings only in the home country and travels to the 
home country with more regularity and higher frequencies. We also see that in terms of purpose 
of remittance, respondents in this pattern send money for the daily expenses of their families 
back in the home country suggesting that they, while in Japan, remain to be the main 
breadwinners in their families since their families still consider their remittances as the main 
source of income of the household. This pattern is labelled Parallel because of this, since we see 
that their integration outcomes are generally good  they can speak the language and interacts 
with the host society in one way or another, but they continuously engage with the home country, 
therefore they experience a parallel integration. 
 
Finally, we also see that respondents in this group, compared to the other groups do not have 
any intention to stay permanently in Japan and intends to stay for about three to five years, 
clearly noting that their stay in Japan is temporary. This is highly connected to their economic 
reasons for migration which is reflected in their transnational practices. In ways more than one, 
members of this group reflect traditional labor migration assumptions, that people migrate 
because of economic reasons but stay only in the host society temporary, or they intend to, until 
they have reached their economic goals.  
 
 
Straight-line 
Members of this pattern make up about 44 percent of the respondents. Compared to other 
groups, this pattern shows above average scores in all four dimensions, in that they are 
economically active, has above average language perception, has high levels of interaction with 
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the host society at all levels, and has high levels of contentment, perceptions of being welcomed 
and being able to succeed. Compared to the second pattern, labeled as Economically inactive, 
they have relatively lower integration scores in terms of the last three dimensions but they have 
relatively high scores overall, suggesting a well-rounded integration performance. Based on their 
performance, this group was labelled Straight-line as they reflect classical straight-line 
assimilation patterns.  
 
Interestingly there are more males in this group than in any other groups. Compared to the 
members of the first and second pattern who tend to be older, and members of the third pattern 
who tend to be younger, members of this group tend to be middle-aged, mostly in working-age 
groups. We also see that respondents who follow this pattern of integration have lived in Japan 
for more than five years but less than ten years and have spent almost half of their lives in Japan. 
We also see that contrary to the members of the first and second pattern and similar to members 
in the third pattern, members in this pattern tend to have migrated for more economically-driven 
reasons and they tend to go through the designated activities residency route meaning they 
entered Japan through categories considered as more economically-driven such as entertainers 
and trainees.  
 
We see that like members following the third pattern of integration, members in this group tend to 
have combination of ethnic social ties, and in cases when they do access only one type, they 
access only weak ties. As mentioned, weak ties are associated with better economic 
opportunities, as compared to strong ties which can provide emotional and psychological 
support.  
 
practices. It has been said that members of the third pattern engage highly in transnational 
practices in terms of regularity and in frequency. While in this group, we see that members do 
engage in transnational practice but in limited frequencies. Members of this group tend to send 
remittances irregularly for items considered to be more investment-related reasons such as for 
education of younger household members and not for daily consumption which is the main 
reason why members of the third group send remittances. Further, we see that most importantly, 
individuals in this group keep savings in both Japan and the Philippines suggesting that 
members of this group invests in their lives in both home and host country. They also very rarely 
travel to home country. Irregular remittance frequencies and rare travel to home countries 
suggest that, following earlier discussions about the culture of migration in the Philippines and 
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and live their lives more in Japan than in the Philippines. However, we see that respondents in 
this group do not intend to permanently live in Japan but intend to stay for more than ten years 
more.  
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Chapter conclusion 
In this chapter, I constructed composite indicators for the four dimensions of integration we have 
discussed in previous chapters. Using these composite indicators, I was able to understand four 
underlying patterns of integration that we have previously argued arise specifically because of 
the particular contextual and individual factors present in the case of the Filipino residents in 
Nagoya City.  
 
After clustering underlying groups, I looked at what could possibly predict group membership and 
I found out that certain variables such as age, length of stay, sending money to the home country, 
frequent visits to the home country and over reliance on close-knit ethnic ties may impact 
membership. Understanding this, I was able to, using multinomial logistic regression understand 
better the four underlying patterns which include non-integrated, economically immobile, parallel 
and straight-line patterns.  
 
What the results however do not show however is whether the patterns are changeable. I would 
argue that a foreign resident initially classified in one pattern may change his or her pattern 
membership if his or her outcomes change. What this means is that patterns are fluid and are 
dependent on many factors, both structural and agential. There are two things that I argue have 
been demonstrated in this chapter: first, that it is possible to empirically understand patterns and 
processes of integration and that by doing so it presents a huge potential for policymaking. What 
it shows is how we can prioritize targets for interventions if there would be interventions. And 
second, as an empirical exercise, what this showed is the applicability of the methodology into 
specific contexts. I argue that if the context and factors were different, there would be other such 
patterns that can arise.  
 
In the next chapter, I will present my conclusions. First, I will provide a brief summation of what 
this research project was about, of what it aimed to do and what it achieved. Next, I will provide 
certain policy implications by focusing on key issues that arose and try to provide 
recommendations and suggest further discussion on how different stakeholders can help 
facilitate better integration of foreign residents.  
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Chapter 9: Conclusion 
 
In this research I aimed to address the question: how integrated are Filipino residents in Nagoya 
City to the Japanese society? To be able to answer this question, I broke this question into more 
specific questions: How do we measure integration as both an outcome and a process that takes 
account of the interplay between individual and contextual factors? What are the foreign 
finally, what patterns of integration arise and how do the structural and individual factors impact 
pattern membership? 
 
To be able to answer the first question, I reviewed the literature in Chapter 1 and provided a 
definition that will be employed in this project. First, I located where integration is in the literature 
of migration and examined gaps in the literature. While previously, migration has looked at 
concepts such as assimilation and multiculturalism and variations of those concepts, the 
changing nature of migration has called into question the applicability of these concepts in the 
present times. The inapplicability of these concepts has led many migration theorists to rethink 
what they know of the integration process. The shift from assimilation to multiculturalism has also 
shifted the way the integration of migrants is understood for one, from economic-focused 
outcomes to more human-centered outcomes and processes. What the literature on integration 
agree on is that integration is a both an outcome and a process that involves both the host 
society and migrants. In this definition, it is assumed that the very process of migration is 
conducted by individuals who wanted to better their outcomes (Esser 2004) and that for 
individual migrants, integration is seen as an investment. As an outcome, integration is 
multi-dimensional, seen in terms of structural, cultural, interactive and identificational dimensions. 
Outcomes in these dimensions provide information on the specific patterns of integration that 
may arise. 
 
I employed a mixed-methods approach. The literature of mixed-methods approach 
acknowledges four broad rationales why researchers undertake this approach that combines 
quantitative and qualitative methodologies: to improve the accuracy of their data, to produce a 
more complete picture by combining information from complementary kinds of data or sources, 
to compensate specific strengths and weaknesses associated with either quantitative or 
qualitative methods, and to develop the analysis and build upon initial findings.  
 
This mixed-method study involved three stages. The first stage is identified as the qualitative 
stage. The qualitative stage provided the baseline information needed in preparing the survey 
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questionnaire. I conducted extensive archival research; I also interviewed representatives from 
local government multicultural offices, representatives from migrant organizations and Filipino 
residents who are active in their communities. I also attended and participated in some of the 
events held by migrant organizations and by the local government for foreign residents. The 
second and third stages, which are identified as the quantitative stages involved preparation, 
pre-test and implementation of survey. The survey was composed of eight sections: 
demographic, pre-migration and settling-experience, employment and labor, housing and health, 
language proficiency, civic participation, transnational practices and ethnic ties, and intentions 
for the future. A total of 459 Filipino residents responded completely to the survey. I have 
provided more details on the methodology in Chapter 2.  
 
I argued that contextual factors and individual factors impact the outcomes and the patterns or 
processes of integration of Filipino residents. Hence in Chapters 3, 4 and 5 I endeavored to 
illustrate and describe the context whereby the Filipino residents integrate. At the heart of this is 
the argument that contexts are frames where individuals exercise their agencies. Knowing how 
Japan as the host society receives migrants and how Philippines as the migrant-sending country 
constitute the frames whereby Filipino residents live their day-to-day lives provide for a richer, 
more holistic understanding of integration. I argue that the contextual factors, along with the 
individual factors of the migrants have big roles to play in determining the outcome and process 
of integration. This rather historical approach has been important in understanding why certain 
groups of foreign residents are associated with certain sectors in the host society, why certain 
groups of foreign residents are ascribed certain images. These images, I argue impact the way 
they are being perceived, affecting in turn the stance the host society takes towards them.  
 
I began this dive into the contextual factors with an exploration as to how Japan has approached 
immigration. Japan has often been seen as new  to the immigration of foreign people. However, 
people have moved in and out of Japan even before the economic boom in the 1980s. The 
foreign population is generally categorized into two: old comers and new comers. Old comers 
pertain to entrants before the industrialization and economic booms of the 1980s. Newcomers 
began coming in the 1980s, as the Japanese government started accepting foreign workers. 
Initially, the government has seen the entrants as temporary guest workers, but as has been 
shown in Chapter 3, many foreigners stayed longer than expected, which led to an increase in 
the foreign resident population from the 1980s up to the present.  
 
However, given Japan s perception of the temporariness of its foreign residents, the concerns 
had mostly been centered on the inflows and outflows of people and not so much on the 
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corresponding issues related to settlement, rootedness, householding and livability. What this 
led to is the passing off the responsibility to local governments whose jurisdiction and legal 
powers may not be enough to address the livability issues of foreign residents.  
 
We have traced in Chapter 3 the evolution of policies relating to assimilation, multiculturalism 
and integration.  And that regardless of the increase in the country s foreign population, Japan 
has never had an immigrant policy. What we see is that in the absence of policies aimed to 
address livability issues of foreign residents at the national government, local governments are 
trying to fill in this role to facilitate a more harmonious co-existence between foreign and local 
residents. However, to create a lasting harmonious co-existence, simply delivering services may 
not be enough. We see from the development of the approaches to foreign-related issues that 
immigration is something that if can be avoided should be avoided. Issues therefore ran much 
deeper than simply providing services. As the initial applause for tabunka kyousei begins to die 
down, speculations as to how lasting such an arrangement could be start sprouting. While some 
local governments want a more progressive integration policy its limitations prove that at the end 
of the day what is needed is an integration policy from the central government. 
 
On the other hand, we see that a conflation of factors has contributed to the particular migration 
of Filipinos to Japan. I argued in Chapter 4 that the compounding and meeting of the demand 
and supply sides of migration have allowed the stocks of Filipino residents in Japan to increase. 
On the one hand, on the supply side, 
about by the labor export policy of the 1970s have seen massive migration of Filipinos to 
countries such as the USA, Japan and to the countries in the Middle East. A big bulk of Filipinos 
aspired to migrate and became available and willing to take up occupations that other Japanese 
people would not. While on the other hand, on the demand side, the economic boom in the 
1980s have opened up doors for the Filipino labor export supply and the succeeding concerns 
with age and depopulation have continued to create a market for Filipino labor. The labor and 
reproductive demands of Japan in the 1980s saw a supply of Filipino migrants that are mostly 
unskilled and females. However, I note that the relationship is never equal and that the 
occupations allowed to Filipinos is a reflection of the different needs of the demand side. 
Coupled with restrictions and ambivalence of the national government to accept and recognize 
the many foreign bodies coming into the country, this created a very particular context to 
integrate into for Filipinos who stayed and became residents.  
 
This we see in the microcosm of Nagoya City as have been discussed in Chapter 5. As has been 
outlined previously the most number of Filipinos in Japan can be found in Nagoya City. 
 229 
 
According to Penninx (2005), urban cities are where the friction and tension between native-born 
and foreign residents are mostly felt because it is urban areas that become the entry point for 
many foreigners. Nagoya City, one of the most important port cities in Japan, with its increasing 
foreign resident population, as well as the host to majority of the Filipino residents in Japan, is in 
the middle of this friction and tension. As with many other cities and prefectures in Japan there is 
no overarching integration plan. This is most of all because there is no such integration plan at 
the national level.  
 
The city implements policies on integration based on three policy directions which coincide with 
the dimensions of integration we have previously introduced. The goal of the City to structurally 
integrate the foreign residents can be seen in one of its policy directions which is livelihood 
n thrust is providing 
support for finding information on employment, housing, the education system, the improvement 
of the working conditions of foreign residents and information on health care. Summing it up what 
we see is a very comprehensive list of programs that facilitate structural integration that are 
available not just to native-born residents but to foreign residents as well. What this implies are 
two things: first, that having such a comprehensive and developed approach to structural 
approach can positively impact the structural integration outcomes of the foreign residents, and 
in the case of this study, of the Filipino residents. Second, what this implies is that the efficiency 
and comprehensiveness that we see is because of the fact that these services are already in 
place since these services are the same services offered to native-born residents and that 
delivery is simply extended to the foreign residents. Except for making some counseling services 
available in various other foreign languages and the medical interpretation services, most of 
these services are nothing new. I argue that the efficiency and comprehensiveness stem from 
two things: first, rationally, foreign residents need to be structurally integrated to be able to 
contribute to the society. Second, the provision of services to integration foreign residents 
structurally are in line with the MIAC s platform on tabunka kyousei, that is, as a tool to revitalize 
local municipalities. 
 
On the other hand, the City also aims to integrate foreign residents culturally and interactively as 
can be seen from its policy direction of providing communication support. The plan highlights the 
importance of making information multilingual and providing Japanese language support. The 
foci of the programs implemented to facilitate cultural and interactive integration dimensions are 
twofold: first, to promote communication by language support; and second, to facilitate 
interaction by providing venues and opportunities for interactions between foreign and 
native-born residents. What we see here is that regardless of the strong indication to provide 
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communication support, we see that the programs are not enough. On the other hand, the 
interaction that we see is mostly unequal. 
 
Finally, identification integration is being facilitated by the policy directions pertaining to 
promoting and creating a multicultural communal society. Participation in the planning of policies 
and programs is key in creating perceptions of belongingness which is what identificational 
integration stresses. It puts focus on representation and how representation is important in 
creating an identity as a member of a community. There are three trends in how the City 
government tries to facilitate this: first through internationalization seminars and holding of 
multicultural events such as festivals; second, through inviting foreign residents to participate in 
events that will give them voice in relation to planning and crafting policies and programs and; 
third, tapping foreign resident associations in disseminating information and in holding events. 
Through these programs we see a step-by-step method of facilitating identificational integration. 
Programs aimed at promoting multiculturalism and awareness of having different cultural groups 
existing in the City is the first step. In here, native-born residents and foreign residents are made 
to acknowledge each other s presence in the City. Through festival and internationalization 
seminars, residents, both foreign and native-born, are made to acknowledge that their cultures 
are different and that respect is necessary to be able to create a multicultural communal society. 
This is the very basic approach to multiculturalism. But this runs the risk of essentializing a 
culture into simply a sum of its festival, food or fashion, or what we call 3Fs multiculturalism. The 
second and third steps show us a more inclusive approach, an approach that is supposed to go 
beyond the 3Fs. By providing venues where foreign residents can express their opinions and 
concerns and by involving foreign resident organizations, the City somehow aims to go beyond 
the 3Fs and address actual issues that foreign residents are experiencing. However, we see two 
issues come up: first, the relationship is unequal and second, the migrant organizations 
themselves are somehow divided. 
 
Understanding now the contexts whereby Filipino residents integrate, I proceeded to conduct a 
survey to understand the integration outcomes of Filipino residents. Following the assumptions 
of the framework I employ in this research that migrants migrate to improve their outcomes, with 
improvements being defined against the shared meanings of success in the host society, I 
anchored outcome measures on policy directions and issuances. In Chapter 7 I provided findings 
on the demographic characteristics of the respondents. As was previously discussed, I 
presented the findings from both qualitative and quantitative data collection jointly side by side. 
All statistical data that has been presented came from the quantitative element of the project 
while anecdotes came from the qualitative aspect of the design. This I did to sort of evaluate the 
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results of both methods and provide explanations and nuances as to how possibly such data 
from the qualitative and quantitative aspects arose. Further, I did this to show inconsistencies 
within the two types of data that I gathered. By jointly displaying the data side by side I showed 
that what may be depicted in numbers and that suggest a particular interpretation can be 
understood differently when we look at the anecdotes of the foreign residents themselves. And in 
general, the characteristics of the respondents reflect what has been discussed in Chapter 4 on 
the Filipino migration to Japan. Majority of the respondents are permanent residents who mostly 
came to Japan as entertainers or trainees. Many of them came during the late 1990s and have 
been living in Japan for almost 20 years.  
 
Knowing these I proceeded to analyze the integration outcomes of the Filipino residents in 
Chapter 7. As has been discussed, many of the arguments in Chapter 5 found their way in 
Chapter 8 as the foreign residents  outcomes, which I argue are reflective of the approach of the 
local government. This was further compounded by the context by which Filipinos came to Japan 
as we have seen in Chapter 4 and as we have previously summarized. As I also mentioned, the 
findings suggest that the Filipino residents are experiencing an uneven integration, uneven in the 
sense that their outcomes vary in terms of the dimensions of integration. Let us look at these 
dimensions in turn.  
 
Structural integration refers to the access to the core institutions of the host society. It would 
seem from the results of the survey that access to the basic social structures was made easier 
by a combination of factors. On the one hand, the policies and programs of the City facilitate a 
situation where foreign resident engagement in such social structures is generally accepted. The 
thrust towards the participation of foreign residents in the labor market complements the goal of 
tabunka kyousei as the tool to revitalize local municipalities in light of depopulation, aging and 
local public finance crises. The migrant population has the potential to bring in income in the form 
of taxes and businesses. Further, service provision for foreign residents, if seen as an extension 
of service provision for local residents, is considered efficient. Structural integration policies 
involve the same services provided to Japanese citizens and are simply extended to foreign 
residents. Of course, there are some instances when new policies and programs are introduced 
translation of notices. But it is in such instances when specific policies are required that we saw 
from the data that foreign residents experienced more difficulties.  
 
What complicates the scenario however is the specific context of the Filipino residents. As we 
saw from the data, majority of the respondents are in low-skilled jobs. Jobs found through 
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personal connections seem to be more concentrated in low-skilled sectors than jobs found 
through job advertisements, local government and migrant organization fairs. Most of the 
respondents who found jobs through personal connections are in jobs that run the risk of 
entrenching such negative images of the Filipino resident as low- -
permanent residents still engage in entertainment work arguing that the job is a lucrative source 
of income since a permanent residency allows them more movement in terms of choosing a mise 
(pub) where pay and working conditions are better. What we see here corresponds to what has 
been called ethnic mobility entrapment which impacts can be much more detrimental in the long 
run because in a way what it does is inhibit the value of any skill they have which somehow puts 
them at a disadvantage when they negotiate the terms of their position and membership in the 
society. 
 
Respondents in low-skilled and in high-skilled jobs both experience immobility. For low-skilled 
respondents, regardless of how long they have been in Japan, it seems that breaking into 
different sectors is difficult. Language and qualifications seem to be the biggest hurdle, 
entrenching them into jobs that are considered 3D and are often short-term. On the other hand, 
for high-skilled respondents, visa and temporary contracts are the biggest issue which hinders 
their mobility. Immobility seems to arise from this interplay between policies and the specific 
context of the Filipino residents in terms of structural integration. This devaluation of their 
qualifications contributes to their immobility.  
 
Cultural integration, on the other hand represents changes in mindset and behavior towards the 
host society. Language is key in changing mindset and behavior and hence integration scholars 
have put emphasis on how language can facilitate integration. What we see here is that in terms 
of cultural integration, many respondents do have some knowledge of the language but they are 
not proficient. There are two conclusions that can be made: first, what is stipulated here is that 
the average to below average levels of proficiency point to the fact that many Filipino residents 
only invest in learning the language up to a certain extent, and that is when certain goals have 
been met which are mostly economic in nature. As mentioned in the previous section, jobs are 
easy to access, many jobs do not require knowing or speaking Japanese language at all, some 
jobs require only a basic knowledge of Japanese. What this leads to is disincentivizing learning 
the language especially for foreign residents who do not think of staying permanently in the 
country. And second, the increase in the number of Filipino coming to Japan suggests the 
possibility of the Filipino community becoming thicker and tighter as mentioned in Chapter 7 in 
which we see that many of the Filipinos tend to live together. As mentioned in the opening of this 
section, the extent to which cultural integration can happen is going to be wider and deeper if the 
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minority culture is more dispersed. What is implied therefore is language learning is 
disincentivized not just because jobs are available for people who know nothing of the language, 
but that emotional, psychological and social support can also be accessed through the ethnic 
community further disincentivizing the need to go out of the community to interact with 
native-born Japanese.  
 
Interactive integration refers to the inclusion or acceptance of foreign residents into the primary 
relations and various social networks in the society. These relations include friendships, 
partnerships and memberships in different organizations. From the data, we see that 
participation overall is low and this is not without surprise; many programs can be categorized as 
3Fs multiculturalism and hark back to kokusaika. If following earlier described importance of 
participation in local government-led events as a way to interact with other people of both 
Japanese and other ethnicities and as a way to represent themselves, we see that services and 
events which call for participation among foreign residents are limited as we have discussed in 
Chapter 5. The City government, along with neighborhood associations, has supported parades 
and festivals showcasing the various cultures of the foreign residents such as the Philippine 
Festival and the Brazilian Day. While this is not entirely bad, researchers warn us of the peril of 
the so-called 3Fs multiculturalism which 
thereby failing to recognize the subjectivity of the migrant. While it seems that while programs 
are acceptable, the approach is not appropriate. Following the rhetoric at the national level, 
foreign residents are treated more as a problem rather than as a possible asset. By approaching 
foreign residents as problems needing to be solved, there is a tendency to lump all foreign 
residents into one outsider group, disregarding their differences and the issues particular to their 
historical relations with Japan. In the literature, foreign resident non-engagement with the host 
society has been a chicken and egg kind of question. Whether it is caused by foreign residents 
not wanting to engage or whether it is the lack of government responses, the literature could not 
really seem to say definitively. What we see in this case however is a largely inactive group of 
foreign residents whose inactivity is being addressed by inappropriate approaches. 
 
In short, interactions measured in terms of personal relationships are high while the proportion of 
respondents engaging in organizations and with the local government are low. On the one hand, 
at the individual level the respondents seem to interact and establish personal ties with other 
Japanese individuals, and they seem to acknowledge the importance of being involved in 
meso-level organizations, though reasons for participating are more for personal benefits than 
for pushing for acceptance in their locality. At the organizational level on the other hand, many 
still do not see the need to push for representation. And further, we see a local government 
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whose approach on diversity has the tendency to consume other cultures where the center of 
this multicultural exchange is the host society and migrant subjectivities ignored.  
 
Finally, we looked at identificational integration. Central to the concept of identificational 
integration is belongingness. It refers to identification with a certain social structure, whether it be 
with the host society, or the ethnic community or other ethnic communities. In terms of immigrant 
integration however, the focus is on the perception of belongingness or the degree to which the 
migrant identifies with the dominant culture. Overall, interestingly, based on the data, 
identificational integration in terms of contentment and fit are moderate while involvement is 
moderate to high. It would seem that while involvement or the perception of being able to 
succeed is an inward assessment of the 
welcomed are assessed more on in terms of their position as a Filipino in Japan. The relatively 
lower levels of perception of fit and contentment are possibly affected by the conflation of the 
approach of the local government which values language competency and high-skilled 
participants in the labor market (see Chapter 5), as well as the stereotype of the Filipino in Japan 
resulting from their taking up positions in the society that can benefit them economically, which is 
the main purpose of their migration activity but has severely impacted their mobility. There are 
two things that we can glean from this. One the one hand, the policies and preferences of the 
government, while aiming to reward those with high-skills, also have a tendency to limit their 
mobility and impact their positions in the host society by having no encompassing integration 
strategy. On the other hand, it remains indifferent to the concerns of those in low-skilled jobs and 
this indifference actually punishes them by devaluing any skills they bring with them and any 
skills they eventually develop as they become involved in the labor market. This leads them to 
continuously assume positions that maybe oppositional to their culture and maybe detrimental to 
their position in Japan in order to continuously earn money to be able to stay in the host country 
and to be able to continue sending remittances to the home country. What we saw is that a 
number of factors impact belongingness: one, the individual characteristics of the migrants play 
an important role in determining their levels of fit, involvement and contentment. It would seem 
that better educated and higher-skilled individuals feel the frustration of economic immobility and 
this translates to low levels of contentment and fit. Second, the division among the migrant 
groups who somehow become representatives of Filipino residents in the local government and 
in the Japanese society can also impact discontent and fit, as not properly addressing 
stereotypes and addressing stereotypes in different ways can work against them, entrenching 
the very stereotype they try to erase. And finally, the local government who rewards both 
high-skilled individuals and low-skilled individuals with better economic resources but does not 
give them economic mobility and the chance to negotiate better their membership in the host 
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society because of a lack of a comprehensive integration strategy also impact identificational 
integration in certain ways. 
 
What the discussions on the Filipino residents  integration outcomes tell us is that there is no 
simple measure of saying a migrant is integrated or not. What we saw is a conflation of factors 
that influence the way they integrated in terms of different dimensions. Further, as there is no 
one integration outcome, the findings also showed that there is no one path to integration. The 
respondents based on their outcomes fall into four distinct patterns of integration that I labelled 
as straight-line, parallel, economically inactive and non-integrated. The respondents who were 
categorized as having a straight-line integration pattern show high outcomes in all four 
dimensions of integration. The parallel integration group is characterized by high structural 
integration scores coupled with average cultural, interactive and identificational scores. The 
economically inactive pattern is characterized by high levels of integration outcomes for cultural, 
interactive and identificational dimensions but we see that members of this group are 
economically inactive. And finally, members falling in the non-integrated pattern are 
characterized by low integration scores overall. Members of this group are economically inactive, 
have low self-rated language proficiency and do not have high interaction levels with the host 
society in personal, organizational and civic terms. 
 
Finally, understanding the contextual and individual factors and the integration outcomes that 
arose as a result of these factors become I have come to a conclusion that the patterns of 
integration are diverse and are affected by both individual and contextual factors. Contextual 
factors can impact the outcomes as we have seen and individual factors such as length of stay, 
reasons for migrating, work experience from home country, ethnic social ties and remittance 
sending practices can impact how the foreign residents integrate.  
 
In general, I conclude that the Filipino residents are unevenly integrated. Specifically, their 
outcomes, meaning their inclusion or exclusion into social subsystems vary, as well as the 
process of integration, or the patterns of integration that they follow. These were highly affected 
which sees multicultural co-existence as a way to revitalize local municipalities, municipalities 
which face problems of aging, depopulation and public finance. Also, the lack of an overall 
integration plan at the national level, the ad hoc approach of the local government which 
prioritizes structural integration and confuses non-conflict with harmonious co-existence that 
does not promote substantial engagement between the native-born and the foreign-born 
residents. As well as the entrapment of many Filipino residents into unskilled jobs and into 
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certain stereotypes, stereotypes that cannot be removed without engaging the host society. On 
the other hand, individual factors such as the Filipino residents
mostly economic, their intents for the future which does not usually involve a permanent life in 
Japan, their high engagement with their ethnic community which can sometimes disincentivize 
engaging with the host society since they get most of what they need from their ethnic 
community and their engagement with their  home country through transnational practices have 
also contributed to creating an integration that can be characterized as being uneven.  
 
Understanding all these, I argue that there are three intertwined issues that need to be 
underscored. First is language. The lack of a comprehensive immigrant policy in Japan leads to 
a lack of necessity of having a mandatory education of the Japanese language. What has been 
implied from the study is that permanently settling in Japan has not been in the minds of the 
foreign residents before they decided to move to Japan. Most of them travelling on entertainer 
visas when they first arrived in Japan have intended to stay for a short time until their economic 
goals had been achieved. This is unlike the experiences in many Filipino immigrants to countries 
such as Canada and the United States where permanent settlement is most often the goal upon 
moving. Not knowing whether they will end up in Japan for a long time or not, there really was no 
requirement to learn the language. What we have seen from the data is a group of foreign 
residents who, on average, have stayed for a substantial length of time in Japan without really 
being able to say that they are proficient in the language.  
 
This uncertainty about their stay in Japan was also reflective in their responses regarding 
whether they intend to stay permanently or not. While many do have permanent resident visas, 
we saw that still most of them do not look to Japan as a place where they want to settle. Who can 
actually say whether they are going to settle forever or not? They might end up in Japan 
permanently in the future, but what this lack of intention brings us to is the lack of creating an 
incentive to learn the language more proficiently. We saw from the data that those who 
is to stay, then he or she will most likely invest in learning the language. This leads us to the 
second issue which is skills.  
 
According to Mr. Manuel Imson of the International Labor Organization, who was among those 
who contributed to the institutionalization of the Philippine labor export policy said in a lecture 
that the best protection a migrant can have is skills. In Japan where high skills are valued, it is 
definitely applicable. Many entertainers who travelled in the 1980s to the 1990s did undergo 
trainings as cultural dancers and singers but their trainings did not include language courses. If 
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one was to think about it, it was expected given that their migration was considered to be 
temporary. Fast forward to the time many of them decided to get married to Japanese men and 
live in Japan. The lack of language skills among many previous entertainers and other unskilled 
workers had been raised in the literature and has been argued to have contributed to their 
entrapment. Having permanent resident visas, many still work in the entertainment industry as it 
is still highly lucrative, especially since a permanent resident visa affords them mobility in terms 
of moving from one omise to the next. Not being able to develop skills beyond skills they have 
developed working in the entertainment industry, they find it hard to change jobs. Again, skills 
nd in the case of not having skills, what then is their protection?  
 
Third, being unskilled and lacking language capabilities can also discourage one from 
participating more in the community. We see in the responses of the respondents that their 
interaction with their host society is low and that in general many of them do not feel welcomed. 
In twos surveys conducted by the Nagoya City Government in last five years, they found out that 
many foreign residents felt that their native-born neighbors would not want to talk to them, most 
likely because of the language difference. In the same results, the City also found out that this is 
the same perception that native-born residents have. What we can glean from this is that the 
hesitation to interact comes from both the foreign and the native-born residents and that perhaps 
the reason behind their lack of interaction is the language barrier. Further, many programs that 
can be classified as possible venues where these interactions can happen are limited.  
 
From the data presented throughout this research project we can look at different stakeholders 
and assess their roles in terms of the entire integration experience. At the last part of this chapter, 
we also offer key policy areas where intervention may be beneficial for foreign resident 
integration.  
 
Stakeholders and target groups 
Foreign residents 
Essentially the integration of the foreign residents, based on the findings of this research begins 
on language. Foreign residents should be encouraged to learn the language to have access to 
better opportunities and to be able to understand better the things that are happening around 
them. Further, there is one strength of the Filipino residents that can be utilized, their proficiency 
in English. The discussion in an earlier chapter has shown that many Filipino residents in Japan 
are slowly changing jobs and with the JET program being not limited to Americans and British 
teachers anymore, there are better opportunities that can be accessed. Further, we also saw 
from previous discussions that many Filipino residents who previously worked as entertainers 
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have undergone trainings as caregivers and as such have shifted to the care industry, an 
industry that is growing larger due to the rapid aging happening in many places in Japan.  
 
Migrant organizations 
We have previously shown that there are a number of Filipino migrant organizations in Nagoya 
City but that there tends to be a divide. This division I argue stems from the scarce resources 
and support from the local government. Many of these organizations still rely on donations and 
voluntary work and hence in some cases responses to problems being faced by many foreign 
residents is inadequate and slow. One big problem that many migrant organizations experience 
is being unable to be registered. Being unsure of where to get their financial resources many 
work on a voluntary basis and as such are unable to gather enough leverage and bargaining 
power which are important in negotiating representation for the foreign residents. 
 
Service delivery agents/facilities 
Currently, a number of service delivery systems and public facilities are being shared by the local 
government with various non-profit organizations. The Nagoya International Center is one such 
instance. As was mentioned the NIC is being run jointly by the local government and by an NPO. 
This partnership is one of the many recent partnerships being done between NPOs and various 
local governments to improve public service delivery under the Designated Manager System. 
This is in light of the public finance crises that is being experienced by a number of local 
municipalities. Such partnerships can provide better and improved service delivery mechanisms. 
 
JFC with focus on the 1.5 Generation  
The literature has talked about how the integration of the first generation can impact the 
integration of the next generations. We have seen that typologies predicting the future integration 
of succeeding generations take into consideration the integration or non-integration of their 
parents. In the case of the Filipinos, this becomes a more serious consideration as many of the 
Japanese-Filipino children still face problems of being recognized by their Japanese parents. 
While being recognized is one problem, it is but the tip of the iceberg. Much of the problems 
-Filipino Children 
working to help JFCs is their lack of roots which could impact their development.  
 
This becomes much more complicated when, upon being recognized, they come to Japan and 
are immediately thrown into a society that they are expected to understand. The so-called 1.5 
Generation, those who have already begun their socialization process in the Philippines and 
were suddenly brought to Japan, face particular integration problems. Because of a variety of 
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reasons, some of them selfish, many Filipino mothers suddenly uproot their kids from this very 
important process of development and bring them into a society that is utterly foreign to them. 
Especially for the 1.5 Generation who is suddenly expected to be able to go to a Japanese 
school even without understanding the language, this goes beyond culture shock.  
 
Therefore, special care and attention has to be given to the JFC and other children born from 
intercultural partnerships. As -Japan Law Conference 
2017: Family Law Issues in Filipino-
2017, the Japan Federation of Bar Associations with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines 
through the Japan-Philippines Law Project has already begun discussions on how to improve 
addressing issues related to interpretation and enforcement of laws and adjudication such as in 
cases related to divorce between Filipino and Japanese nationals and in cases relating to 
recognizing Japanese-Filipino children. With such efforts, paths are being forged that can, while 
this may be far in the future, facilitate better the movement of Japanese Filipino children to Japan. 
In such scenarios then, Japan as the receiving country needs to be better equipped in 
addressing certain issues regarding the children. We see this in how the Nagoya City responded: 
the Nagoya City 2018 multicultural plan is being set to address the issue of the 1.5 Generation as 
they continue to increase in number.  
 
Local governments 
Currently, in the context of Japan, it is still the local government who remains to be the main 
actor when it comes to facilitating integration of foreign residents. Municipalities in different parts 
of Japan have taken to calling foreign residen  suggesting a more welcoming 
stance to foreign residents. In light of what has been discussed regarding local public finance 
crises, aging and depopulation, many municipalities acknowledge the positive impacts 
integrating foreign residents into the society can bring. And at the same time, it is localities and 
municipalities which will experience the most the negative impacts of an uncontrolled influx of 
foreign population. Local governments are at the forefront of this issue. It is local governments 
which become the interface and the guide of many foreign residents in Japan.  
 
However, many criticisms regarding how local governments approach foreign resident 
integration exist. For one, in the case of Nagoya, the City government itself do not call them 
immigrants, following the rhetoric coming from the national level. By not acknowledging foreign 
residents as immigrants, many fail to understand that these foreigners are not temporary stayers 
anymore regardless of whether they actually stay permanently or not. Many of the respondents 
in the data stayed on average for about ten years. And ten years is I think more than enough 
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length of time for the society to feel the impacts of having a foreign population. Another criticism 
to local governments is their blanket and ad-hoc approach to issues surrounding foreign 
residents. Foreign resident groups vary and their needs and their possible contributions also can 
vary.  
 
National government 
At the end of the day it is the support of the national government that can significantly improve 
integration policies and programs. Much has changed since the 1980s and the ICRRA has been 
amended a number of times. The Alien Registration Law has also been somewhat relaxed. With 
the issuance of resident cards or zairyuu kaado, travelling back to the home country and coming 
h services, file taxes and tax returns among 
other things. To say then that there are no improvements is wrong.  
 
However, we have seen that really progressive programs such as the Nakagawa immigration 
plan of 2008 did not come to fruition. While his plan has been criticized as a political strategy to 
immigration plan is something that would utterly change the immigration system in Japan. Much 
has to be done especially in light of the possibility of Japan importing more foreign labor in 
preparation for the Tokyo 2020 Olympics.  
 
 
Key policy recommendations 
Development of language and technical skills 
As we have seen from the results of the study, the biggest issue is the lack of language 
proficiency among the Filipino residents. Learning the language is an investment in itself, and by 
investing in learning the language, one also begins investing in his or her integration process. 
Due to the nature of the jobs and contracts that many Filipinos entered when they first came to 
Japan, language training has not been included in their pre-departure trainings. Language 
training has not been included in the entertainer qualifications and trainings that many would-be 
entertainers then underwent. For those coming to work in jobs considered highly-skilled and for 
those who came as graduate students, they were often provided some months of language 
training by their companies or by their universities, and though this may not be enough, it creates 
a world of difference. Many former entertainers and those who came to do unskilled labor, whose 
Japanese was learned colloquially tend to use Japanese that may not be so useful in more 
formal settings such as job hunting.  
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While some would argue that suggesting having language classes is a given, it is something that 
is often not enforced adequately. It is important to note at this point certain example from other 
immigrant-receiving country. Countries such as Italy and France as well as the French-speaking 
areas in Canada have been enforcing rules on language acquisition. Italy and France enforce 
integration contracts that migrants have to sign. For instance, in Italy, stipulated in the integration 
contracts migrants sign upon disembarkation is earning a certain number of credits to maintain 
their residency. Credits can be earned through attending language and civic culture classes, 
attending vocational and professional training and attending courses on Italian history among 
others. Further funding for such classes are provided and secured through the European 
Integration Fund. Apart from this, Italy has established bilateral agreements with migrant-sending 
countries such as Morocco, Mauritius, Albania and Sri Lanka to provide pre-departure trainings 
that include language trainings as well as civic courses (Caneva 2014). This is similar to the case 
of France where migrants also sign an integration contract. According to (Escafre-Dublet 2014) 
around 60 million Euros go to such language classes and that the budget is dispersed through 
different actors including non-government organizations, and semi-public organizations to 
develop language and civic integration programs. Initiation classes and reception classes both 
children are provided and funded by the Ministry of Education. Apart 
from this, the Office for Integration, Reception and Citizenship also helps migrants to gain 
recognition for qualifications gained abroad. In Canada, language classes receive the largest 
proportion of funding for integration and multiculturalism initiatives and services are available 
without fees and charges for immigrants and refugees for as long as they meet basic eligibility 
requirements (Griffith 2017). 
 
Local governments in Japan currently offers a variety of language classes, some free but most 
are paid. The challenge I think lies more in the encouraging foreign residents to avail of these 
classes. The problem, according to the survey is time and as many foreign residents had to do 
more than one job to be able to afford living in Japan and as such has not enough time to be able 
to attend language classes. Another oft-cited problem is information and as such one important 
intervention would be to go down to the chounaikai level and even to the danchi level to begin 
offering classes. I remember when I was still living in the dormitory, there were classes offered 
there by Japanese volunteers. That is actually very convenient considering that many students 
do not have ample time to get to their ward offices to attend classes especially since many of 
them work in their laboratories from morning to night.  
 
One other possible way to improve language acquisition is through utilization of developments in 
ICTs. The Japanese Government have ben engaging in the development of such applications as 
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VoiceTra, an online interpretation app. While these developments are welcome and provide 
potential, the importance of language acquisition to be able to communicate seamlessly should 
be first highlighted. While interpreters can help, language learning should be viewed as not just a 
mere translation of words, rather language learning carries with it changes in behavior and way 
of thinking and these are things that perhaps an online translation application cannot facilitate. 
While such applications can be useful mostly for tourists and for new foreign residents, the goal 
should be to learn the language to be able to communicate seamlessly, and to be able to 
participate in both personal and civic interactions.  
 
On the other hand, I argue that skills training can benefit so many foreign residents. Though 
there are technical trainee programs that are currently being implemented by the national 
government for those coming from abroad, what I am arguing for is simple skills trainings for 
those that are already here that are important to develop capabilities to move to different 
industries if they want to. Such trainings may include trainings on how to write a professional 
rirekisho or curriculum vitae or a resume. One of my informants told me that when she decided to 
look for a different job she had to write a rirekisho and one of the things that almost hindered her 
from moving forward was her not knowing how to do it. When I reminded her that she told me 
that she had worked before back in the Philippines she said she did not need to write a resume 
then, her parents knew some friends and that was how she had been able to get jobs before.  
 
Further, trainings to develop skills to work in fields such as carework and English teaching do 
exist, but many do not how and where to go to be able to access such trainings. In the literature, 
there were stories of former entertainers who now work as caregivers or careworkers after they 
underwent some trainings. Information on where and how to access such trainings could be 
really helpful especially to those who want to change jobs.  
 
Another skill that can be developed is entrepreneurship. From a personal observation, compared 
to other foreign resident groups, Filipino residents do not engage much in entrepreneurial 
activities. In Tokyo area, Filipino restaurants are few and hard to come by unlike say Indian, 
Nepalese, Thai and Vietnamese restaurants. Skills focusing on developing entrepreneurial 
capacities as well as improving financial literacy may be a good way to improve the economic 
mobility of the Filipino residents.  
 
Increased partnership between local governments and non-profit organizations including migrant 
organizations 
Public private partnerships may be the way to go in light of issues of local public finance and 
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depopulation. The government has already begun this under the Designated Manager System. 
This was as a result of reduced national government subsidies to local governments under the 
Trinity Reform. Though this may mean lesser budgets for different public service delivery 
systems, it may also mean more possible venues where public and private can partner in. As I 
have mentioned the NIC is one such partnership and the local government of Nagoya City can 
benefit from increasing such partnerships with other registered NPOs to facilitate service delivery 
and management of facilities. While it frees up some resources for the government, it also 
widens the population that is involved in addressing various issues, such as the increasing 
foreign resident population.  
 
Through such partnerships, the local government may become better equipped not just with 
resources and facilities but with a better and more human approach. Many local governments 
had been engaging in the so-called frame of new public management where stakeholders and 
constituents are being treated as clients and while it does public service delivery more efficiently, 
it also removes the more human aspect of public service. By bringing in NPOs and other 
voluntary associations, it can create a more grassroots and communal approach to public 
service delivery, involving more people in the process and providing actual individual faces to the 
Japanese so-called host society.  
 
Increased opportunities for interaction 
Connected to the previous point as following what has been discussed in the findings, venues for 
interaction are limited. Though Nagoya City is a dense city and though there are no concrete 
findings showing that there is housing segregation, we can still say that more foreign residents 
still tend to stay within their co-ethnic circle. Again, one reason for this is language. Though the 
findings did show that many foreign residents do form personal relationships with Japanese 
friends and acquaintances, we see that these interactions do not go beyond from the private into 
the public. And it is this public interaction that will actually help negotiate their positions in the 
society.  
 
The local government do implement some programs that serve as venues where native-born and 
foreign residents do interact but these are limited and often revolve around events considered as 
3Fs. Though this is good in promoting the foreign culture, it may be problematic if this is the only 
thing that is being done. Interaction I argue should be in stages. After the introduction of the 
culture should come a more substantial interaction that can help people get to know each other 
better and help either confirm or disprove certain stereotypes. At this point, perhaps because this 
was the first multicultural plan that the City launched, the stage being addressed in terms of 
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increasing interaction is still the first stage.  
I think that making public service delivery a partnership between public and private entities can 
increase these interactions as I have previously mentioned. This coupled with multicultural 
education will be key in improving the way how we see and understand other people, especially 
those who look different from us.  
 
Multicultural education 
Multicultural education I argue should be the cornerstone of any integration plan. Multicultural 
co-existence is more of a mindset and a way of life more than a policy pronouncement. Really 
biases against the foreign other overnight. Hence, we see such increasing conflicts regarding 
diversity in many parts of the world recently.  
 
Multicultural education can be included in school curriculum, with the increasing presence of 
foreign-born and foreign-looking children in public schools in Japan, perhaps slowly introducing 
multicultural co-existence in the curricula can slowly change mindsets and behavioral patterns 
among both native-born and foreign-born children.  
 
This will especially be beneficial for those children who had to suffer to be able to be recognized 
as having Japanese ancestry and hence create avenues where people being left off because of 
their inability to cope with the system can be pulled back in. This has been the problem that 
plagued Germany and Britain where foreign residents, because of the confusion between 
non-conflict and indifference, were left and now constitutes majority of the poorest households.  
 
Japan has been highlighting the economic nature of the movement of people and as such it has 
a lot to gain from properly integrating foreign residents. Multicultural education is the first step in 
facilitating this integration.  
 
 
Ways forward 
There are still ways to go to be able to understand fully the integration extent of foreign residents. 
All throughout this project I pointed out to very striking contradictories that I found between the 
results of the qualitative and the quantitative data. One very important distinction is what 
stakeholders argue that they think Filipino residents think and what regular Filipino residents 
think that they need and are alright with. While many migrant organizations want to demand 
better representation to improve their image, we see from the data that it seems that many 
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Filipino residents, while rec
activities. The question then is what do they really want? This is important to know to provide 
areas where further research can come in that will help enrich the literature and that can provide 
better understanding of how to address such an issue. This issue can benefit from more 
empirical research on the different foreign resident groups in different cities and localities. As 
discussed earlier, such research can help improve policymaking and targeting of program 
recipients.  
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Table 8.6. Regression models 
Variables 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 
RRR P>|z| RRR P>|z| RRR P>|z| RRR P>|z| RRR P>|z| RRR P>|z| 
              
Female 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Male 0.07 0.02 0.20 0.07 0.76 0.34 0.11 0.05 0.20 0.18 0.75 0.33
               
Age 0.95 0.21 1.00 0.99 0.96 0.07 1.00 0.98 0.71 0.05 0.99 0.72 
               
Single/Never 
married 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Married 2.05 0.37 1.59 0.63 1.28 0.48 1.12 0.91 6.94 0.16 1.29 0.50 
Divorced 0.00 1.00 4.43 0.24 2.91 0.14 0.00 1.00 5.02 0.34 6.56 0.02 
Widowed 0.00 1.00 2.01 0.67 2.72 0.22 0.00 0.99 0.00 0.91 5.39 0.07 
Cohabitation/Live-in 0.00 1.00 1.85 0.65 1.77 0.39 0.00 1.00 7.57 0.32 1.32 0.69 
               
Permanent 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Spouse 5.26 0.26 0.00 1.00 4.85 0.21 0.84 0.92 0.00 1.00 6.44 0.17 
Entertainer 1.09 0.94 0.00 0.99 33.37 0.00 0.46 0.62 0.00 0.99 11.88 0.00 
Long-term 2.69 0.11 2.54 0.18 2.01 0.06 1.07 0.94 9.07 0.04 1.26 0.58 
Trainee 0.83 0.88 0.00 0.99 4.78 0.00 0.42 0.57 0.00 0.99 1.47 0.52 
Working 0.00 0.99 0.00 1.00 3.39 0.02 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.37 0.64 
Student 0.00 0.99 0.00 1.00 1.32 0.66 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.40 0.27 
Citizen 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.99 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 
Overstay 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 22.32 0.01 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 9.34 0.06 
               
Length of stay in 
Japan (in years) 
        0.92 0.74 2.26 0.01 0.85 0.10 
               
Proportion of life 
spent in Japan (%) 
        0.97 0.79 0.81 0.03 1.02 0.63 
               
High school         0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Tech Voc         0.88 0.86 1.12 0.93 0.89 0.78 
College         0.24 0.05 3.42 0.19 0.39 0.01 
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To work/look for 
work 
        0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
To train/study         0.00 0.99 0.00 0.99 1.37 0.51 
To marry/be with 
spouse 
        2.92 0.16 3.81 0.23 0.13 0.01 
To be with relatives         2.20 0.37 5.29 0.10 0.41 0.11 
Tour         0.06 1.00 0.10 1.00 0.00 1.00 
               
No work experience         0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
With work 
experience 
        4.55 0.22 0.11 0.01 1.35 0.47 
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Table 8.6. Regression models continuation 
Variables Model 3 Model 4 
 Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 
 RRR P>|z| RRR P>|z| RRR P>|z| RRR P>|z| RRR P>|z| RRR P>|z| 
               
Female 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Male 0.16 0.13 0.22 0.21 0.74 0.33 0.10 0.13 0.01 0.15 0.68 0.28 
               
Age 0.98 0.86 0.72 0.04 0.99 0.77 1.03 0.86 0.40 0.06 1.03 0.51 
               
Single/Never 
married 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Married 1.63 0.66 8.00 0.14 1.33 0.46 3.87 0.49 5399.79 0.14 1.47 0.40 
Divorced 0.00 1.00 6.34 0.28 6.91 0.02 0.00 1.00 942.18 0.30 6.20 0.06 
Widowed 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.90 5.03 0.08 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 5.34 0.14 
Cohabitation/Live-in 0.00 1.00 9.62 0.27 1.34 0.67 0.00 1.00 3.E+07 0.04 0.95 0.95 
               
Permanent 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Spouse 0.49 0.70 0.00 1.00 6.43 0.17 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 6.52 0.25 
Entertainer 0.65 0.78 0.00 0.99 11.61 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.99 13.57 0.00 
Long-term 0.63 0.60 9.51 0.04 1.17 0.71 0.18 0.16 44.35 0.19 1.11 0.84 
Trainee 0.31 0.46 0.00 0.99 1.40 0.59 1.61 0.88 0.00 1.00 1.13 0.87 
Working 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.32 0.69 0.00 1.00 0.05 1.00 1.21 0.81 
Student 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.37 0.24 0.00 1.00 0.01 1.00 0.57 0.64 
Citizen 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 
Overstay 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 8.60 0.07 0.00 1.00 1.27 1.00 3.75 0.33 
               
Length of stay in 
Japan (in years) 
0.97 0.91 2.25 0.01 0.85 0.09 0.87 0.72 8.19 0.02 0.75 0.02 
               
Proportion of life 
spent in Japan (%) 
0.97 0.69 0.80 0.02 1.02 0.62 1.00 0.98 0.64 0.09 1.07 0.13 
               
High school 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Tech Voc 
 
0.92 0.92 1.21 0.88 0.86 0.72 0.30 0.28 0.00 0.06 1.06 0.91 
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College 0.17 0.03 2.94 0.26 0.37 0.00 0.33 0.27 876.56 0.07 0.47 0.05 
               
To work/look for 
work 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
To train/study 0.00 0.99 0.00 1.00 1.37 0.51 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.45 0.23 
To marry/be with 
spouse 
1.48 0.64 2.30 0.51 0.11 0.01 0.59 0.66 0.00 1.00 0.05 0.00 
To be with relatives 3.43 0.20 4.46 0.15 0.38 0.08 1.83 0.74 0.06 0.54 0.57 0.41 
Tour 0.06 1.00 0.09 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.04 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 
               
No work experience 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
With work 
experience 
22.35 0.06 0.12 0.01 1.37 0.45 7.69 0.28 0.00 0.03 2.62 0.07 
               
Only strong ties 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Only weak ties 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.24 0.22 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.17 0.15 
Combination 0.05 0.00 0.28 0.26 0.69 0.45 0.02 0.00 0.28 0.80 0.65 0.50 
               
Has no savings in 
home country 
        0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Has savings in 
home and host 
countries 
        13.88 0.16 287.84 0.27 0.52 0.36 
Has savings only in 
home country 
        4.60 0.40 0.00 0.24 1.28 0.73 
               
Does not send 
remittance 
        0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Sends remittance 
irregularly 
        0.09 0.21 0.00 0.05 4.40 0.05 
Sends remittances 
regularly 
        0.03 0.08 0.00 0.07 1.67 0.49 
               
Does not travel to 
home country 
        0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Irregularly travels         1.11 0.95 19.52 0.46 0.41 0.06 
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Every 2 years         10.29 0.31 200.57 0.22 0.91 0.88 
Every 1 year         10.22 0.31 0.04 1.00 0.40 0.17 
Every 6 months         0.00 1.00 1993.51 1.00 1.52 0.53 
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Table 9.6. Regression models continuation 
Variables Model 5 
 Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 
 RRR P>|z| RRR P>|z| RRR P>|z| 
         
Female 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Male 0.10 0.14 0.01 0.15 0.70 0.31
         
Age 1.03 0.85 0.40 0.07 1.04 0.43 
         
Single/Never married 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Married 3.81 0.50 4175.13 0.20 1.40 0.47 
Divorced 0.00 1.00 808.55 0.34 5.70 0.08 
Widowed 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 5.14 0.15 
Cohabitation/Live-in 0.00 1.00 3.E+07 0.04 0.86 0.86 
         
Permanent 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Spouse 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 5.65 0.29 
Entertainer 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.99 12.52 0.00 
Long-term 0.17 0.15 42.49 0.20 1.02 0.96 
Trainee 1.61 0.89 0.00 1.00 1.01 0.99 
Working 0.00 1.00 0.04 1.00 1.07 0.93 
Student 0.00 1.00 0.01 1.00 0.51 0.57 
Citizen 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 
Overstay 0.00 1.00 1.21 1.00 3.32 0.38 
         
Length of stay in Japan (in years) 0.86 0.71 8.03 0.03 0.74 0.01 
         
Proportion of life spent in Japan (%) 1.01 0.97 0.65 0.12 1.07 0.12 
         
High school 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Tech Voc 0.31 0.30 0.00 0.08 1.10 0.85 
College 0.33 0.28 827.71 0.08 0.50 0.08 
         
To work/look for work 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
To train/study 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.44 0.21 
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To marry/be with spouse 0.57 0.65 0.00 1.00 0.04 0.00 
To be with relatives 1.87 0.74 0.05 0.54 0.64 0.52 
Tour 0.04 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 
         
No work experience 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
With work experience 7.95 0.27 0.00 0.04 2.66 0.07 
         
Only strong ties 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Only weak ties 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.15 0.13 
Combination 0.02 0.00 0.29 0.82 0.62 0.46 
         
Has no savings in home country 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Has savings in home and host countries 13.28 0.17 300.37 0.27 0.50 0.34 
Has savings only in home country 4.48 0.41 0.00 0.28 1.24 0.76 
         
Does not send remittance 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Sends remittance irregularly 0.09 0.21 0.00 0.05 4.10 0.06 
Sends remittances regularly 0.03 0.09 0.00 0.07 1.57 0.55 
         
Does not travel to home country 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Irregularly travels 1.13 0.95 20.99 0.46 0.40 0.06 
Every 2 years 10.12 0.34 219.81 0.23 0.87 0.82 
Every 1 year 10.22 0.35 0.04 1.00 0.39 0.16 
Every 6 months 0.00 1.00 3217.33 1.00 1.52 0.53 
         
Plan to stay permanently 0.90 0.93 1.27 0.95 0.63 0.37 
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Annex II: Some anecdotes from some key informants 
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Mr. A (Interview conducted on September 23, 2016) 
Mr. A came to Japan as a dependent. He is in his 50s. His relatives were already in Japan and 
since that time in the Philippines jobs were hard to come by he decided to give it a go and came 
as a dependent. He started doing work on his own, working in many construction sites. He now 
holds a permanent resident visa and has since sponsored the arrival of his children. He likes 
living in Japan but he did say that the country is not for him. He speaks average Japanese but he 
said he could not really speak formal Japanese as it is hard. Like many others, he finds it hard to 
read kanji. He is doing many short-term contractual jobs in construction and is currently very 
active in organizations that try to help improve the plight of Filipinos. He plans to eventually retire 
to the Philippines since he already had a house built there.  
  
 
Mr. B (Interview conducted on September 24, 2016) 
Mr. B came to Japan as a student under the Monbukagakusho Japanese Government 
scholarship in his late 20s. He finished his graduate studies and is now working as a lecturer in 
one of the universities in Nagoya City. He had to go back to the Philippines after graduating as 
finding a job in Japan was tough. Eventually he found his current job in Nagoya City while looking 
for jobs online. The place where he currently works helped him secure his working visa. He is 
active in voluntary associations for Filipino migrants. He said the pay is good where he works but 
he plans to find other opportunities in some other country in the future. Even though he is a 
professional and considered high-skilled, he claims to not be able to speak a word of Japanese 
and does not plan to study the language anytime soon. 
 
 
Ms. C. (Interview conducted November 5, 2016) 
Ms. C came as a professional. She has been in Japan for almost 20 years. She is now in her 40s. 
She started working in Japan after she graduated from the Philippines and secured a degree in 
Engineering. She decided to accept the job offer that she came across while job hunting and 
decided to move to Nagoya City. Since then her family has also moved to Japan and she is 
currently very active in many organizations that are trying to help address the hardships that 
come with being a foreigner. She would like to go back to the Philippines one day and help her 
family.  
 
 
Ms. D (Interview conducted September 24, 2016) 
Ms. D came as a spouse of a Japanese National. Right after finishing university, she secured a 
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job as a company staff. But before she began working she decided to travel to Japan to marry 
her current spouse. Her reason, according to her, was very personal. She had a Filipino 
boyfriend before she left for Japan, however she found out that her boyfriend has been cheating 
on her. After breaking up with her boyfriend, she was introduced by a friend to her current 
husband. Thinking that she would want to get back at her boyfriend for cheating on her by 
marrying a Japanese, she agreed to the proposal and flew to Japan. She currently has one 
daughter with her husband. She still lives with her husband even though she did say their 
relationship is not in the best circumstances and that she has already found a boyfriend who 
lives in Manila and plans to also migrate to Japan. When asked what led to the demise of their 
relationship, she said that there really was no such thing as love from the very beginning and 
little disagreements related to housekeeping and raising their child started to accumulate. One 
example that she cited was their disagreement on using baby powder for their daughter when 
she was still a baby, a practice so common in the Philippines that her husband did not like. 
 
 
Ms. E (Interview conducted during September 24, 2016) 
Ms. E came as an entertainer during the first waves of entertainers coming into Japan. She has 
been in Japan for almost 20 years. She is currently married and is a housewife to a Japanese 
National. She said that when she first came as an entertainer things were very hard and very 
strict. She used to live in a dormitory that is assigned to them and the only times that she can go 
out of the dormitory is when she has to work in the club or when she needs to buy something 
from the convenience store. She said that compared to many entertainers now and compared to 
permanent residents working as entertainers they had a hard time trying to adjust, to move to 
different clubs which provide better salaries and just to live in general. She used to move back 
and forth from the Philippines to Japan every six months because of the nature of her contract. 
But then she met her husband and decided to get married and settle in Nagoya City. 
 
 
Mrs. F (Interview conducted during September 24, 2016) 
Mrs. F is a a retiree living in Nagoya City. She first came to Japan because she was petitioned by 
some relatives. She is so old she can barely hear my questions and she could not remember 
clearly the jobs she did when she was younger though she did say she did a number of odd jobs. 
She likes living in Japan as her pension is good and she does not need to pay anything. She did 
say she would not want to go back to the Philippines as she considers Japan her current home.   
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Ms. G (Interview conducted February 2, 2017) 
Ms. G applied as a talent in promoting agency and came to Japan as an entertainer. She found it 
easy to adjust in Japan because she came to Japan in a group of ten people. She has also 
received help from other Filipinos who had been here already for a long time. She is currently 
busy with work, with her elementary school-age child and feel contented in Japan. She does not 
attend meetings and that was tough because there were many things that she could not read. 
She wanted to live permanently in Japan if ever but is hesitant that when she grows old she will 
not have enough money to survive. Her nenkin or pension she would use for the Philippines. She 
 they are untrue. She has many 
acquaintances but she does not have any close Japanese friends. She could not say whether 
she has felt discriminated because she does not really care. She just felt sometimes that she is 
 or 
after the yen, and this is especially true for those working in Sakae. But in general, the image of 
Filipinos in Japan is hardworking.  
 
 
Mrs. H (Interview conducted February 5, 2016) 
Mrs. H is one of the few entrepreneurial Filipinos that I met. She is in her mid-40s. She owns a 
restaurant along the Sakae Entertainment District. She said she came to Japan to work and then 
she met her Japanese husband. After a couple of years, they decided to open up the restaurant 
where her husband works as a cashier and she the cook. The restaurant is a carinderia-type of 
restaurant where you get one serving of rice and two types of viands that you can point to among 
the pots and pans displayed on the counter. She said the restaurant serves as a place where 
Filipinos meet and many Filipinos working in the pubs along Sakae come by to have dinner 
before starting their shifts.   
 
 
Ms. I (Interview conducted February 2, 2017) 
Ms. I is currently working as an entertainer in Japan. She is in her mid-40s. She was previously 
working as a sales lady in one of the department stores in Manila when her cousins encouraged 
her to go to Japan to find work and to find a Japanese husband. She said she liked it in Japan 
and if given a chance she would want to live her permanently if she finds a Japanese husband, 
otherwise she will go back to the Philippines and go to her hometown in Cavite, a province in the 
Greater Manila area. She said that the key to living a good life in Japan is just to follow rules. She 
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pays taxes, sees the result of her taxes in good public transportation systems, good public 
services delivery and so she has no reason to complain. The only problem is homesickness. But 
she says she has lots of Filipino friends, especially where she works since the Mama-san or the 
head mistress of the club is also a Filipino.  
 
 
Ms. J (Interview conducted February 2, 2017) 
Ms. J is currently married to a Japanese friend. She first came to Japan as an entertainer but she 
keeps this as a secret because when she was working as a talent, she used her youngest 
met shoukai  or introduction. Including her previous experience as an 
entertainer she has spent 17 years in Japan, but she does not want to include that so she 
declares that she has been here 14 years, removing the time she has been here as an 
entertainer. Her main reason for coming to Japan was to get married. She had a hard time 
adjusting in Japan because of language, the way of life. She said that as of now she does not 
experience big problems in interacting with Japanese. She actually experiences problems in 
interacting with other Filipinos. She said that she plans to spend her entire life in Japan because 
she does not have anyone back in the Philippines. She finds it hard and sad but her family is in 
Japan so she does not really want to go back in the Philippines. She also looks forward to getting 
her nenkin or pension. She actually feels more at home with Japanese than with other Filipinos. 
She said she has more Japanese friends than Filipino friends and if she has big problems she 
feels like she will run to her Japanese friends more than her Filipino friends. She said the reason 
is because if she tells her problems to a Filipino it will immediately spread as gossip in the 
Filipino community. She also does not want to go back to the Philippines because she does not 
have any more family there. And she said that her remaining relatives in the Philippines are only 
nice to her when she has money.  
 
 
Ms. K (Interview conducted February 3, 2017) 
Ms. K is one seven siblings who decided to move to Manila to work to be able to help her family. 
As with most of the interviewees, she is in her early 40s. In Manila, she met her promoter who 
helped her move to Japan. She said that her main purpose of moving to Japan is earn more 
money to be able to support her family and to be able to find a foreign husband. According to her 
living in Japan is easy she gets jobs easily though the jobs are for short-time. She is currently 
working in a factory packing bentou. She said that the many problems she encounters in Japan 
is sadness and longing for her family. She said that while Japanese people are nice, she still 
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finds it easier to communicate with Filipinos and has more Filipino friends than Japanese. Even if 
she has already married a Japanese man and has started a life in Japan, she still hopes one day 
to be able to retire in the Philippines as Japan is a very sad place because she feels so far apart 
from her family and relatives.  
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Appendix: The Survey Instrument 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 




































